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Abstract
The world relies heavily on industrial voluntary consensus standards to serve public
interests through the development of uniform and harmonized social and economic
procedures. The research problem focused on generating suggestions for improving
collaborative practices between U.S.-based accredited and unaccredited standards
development organizations that create voluntary consensus standards. The research
centered on assessing the level of consensus among experts regarding what actions may
be conducive to improving collaborative practices through the lenses of stakeholder and
institutional theory. This modified 3-round qualitative Delphi study began with openended questions in Round 1 and progressed towards consensus in Rounds 2 and 3 using
close-ended questions. The results encompassed consensus on 12 actions for preserving
the historically deliberative and inclusive democratic U.S. voluntary consensus standards
process spanning 6 categories: competition, deregulation, oversight, organizational
structure, leadership training, and market-driven. The most notable of the 12 actions was
an increase in internal and external liaison functions between standards development
organizations and more participation on the part of industry and trade groups. This was
the 1st study to apply the construct of consensus to the generation of actions focused on
reducing the rise of an exclusive and nondemocratic voluntary consensus standards
process and preserving a historically deliberative and inclusive democratic process.
Incorporating the suggestions identified in this study may lead to positive social change
by improving collaborative practices between standards development organizations and
preserving the legitimacy of this important social function.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Voluntary consensus standards created by standards development organizations
(SDOs) serve public interests by establishing uniform and harmonized social and
economic procedures. In industrial manufacturing environments, voluntary consensus
standards serve public interests by promoting uniform and harmonized
occupational/consumer safety and quality control procedures (Timmermans & Epstein,
2010). When industrial voluntary consensus standards do not exist, are ignored, or are in
conflict, the uniformity and harmonization of occupational/consumer safety and quality
control procedures are at risk (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson, Rasche, & Seidl,
2012; Ernst, 2013; Reinecke, Manning, & Hagen, 2012).
The United States has historically been a global leader in the development of
industrial voluntary consensus standards through accredited industrial SDOs (Behr &
Diaz, 2014; Ernst, 2013; Hopper, 2013). Per the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), the only congressionally approved U.S. industrial standards setting organization
(SSO), there are currently over 240 accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs operating
under the auspices of ANSI
(http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/domestic_programs/overview.aspx?menuid=3).
Accredited industrial SDOs are generally composed of professionals (often engineers)
with specific skills. Typical accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs are incorporated as
nonprofit organizations but are increasingly considered hybrid organizations because of
funding generation activities. Accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs fund their activities
through membership fees, professional publication fees, certification fees, and fees
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generated by selling standards. Most professionals participate on a voluntary basis, with
financial support for travel and other participation related expenses being provided by the
volunteers’ employers. The goal of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs is to develop
normative guidelines that promote uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer
safety and quality control procedures designed to serve public interests by establishing
agreed upon industrial voluntary consensus standards (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Ponte &
Cheyns, 2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Industrial voluntary consensus standards
can include designs (e.g., automotive seat belts), the meaning of terminology (e.g., should
versus shall), performance specifications (e.g., interference between electrical devices),
and operating procedures (e.g., hospital sterilization protocols).
Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there has been an increase in the
number of unaccredited industrial SDOs participating in development, adoption, and
diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards, particularly in the United States
(Ernst, 2013; Rindt & Mouzas, 2015). This increase in the number of unaccredited
industrial SDOs is thought to be a direct result of deregulation (Coates, 2015; Wijen,
2014) and has created challenges for leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs
and unaccredited industrial SDOs who now often find their organizations in competition
(a struggle for legitimacy). Competition of this nature threatens to reduce the legitimacy
of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and industrial voluntary consensus standards in
general by creating conflicts between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs (Osula
& Ng, 2014). The challenge is of particular importance in the United States because of
the unique U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to voluntary consensus standards
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development, adoption, and diffusion (Strauss, 2013) and that accredited U.S.-based
industrial SDOs must adhere to ANSI essential requirements that do not apply to
unaccredited industrial SDOs (Hopper, 2013). Collaboration rather than competition
with unaccredited industrial SDOs might ultimately be a less contentious approach to
developing and establishing uniform and harmonized industrial voluntary consensus
standards for all stakeholders. If leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs are not prepared to collaborate with each other, there is the
risk of turning the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process into a political
and economic conflict as accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs fight for
legitimacy (Fransen, 2011). Such conflicts could potentially endanger public interests by
threatening the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus process that has historically focused
on the collaborative establishment of uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer
safety and quality control procedures through a deliberative and inclusive democratic
process (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
Chapter 1 includes the background and statement of the problem associated with
the increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs. The purpose and
significance of this qualitative modified three-round Delphi study was to discover how
leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may
improve collaborative practices to preserve the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary
consensus standards process and better serve public interests. Chapter 1 also includes the
research question and subquestions, nature of the study (research design), conceptual
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framework that supports the study, definitions, assumptions, scope, delimitations,
limitations, and chapter summary.
Background of the Study
Standards development was originally a relatively informal process on the part of
the scientific community to establish common practices. Establishing common practices
would then allow scientists to reproduce experiments conducted by others (Sandholtz,
2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). By the early 1900s, and based on early scientific
community successes, some organizations that would become the model for today’s
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs were beginning to form. The U.S. government
legitimized standardization efforts during WWI, partially as a cost saving method but
also driven by safety and quality concerns (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Yates &
Murphy, 2015). Another well-known SDO, the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), was the result of a collaborative post-WWII United Nations effort
to promote postwar trade through the voluntary coordination of recommended procedures
(Brunsson et al., 2012; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013).
Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, the power of accredited U.S.-based
industrial SDOs has declined significantly as a result of an increase in the number of
unaccredited industrial SDOs (Allen & Ramanna, 2013). This decline in the power of
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and the increase in the number of unaccredited
industrial SDOs is thought to be a direct result of deregulation, which became politically
and economically popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Coates, 2015; Wijen, 2014).
Prior to deregulation, the legitimacy of industrial SDOs and the industrial voluntary
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consensus standards they developed was mostly the result of consensus building through
a deliberative and inclusive democratic process within and between a highly-concentrated
number of accredited industrial SDOs that remained politically and economically neutral
while serving public interests. The net result of deregulation in the United States is that a
process that has historically been politically and economically neutral is being replaced
by a contentious political and economic process whereby accredited and unaccredited
industrial SDOs compete for legitimacy (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Fransen, 2011). The
increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs has led to compromises, power
plays, competing standards, and other conflicts that potentially threaten public interests
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012). Franzen (2011) suggested that political and ideological
differences between interest groups must now be considered a cornerstone of any
discussion regarding industrial voluntary consensus standards. The rationalization
offered by Franzen is that once formed, SDOs in general are reluctant to let go of what is
publicly claimed to have added value and privately perceived to be more about power. If
allowed to continue, many industrial SDOs and the industrial voluntary consensus
standards they create may be reduced to the status of “paper tiger” (Timmermans &
Epstein, 2010, p. 79). Timmermans and Epstein (2010) claimed that the study of
voluntary consensus standards in general is now a sociological concern and needs to be
treated as such.
The U.S. approach to industrial voluntary consensus standards development,
adoption, and diffusion is also unique compared with industrial voluntary consensus
standards processes in other parts of the world (Ernst, 2013; Strauss, 2013). In the United
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States, the industrial voluntary consensus standards process is based upon a marketdriven, bottom-up approach with little if any government oversight or participation. The
market-driven, bottom-up approach makes the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus
standards process for the development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary
consensus standards unique because industrial voluntary consensus standards processes
in other parts of the world are top-down and involve some sort of government oversight
and participation. The U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach creates a situation that is
ideal for the rise of competing interests driven by economic and political motivations.
Another consideration important to this study is the structure of industrial SDOs.
Most industrial SDOs in the United States, although legally established as nonprofit
organizations, are increasingly considered hybrid organizations in that they must deal
with competing institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities (Pache & Santos,
2013). Leaders of accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs may find themselves
facing a situation where there is no single goal (Schröer & Jäger, 2015). Leaders of
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs may find the situation particularly challenging
because the very nature of being accredited means an accredited organization subscribes
to a business model that places mission and vision ahead of profit and discourages over
representation by parties with vested interests (Farrell & Simcoe, 2012). Unaccredited
industrial SDOs are not constrained in the same way, allowing leaders of unaccredited
industrial SDOs greater flexibility in selecting a single goal (Gadinis, 2014). Leaders of
industrial SDOs often come from a forprofit or nonprofit background (usually forprofit)
and may not be prepared to address the conflicting institutional logics that define a hybrid
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organization’s structure that places the competitive and economic business model of
forprofit activities in conflict with the social, philosophical, and moral business model of
nonprofit activities (Pinho, Rodrigues, & Dibb, 2014). The collaborative component of
leading a hybrid organization may therefore be an underdeveloped skill set of leaders
who come from either a forprofit or nonprofit background (Benner & Pastor, 2015; Osula
& Ng, 2014; Smith, 2014), requiring accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs to
more carefully select and train their leaders (Walston, 2014). The net result is that
leadership of hybrid organizations such as accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs may represent “an extreme leadership challenge” (Battilana
& Lee, 2014, p. 422). Pache and Santos (2013) suggested that what makes leaders able to
deal with the competing institutional logics of hybrid organizations represents a gap in
general leadership studies.
The overarching research literature gap that currently exists, and the focus of this
study, is a lack of specific strategies for how leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial
SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may improve collaborative practices to reduce
conflicts that threaten the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards
process (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Fransen, 2011;
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). The current study is needed because even though the
public is generally unaware of how the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards
process works (Ashley, 2015; Gadinis, 2014), the public represents a large group of
stakeholders who are greatly affected by industrial voluntary consensus standards
(Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). A functional approach to the development, adoption,
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and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards is critical to protecting public
interests and promoting positive social change by maintaining a deliberative and
inclusive democratic process that supports the legitimacy of industrial SDOs and the
U.S.industrial voluntary consensus standards process (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et
al., 2012; Hopper, 2013; Olshan, 1993; Sandholtz, 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010;
Yates & Murphy, 2015).
Problem Statement
In industrial manufacturing environments, voluntary consensus standards serve
public interests by promoting uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer safety and
quality control procedures (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). When industrial voluntary
consensus standards do not exist, are ignored, or are in conflict, uniformity and
harmonization of occupational/consumer safety and quality control procedures are at risk
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Ernst, 2013; Reinecke et al., 2012).
The general problem is that regulatory and collaborative efforts to develop uniform and
harmonized industrial voluntary consensus standards to serve public interests are under
threat caused by an increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs (Allen &
Ramanna, 2013; Yates & Murphy, 2015). The rise of unaccredited industrial SDOs is
thought to be a direct result of deregulation, which became politically and economically
popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Coates, 2015; Wijen, 2014). Prior to
deregulation, the legitimacy of industrial voluntary consensus standards was established
among a highly concentrated number of organizations that remained politically and
economically neutral while serving public interests by creating a win-win environment.
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In the postderegulation environment, accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs
increasingly compete with one another, creating conflicts that threaten public interests by
creating a win-lose environment (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Fransen, 2011).
The specific problem is that leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs are unprepared to collaborate with each other (Krug,
Rabczuk, & Cenian, 2015; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). Leaders of accredited U.S.-based
industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs need to improve collaborative
practices to serve public interests and promote positive social change by reducing
conflicts between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs (Fransen, 2011; Ponte &
Cheyns, 2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative modified three-round Delphi study was to discover
what consensus could be built among a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding
desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial
SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improved collaborative practices
and better serve public interests.
Research Question
Overarching Research Question: What is the level of consensus among a panel of
SMEs regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve
collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
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Subquestion (SQ) 1: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs
regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions regarding competition that
leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs
may take to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
SQ 2: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable
and feasible future-oriented actions in deregulation that leaders of accredited U.S.based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve
collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
SQ 3: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable
and feasible future-oriented actions in oversite that leaders of accredited U.S.-based
industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve
collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
SQ 4: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable
and feasible future-oriented actions in organizational structure that leaders of
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
SQ 5: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable
and feasible future-oriented actions in leadership training that leaders of accredited
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve
collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
SQ 6: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable
and feasible future-oriented actions in market-driven standards that leaders of
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accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
Conceptual Framework
The development of this study drew on institutional theory and stakeholder theory
to explore the institutional mechanisms by which industrial voluntary consensus
standards are developed, adopted, and diffused and the tensions that exist between
significant stakeholders. Institutional theory and stakeholder theory assisted in exploring
the challenges leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited
industrial SDOs must confront in the face of increasing conflict caused by competition
(See Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework.
The Figure 1 conceptual framework describes all the various aspects reviewed in
this study. Six themes were derived from the literature as depicted in Figure 1 and
formed the basis for this study.
The process of acceptance and convergence of industrial voluntary consensus
standards by potential adopters typically follows a path that includes development,
adoption, and diffusion (Slager, Gond, & Moon, 2012). The ultimate goal in the case of
industrial SDOs is that voluntary consensus standards developed by industrial SDOs will
become legitimate through acceptance by industry, government, society, SSOs, and other
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SDOs (Stranieri, Cavaliere, & Banterle, 2015). Industrial voluntary consensus standards,
perceived as legitimate, enhance perceptions of legitimacy of the SDOs that developed
them (Stranieri et al., 2015). Stakeholders affected by industrial voluntary consensus
standards and the U.S. voluntary consensus standards process often have different value
systems, cultures, and agendas (Eskerod & Huemann, 2013). Competing interests
between industrial SDOs, regulatory bodies, end users, or even between members who
are part of a given SDO tend to make the development, adoption, and diffusion of
industrial voluntary consensus standards a time consuming, costly, and politically and
economically contentious process (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). Depending on the mix of
stakeholders potentially affected by a specific industrial voluntary consensus standard,
the environment can be dynamic and confrontational with political and economic agendas
within and between stakeholder groups changing over time (Verbeke & Tung, 2013).
Institutional Theory
Institutional theory was appropriate for this study because institutional theory
deals with what, why, how, and when ideas are adopted and diffused (Brunsson et al.,
2012; Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Suddaby, 2010). These concepts are an important part
of how industrial voluntary consensus standards processes work (Simpson, Power, &
Klassen, 2012). The primary concept behind institutional theory involves a tendency
towards convergence through normative, coercive, and mimetic institutional pressure
(Brunsson et al., 2012; Suddaby, 2010). Convergence is often described using the terms
isomorphism or homogeneity. According to institutional theory, organizations tend to
resemble one another over time (institutional isomorphism) through the use of similar
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practices driven by institutional pressures (Zorn, Flanagin, & Shoham, 2011). Gadinis
(2014) suggested that convergence brought about by normative institutional pressure
(normative institutional isomorphism) is generally most compatible with the deliberative
and inclusive democratic process employed by accredited industrial SDOs. Competition
between SDOs can also increase institutional pressure (Fernando, Ng, & Walters, 2015),
but competition tends to result in convergence driven by coercive institutional pressure
(coercive institutional isomorphism) or mimetic institutional pressure (mimetic
institutional isomorphism) because of power imbalances (Gadinis, 2014). Coercive and
mimetic pressures, compared with normative pressures, are generally not as compatible
with a deliberative and inclusive democratic industrial voluntary consensus standards
development process (Gadinis, 2014). Coercive or mimetic behavior is often the form of
institutional isomorphism practiced by unaccredited industrial SDOs whose motives tend
to be more about securing economic and competitive advantages rather than taking a
deliberative and inclusive democratic approach (Gadinis, 2014). In the case of accredited
and unaccredited industrial SDOs, the increase in conflicts in pursuit of legitimacy only
invites more institutional pressure of the coercive and mimetic variety and causes rivalry
between power structures (Rindt & Mouzas, 2015) or encourages “free rider” behavior
(Behr & Diaz, 2014, p. 598). Institutional theory does not necessarily point to a best
approach for dealing with institutional pressures, but the lens of institutional theory can
help explain the tensions created by what has been described as an emerging standards
market (Reinecke et al., 2012). At the heart of any SDO is the SDOs culture, which is
largely determined by leadership behavior. How institutional isomorphism works is then
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of importance to leaders of accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs who should be
striving for all parties to adopt a normative approach in support of a deliberative and
inclusive democratic process.
Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory was appropriate for this study because stakeholder theory
deals with conflicts of interest that may exist between various parties affected by direct or
indirect interactions (Garriga, 2014; Hasnas, 2013; Tullberg, 2013). The development,
adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards involves multiple
stakeholders, each with their own personal and/or group bounded rationalities (Tashman
& Raelin, 2013). The primary or critical stakeholders involved during the development,
adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards tend to be classified
as influencers (Miles, 2012). Influencers can include accredited and unaccredited
industrial SDOs, SSOs, end users (industry), manufactures (suppliers), employees,
legislative bodies, and potentially even the public at large (Tullberg, 2013). Members of
accredited industrial SDOs are often also members of unaccredited industrial SDOs.
Dual participation can complicate identifying stakeholders and determining each
stakeholder’s relative importance and motivations (Tashman & Raelin, 2013). Per Yates
and Murphy (2015), some unaccredited industrial SDOs further complicate the
stakeholder picture by interjecting standards they develop into existing accredited
industrial SDO processes to enhance adoption and diffusion. There is also a leadership
component to stakeholder theory in that several studies placed leaders at the center of the
stakeholder discussion and suggest that it is the responsibility of leaders to identify and
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classify various stakeholders and then identify what each stakeholder considers to be of
value (Garriga, 2014). Parmar et al. (2010) suggested that leaders must also engage
stakeholders from a “two-way” perspective (p. 22) in that leaders must look inward as
well as outward. Since accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs tend to compete in
the same space, stakeholder theory becomes an important lens for trying to understand
the tensions that exist between industrial SDOs and significant stakeholders.
Chapter 2 expands upon the potential roles of institutional theory and stakeholder
theory to better explore the dynamics of industrial voluntary consensus standards
processes, particularly in the United States. Included in Chapter 2 is a discussion of how
deregulation and the unique U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to industrial
voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and diffusion has encouraged an
increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs and presented leaders of
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs with unique
institutional and stakeholder challenges.
Nature of the Study
In this dissertation, I used a qualitative modified three-round Delphi study
designed to discover what consensus could be built among a panel of SMEs from
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented
actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial
SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests.
Qualitative research is consistent with the goal of exploring how leaders of industrial
SDOs approach industrial voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and
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diffusion, and what changes in leadership approach might be conducive to improving
collaborative practices between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs. The
selection of a Delphi design was deemed appropriate because of the desire to compare
expert opinions (Hasson & Keeney, 2011). Gaining insight into the current mindset,
behavior, and qualifications of leaders of industrial SDOs might suggest changes in how
leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs deal
with potential conflicts, and how collaborative practices may be improved between
accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs. Although generally incorporated as
nonprofits, industrial SDOs are increasingly considered hybrid organizations that present
leaders with unique challenges because of the blending of conflicting forprofit and
nonprofit institutional logics (Dimitrios, Sakas, & Vlachos, 2013; Osula & Ng, 2014;
Pache & Santos, 2013; Schröer & Jäger, 2015). Researchers suggested that leaders of
hybrid organizations that come from forprofit or nonprofit backgrounds may be
unprepared to manage the conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit
activities inherent to hybrid organizations (Schröer & Jäger, 2015). Other researchers
suggested studies regarding leadership of hybrid organizations are neglected in favor of
research specifically focused on forprofit organizations, and to a lesser extent on
nonprofit organizations (Smith, 2014). Understanding desirable characteristics of leaders
of hybrid organizations could illuminate potential collaborative practice improvements
(McMurray, Islam, Sarros, & Pirola-Merlo, 2012). Researchers posited that hybrid
organizations may benefit from adopting some forprofit leadership practices because of
the forprofit focus on profit and competition that is increasingly a component of

18
industrial SDOs (Pinho et al., 2014). Researchers also suggested that leaders of hybrid
organizations may need to be specifically selected or trained to do justice to a hybrid
organizations’ unique leadership challenges (Schröer & Jäger, 2015). Exploring these
considerations made a Delphi design appropriate for this study.
For this study, SMEs who qualified as potential expert panel members where
defined as individuals with similar experiences (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014), with a
focus on expertise with accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs. Assuring similar
experiences was accomplished by selecting expert panel members who were currently
active in accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and met a specific set of criteria outlined
in detail in Chapter 3. All questionnaires were sent electronically to expert panel
members using SurveyGizmo. In Round 1 of the study, semistructured open-ended
research questions were sent to the expert panel members. The questions were based
upon the outcome of the literature review in which six themes related to management
practices were identified as being critical for improving collaborative practices. The
expert panel members responded to the questions by identifying actions for improving
collaborative practices that exemplify each management practice. Based on word
frequency and interpretation of responses using traditional text analysis (Bright &
O’Connor, 2007), a series of closed-ended questions for each theme was created. In
Rounds 2 and 3, a Likert-type approach was applied to each question and descriptive
statistics were used to evaluate the ratings expert panel members provided for enabling
the evaluation of consensus for each question.
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Analysis of the data from Round 1 focused on looking for subthemes and
considering which subthemes and resulting questions under the six major themes
demonstrated a level of consensus or not in Rounds 2 and 3. The ultimate goal was to
analyze the data in a way that answered the primary research question (Laick, 2012;
Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007) and to suggest topics for future research (Asselin &
Harper, 2014).
Definitions of Terms
Throughout the dissertation, the follow definitions are used:
American National Standards Institute (ANSI): A congressionally authorized
accrediting organization responsible for representing the United States in the
development of international consensus standards and managing the U.S. standards
development organization accreditation process (Hopper, 2013).
Bounded rationality: A concept whereby individual and/or organizational sensemaking and rational decision-making abilities are constrained (Tashman & Raelin, 2013).
Delphi design: A research technique used to understand group behavior by
interviewing subject matter experts in the area of focus (Davidson, 2013).
Forprofit organization: An organization specifically formed to generate profit for
the organization and for selected stakeholders (shareholders) (Cooper, Santora, & Sarros,
2011).
Hybrid organization: An organization that incorporates competing institutional
logics of both forprofit and nonprofit organizations (Pache & Santos, 2013).
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Institutional theory: A theoretical approach to understanding organizational
behavior through a social lens rather than just an economic lens (Suddaby, 2015).
Isomorphism: A similarity of the processes or structures between organizations
representing a trend towards convergence or homogeneity (Zorn et al., 2011).
Knowledge experts: Individuals with specific or unique knowledge regarding an
area of interest. Knowledge experts in industrial settings tend to be those with specific
technical or scientific skills (Sandholtz, 2012).
Nonprofit organization: An organization whose mission is primarily one of social
responsibility and philanthropic values (Cooper et al., 2011).
Servant leadership: A theory of leadership that is marked by a leaders concern for
others and a desire to help others grow (Cooper et al., 2011).
Stakeholder theory: A theoretical approach for connecting ethics and strategy that
creates value for a broad group of stakeholders (Harrison & Wicks, 2013).
Standard development organizations (SDOs): Organizations whose primary
responsibility is to develop voluntary consensus standards (Behr & Diaz, 2014).
Standards setting organizations (SSOs): Organizations whose primary function is
to review standards developed by SDOs and to establish criteria for SDOs that wish to
become accredited (Behr & Diaz, 2014).
Subject matter experts (SMEs): Individuals with specific or unique competence in
the subject of interest (Hopper, 2013).
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Systems theory: A group of specific propositions that when brought together can
aid in the understanding of complex systems, especially those that operate on a long-term
basis (Adams, Hester, Bradley, Meyers, & Keating, 2014).
Transactional leadership: A theory of leadership that is marked by leaders
motivating followers through a system of reward and punishment (McMurray et al.,
2012).
Transcendent leadership: A theory of leadership that is marked by a leaders
concern for followers that takes into account the motivation and empowerment of others
(Shiva & Suar, 2010, p. 118).
Transformational leadership: A theory of change leadership that is marked by
relationship-oriented and inspirational behavior (Bordia, Restubog, Jimmieson, & Irmer,
2011).
Voluntary consensus standards: Nonlegally binding standards created by
deliberation of interested parties who attempt to reach consensus and a balance of
interests through respectful dialogue between members of a development committee
(Yates & Murphy, 2015).
Assumptions
This Delphi design relied on input from a panel made up of SMEs with me (the
researcher) playing an integral role in soliciting input and analyzing data. This study was
based on nine assumptions regarding expert panel members and my role. The first
assumption was that the established criteria did qualify an individual as a SME. The
second assumption was that individuals who agreed to become expert panel members met
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the established criteria of being a SME regarding industrial voluntary consensus
standards processes, especially from a U.S. perspective. The third assumption was that
expert panel members would provide thoughtful and truthful answers to questionnaire
questions and statements. The forth assumption was that expert panel members were
familiar with the function of accredited SDOs and at least anecdotally familiar with the
function of unaccredited industrial SDOs. The fifth assumption was that expert panel
members understood the development, adoption, and diffusion processes by which
standards become legitimized. The sixth assumption was that expert panel members
tended to represent the attitudes of the larger body of SMEs familiar with the U.S.
process. The seventh assumption was that expert panel members had no ulterior political
and/or economic motivations for participating in this study. The eighth assumption was
that definitions of consensus and data analysis supported claims of rigor and infused this
study and the study results with “a quality of undeniability” (Miles, Huberman, &
Saldana, 2014, p. 4). The ninth assumption was that my personal biases would not
adversely impact input or analysis.
Scope and Delimitations
The scope of the study was accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs and the discovery of how a panel composed of SMEs
familiar with industrial SDO processes could build consensus regarding desirable and
feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better
serve public interests. Per studies discovered during the literature review, accredited
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U.S.-based industrial SDOs in particular could be facing challenges from several
quarters. These included challenges directly from unaccredited industrial SDOs,
legislation that could either be too restrictive or not restrictive enough, the SSO (ANSI)
that oversees the industrial SDO accreditation process in the United States, the U.S.
market-driven, bottom-up approach to voluntary consensus standards development,
adoption and diffusion, and leaders themselves who may be unprepared to manage
industrial SDOs.
The delimitations were established boundaries within the study (Leedy &
Ormrod, 2010). One delimitation was having a purposive sample. In this qualitative
modified three-round Delphi study, the purposive sample included SMEs from accredited
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and did not include SMEs from only unaccredited industrial
SDOs.
Per the literature reviews, a lack of collaboration between accredited and
unaccredited industrial SDOs is the primary threat to SDO legitimacy and the legitimacy
of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process. Leaders of accredited U.S.based industrial SDOs are constrained by the accreditation requirements to which their
organizations subscribe. Such constraints generally do not apply to leaders of
unaccredited industrial SDOs. The pool from which SMEs were recruited to participate
as expert panel members were comprised of selected ANSI accredited SDOs. ANSI is
the only congressionally approved U.S. SSO authorized to represent the United States on
international industrial voluntary consensus standards matters and manage the U.S. SDO
accreditation process. Selected SDOs were sent a request to extend the invitation to
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participate as an expert panel member to their respective volunteer membership bases, or,
potential expert panel members were contacted directly by me. Expert panel members
drawn from this pool of SMEs were expected to represent a competent source of opinion
regarding challenges faced by leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs. Another delimitation was that I was only looking at two
theories, institutional theory and stakeholder theory. These theories were selected
because they came up most frequently during the voluntary consensus standards literature
reviews. Institutional theory was of interest to explore what types of institutional
isomorphism resulted from the current competition between accredited and unaccredited
industrial SDOs, what types of institutional isomorphism would be desirable, how to
achieve desirable institutional isomorphic behavior, and what impediments may exist that
interfere with desirable institutional isomorphism. Stakeholder theory was of interest to
explore how stakeholders with similar or different agendas were affected by industrial
voluntary consensus standards and could be managed in ways that promoted
collaboration that did not significantly favor or disenfranchise specific stakeholders.
Limitations
The primary limitations were time, cost, communication, fatigue, panel member
dropout, attracting potential expert panel members, selecting expert panel members
(uncritical adoption), and biases. Accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and their
volunteer members tend to be geographically dispersed. This presented a problem
regarding travel time and cost. My contact and subsequent communication with potential
SMEs during the expert panel member attraction and selection process was conducted by
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electronic means. While a relatively efficient and cost effective way to communicate,
there was the inevitable loss of visual and audio cues that could increase the possibility of
not getting appropriate or sufficient expert panel members prior to starting the study or a
failure to communicate between expert panel members and me during the study.
Another aspect of time that was a potential limitation was how long each expert
panel member took to complete each questionnaire and resulting fatigue that might drive
expert panel members towards a central selection tendency. Related to the central
selection tendency limitation were dropout limitations. Birko, Dove, and Özdemir (2015)
suggested designing questionnaires that took no more than 30 to 45 minutes to complete
as a defense against a tendency towards central selection and dropout.
Attracting qualified expert panel members was a limitation from the perspective
of who volunteered. Presenting a compelling reason to participate hopefully mitigated
the potential for attracting expert panel members who were not committed to the study.
Selecting qualified expert panel members (avoiding uncritical adoption) represented
another potential limitation. Uncritical adoption occurs when one takes an individuals’
claim of expertise at face value (Rowe & Wright, 2011). I had little choice but to accept
potential expert panel member claims that they were SMEs. Presenting a simple but
concise list of qualifications that accurately defined the desired skill sets hopefully
mitigated this limitation.
Biases of expert panel members were also a potential limitation. I had little
control or even awareness of expert panel member biases. The biases I was most
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concerned with involved nonobjective mindsets on the part of panel members. Biases
could adversely affect the objectivity of self-reporting.
Significance of the Study
Industrial voluntary consensus standards are an important way in which the world
communicates on a local and international level (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). The
development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards
contributes to positive social change by serving public interests through the establishment
of uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer safety and quality control procedures.
When industrial voluntary consensus standards do not exist, are ignored, or are in
conflict, the uniformity and harmonization of occupational/consumer safety and quality
control procedures are at risk (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Ernst,
2013; Reinecke et al., 2012). From an industrial perspective, most industrial voluntary
consensus standards have historically been created by accredited industrial SDOs through
established processes designed to provide equal (democratic) representation (Yates &
Murphy, 2015). These types of industrial voluntary consensus standards have often been
referred to as soft law (Wijen, 2014). As suggested by Reinecke et al. (2012), the recent
and uncoordinated proliferation of industrial voluntary consensus standards has created a
standards market that threatens the legitimacy of industrial SDOs and the legitimacy of
industrial voluntary consensus standards processes. This threat needed to be explored
because society relies on industrial voluntary consensus standards to clarify designs,
terminologies, performance, and procedures (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
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This study was significant for several reasons. First, there is the importance of
exploring the political and economic aspects of modern industrial voluntary consensus
standards processes so that what is an increasingly competitive and crowded field of
participants can work together to serve public interests. The increase in competition
between accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs in
particular could be leading to conflicts that are not politically and economically neutral,
and threaten public interests (Fransen, 2011). From a political perspective, the effects of
deregulation in the United States (Coates, 2015; Wijen, 2014) made this study significant
because deregulation has resulted in a situation where there is increasingly little if any
legislative oversight regarding the creation of industrial SDOs. Any U.S. state or
industry consortium can create an SDO, and seeking improvements in collaborative
practices with unaccredited industrial SDOs may be a moot point without reengagement
on the part of legislative bodies (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al.,
2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). From an economic perspective, unaccredited
industrial SDOs are often motivated by business related objectives (Reinecke et al.,
2012). Business related objectives tend to be about regulating private markets and are at
odds with historical industrial voluntary consensus standards processes that have favored
a deliberative and inclusive democratic approach. As suggested by Ponte and Cheyns
(2013), the moral responsibility of industrial SDOs to serve public interests primarily by
promoting uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer safety and quality control
procedures is in danger of being replaced by political and economic motivations that
placed special interests ahead of public interests. Researchers claimed the development,
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adoption, and diffusion of voluntary consensus standards in general is now a sociological
concern that demands greater research to understand how the processes are changing and
potentially affecting all stakeholders (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012;
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
Second, there was a need to understand how industrial SDOs work from a
leadership perspective. Most industrial SDOs, although legally established as nonprofits,
are increasingly considered hybrid organizations in that they must deal with the
conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit organizations (Pache & Santos,
2013). Leaders of accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs may find themselves
facing a situation where there is no single goal (Schröer & Jäger, 2015). Leaders of
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs may find the situation particularly challenging
because the very nature of being accredited means an accredited organization subscribes
to a business model that places mission and vision ahead of profit and prevents over
representation by parties with vested interests (Farrell & Simcoe, 2012). Unaccredited
industrial SDOs are not constrained in the same way, allowing leaders of unaccredited
industrial SDOs greater flexibility in selecting a single goal (Gadinis, 2014). Leaders of
industrial SDOs often come from a forprofit background and may be unprepared to deal
with the conflicting institution logics that are inherent to hybrid organizations (Pinho et
al., 2014). The collaborative component of leading a hybrid organization may be an
underdeveloped skill set of leaders who come from a forprofit background (Benner &
Pastor, 2015; Osula & Ng, 2014), requiring industrial SDOs to more carefully select and
train their leaders (Walston, 2014). The net result is that leadership of hybrid
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organizations such as accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs may represent “an
extreme leadership challenge” (Battilana & Lee, 2014, p. 422). Pache and Santos (2013)
suggested that what makes leaders able to deal with the conflicting institutional logics of
hybrid organizations represented a gap in leadership studies.
Third, the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process is unique in that
the U.S. process is based on a market-driven, bottom-up approach instead of the more
top-down approach employed by regions outside of the United States, (Ernst, 2013). The
U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach has served the U.S. industrial voluntary
consensus standards process well for many years, but with changes brought about by
deregulation and globalization, the market-driven, bottom-up approach may be facing
challenges. Researchers suggested that the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach was
part of the reason that U.S. industrial SDOs are losing legitimacy compared with their
non-U.S. counterparts (Kaplan & Kinderman, 2015: Lampland & Star, 2009). The loss
of legitimacy poses a problem not only for leaders of industrial SDOs, but for U.S.
governmental organizations who have been hesitant to interfere in the industrial
voluntary consensus standards process as long as the market-driven, bottom-up approach
appeared to be working (Krug et al., 2015). When industrial SDOs begin to compete,
some researchers suggested that a robust oversight process led by governmental
organizations may be a necessary part of the solution (Makiya & Fraisse, 2015). Olshan
(1993) claimed that the power to set premise by the private rather than the public sector
in the United States is a battle that was won by the private sector. However, since
deregulation, the private sector approach has resulted in a contentious and political
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process that only seems to be getting worse. As a result, the development, adoption, and
diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards in the United States are increasingly
contested and fought over (Vogel, 2010). The net result is recent concern that the U.S.
market-driven, bottom-up approach to industrial voluntary consensus standards
development, adoption, and diffusion may not be able to survive without increased
government involvement (Coates, 2015).
Significance to Practice
Improvements to practice in the United States could come from three directions.
First is the potential need for leaders of industrial SDOs to be properly selected and
trained so that they can be better prepared to deal with the conflicting forprofit and
nonprofit institutional logics that are inherent to hybrid organizations (Smith, 2014).
Second is the possibility that increased government intervention may be deemed
necessary in order to maintain the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus
standards process (Hopper, 2012; Vogel, 2010). Third is the need for greater
collaboration between various stakeholders in order to reduce conflict (Ashley, 2015;
Brenner & Pastor, 2015).
Significance to Theory
Institutional theory and stakeholder theory have long been used as lenses to view
the behavior of forprofit organizations (Hasnas, 2013; Modell, 2012). However, there
has been less research into how institutional theory and stakeholder theory apply to
nonprofit organizations and even less research into how institutional theory and
stakeholder theory apply to hybrid organizations (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Hasnas,
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2013). This study has the potential to expand the use of institutional theory and
stakeholder theory beyond the forprofit and nonprofit sectors and discover new and
potentially unique ways that institutional theory and stakeholder theory can be used to
understand and guide the behavior of industrial SDOs from both an internal and external
perspective. Leadership theory (although not a focus of this research) might also benefit
from this study because leadership research in hybrid organizations has been relatively
overlooked in favor of leadership research in forprofit sectors and to a lesser extend in
nonprofit sectors (Brown & Yoshioka, 2003; Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Cho & Perry, 2012;
Goldkind, 2015; Lazurko, Miller, & Ghoneim, 2014).
Significance to Social Change
There are four implications for positive social change because of this study. First,
this study could result in improvements to collaborative practices in industrial voluntary
consensus standards development, adoption, and diffusion that “help to ensure the quality
and safety of production processes, products, and services” (Ernst, 2013, p. 9). These
potential improvements would be primarily focused on how accredited and unaccredited
industrial SDOs share the industrial voluntary consensus standards landscape, and how
other stakeholders participate in developing, adopting, and diffusing industrial voluntary
consensus standards. Second, the results of this study could aid in the development of
more effective oversight of the industrial voluntary consensus standards process (Hopper,
2013). Improving oversite practices could help reduce conflicts, resulting in more robust
and legitimate industrial voluntary consensus standards (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
Third, the results of this study could help the public gain a greater understanding of
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industrial voluntary consensus standards processes and remove some of the mystery often
referred to as the black box that surrounds industrial voluntary consensus standards
(Gadinis, 2014; Slager et al., 2012). A greater understanding of industrial voluntary
consensus standards processes might encourage more participation on the part of the
public in crafting industrial voluntary consensus standards. Finally, the results of this
study could support positive social change by strengthening the claim that industrial
voluntary consensus standards and industrial voluntary consensus standards processes
should be treated as a sociological concern and not as processes that are simply technical,
political, or economic (Fransen, 2011; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
Summary and Transition
In Chapter 1, I addressed the challenges faced by accredited U.S.-based industrial
SDOs and their leaders brought about by an increase in the number of unaccredited
industrial SDOs. I also addressed the importance of how industrial voluntary consensus
standards support public interests by promoting uniform and harmonized
occupational/consumer safety and quality control procedures. I described the role of
institutional theory and stakeholder theory as a lens through which industrial voluntary
consensus standards processes and the role of SDOs could be explored. I also described
the potentially unique role leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs could play in improving collaborative practices.
Considering the importance of industrial voluntary consensus standards regarding
commerce, social order, and supporting public interests, gaining an understanding into
how the processes work and are potentially changing is of importance to all stakeholders
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(Behr & Diaz, 2014; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Fransen, 2011;
Reinecke et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). I also discussed potential study
limitations and steps taken to mitigate these limitations.
In Chapter 2, I provide literature reviews of historical and current industrial
voluntary consensus standards development processes and the changing roles of SDOs.
The literature review includes selected studies focused on institutional theory and
stakeholder theory as lenses for understanding how industrial voluntary consensus
standard processes work and the potential role of SDOs. I also include literature reviews
of leadership in specific types of organizations and the unique role that leaders of
accredited industrial SDOs play in supporting functioning industrial voluntary consensus
standards processes. The literature review also touches on the claims made by some
researchers that the processes by which industrial voluntary consensus standards are
developed, adopted, and diffused are now a sociological concern and should be treated as
such (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Fransen, 2011; Timmermans &
Epstein, 2010).
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The general problem is that regulatory and collaborative efforts to develop
uniform and harmonized industrial voluntary consensus standards that serve public
interests are under threat caused by an increase in the number of unaccredited industrial
standards development organizations (SDOs) (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Yates &
Murphy, 2015). The specific problem is that leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial
SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs are unprepared to collaborate effectively with
each other (Krug et al., 2015; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). The purpose of this qualitative
modified three-round Delphi study was to discover what consensus could be built among
a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented
actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial
SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests.
Major sections of Chapter 2 include the literature search strategy, conceptual framework,
the general literature review, and summary.
The gap in current literature was a lack of research into how leaders of accredited
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs could improve
collaborative practices. This gap raised questions regarding how leaders of industrial
SDOs can work with significant stakeholders to encourage more effective collaboration
in order to reduce conflicts that threaten public interests (Fransen, 2011; Ponte & Cheyns,
2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
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Literature Search Strategy
The primary sources for the literature review were scholarly peer reviewed
journal articles. The topics of the literature were voluntary consensus standards, SDOs,
tensions that exist between competing interests, leadership challenges based on
organizational structure, institutional theory, stakeholder theory, and Delphi design
considerations. Literature sources came from databases available from Walden
University, Google Scholar, and the University of Nevada Reno. Key words used for the
literature review searches included voluntary consensus standards, standards
development, leadership, hybrid organizations, institutional theory, stakeholder theory,
deregulation, and collaboration.
For the literature review, I started by examining the general role of voluntary
consensus standards in society. I was primarily interested in industrial voluntary
consensus standards and how industrial voluntary consensus standards are incorporated
into the fabric of society. I then turned my attention to the history of industrial voluntary
consensus standards and the unique U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to industrial
voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and diffusion. I next focused on
industrial voluntary consensus standards processed today, primarily from a U.S.
perspective. This section includes a more detailed review of the conflicts that have
developed between accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial
SDOs, and how the increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs in the United
States is affecting a voluntary consensus standards process that has historically followed
a deliberative and inclusive democratic approach. During the review of literature related

36
to voluntary consensus standards, references to institutional theory and stakeholder
theory were constant features as researchers sought to understand and explain tensions.
Subsequently, part of the literature review strategy included literature relating to
institutional theory and stakeholder theory. I had initially anticipated adding system
theory to the literature review, and although there were several references to voluntary
consensus standards systems or systems that included voluntary consensus standards
(Behr & Diaz, 2014; Delmas & Montiel, 2008; Ernst, 2013; Krug et al., 2015), I did not
find any references to systems theory. Finally, I addressed literature on leadership
challenges based on organizational type (nonprofit, forprofit, and hybrid). My primary
focus was on hybrid organizations (the most common U.S. industrial SDO type). What
became apparent as the literature review progressed was that in the United States, the
increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs since the 1970s and 1980s has
increased conflicts between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs, presenting
leaders of industrial SDOs with unique challenges.
There was no shortage of literature regarding the tensions involved in the
development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards. There
was also no shortage of literature regarding the increase in conflicts between industrial
SDOs driven primarily by the increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs.
The literature review revealed five major topics of interest. First, today’s industrial
voluntary consensus standards are ubiquitous, but the processes by which they are
developed, adopted, and diffused are considered black boxes (Behr & Diaz, 2014;
Lampland & Star, 2009; Slager et al., 2012). Second, although incorporated as
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nonprofits, the increasingly hybrid nature of industrial SDOs may present a special
challenge to leaders of industrial SDOs because of the need in hybrid organizations to
address the conflicting institutional logics of forprofit versus nonprofit constructs (Pache
& Santos, 2013; Schröer & Jäger, 2015). Third, the unique U.S. market-driven, bottomup approach to industrial voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and
diffusion creates an environment that is ideal for the rise of competing interests between
accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs (Ernst, 2013; Strauss, 2013). Forth, the
industrial voluntary consensus standards development process in the United States may
be facing a problem of legitimacy brought about by the increase in conflicts between
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs. Fifth,
institutional theory and stakeholder theory were the primary lenses used by researchers to
examine the tensions that exist regarding how industrial voluntary consensus standards
are developed, adopted, and diffused, and how industrial SDOs compete for legitimacy.
The overarching gap in the literature was a lack of specific recommendations regarding
actions that could be taken by leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs to reduce conflicts and improve collaborative practices.
Conceptual Framework
Yates and Murphy (2015) stated that voluntary consensus standards processes, in
general, work best when combined with a deliberative and inclusive democratic
approach. In the United States, accredited industrial SDOs must subscribe to a
deliberative and inclusive democratic process that provides a venue for all significant
stakeholders to participate in the industrial voluntary consensus development process. By
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allowing all significant stakeholders to play a role in the development of industrial
voluntary consensus standards, there is an opportunity for buy-in by “multiple others”
(Timmermans & Epstein, 2010, p. 75). Unaccredited industrial SDOs do not have to
subscribe to a deliberative and inclusive democratic process, and voluntary consensus
standards developed by unaccredited industrial SDOs are less a result of consensus
building and more related to an exclusive and preferential process (Behr & Diaz, 2014).
The Value of a Deliberative and Inclusive Democratic Process
Industrial voluntary consensus standards processes that follow a deliberative and
inclusive democratic approach offer a number of benefits. First, industrial voluntary
consensus standards processes that follow a deliberative and inclusive democratic
approach are not driven by the desires of a small group of powerful players whose
motivations are frequently intrinsic in nature, such as increased sales or competitive
advantage (Simpson et al., 2012). Second, a deliberative and inclusive democratic
approach tends to guarantee the processes are open to multiple participants and are not
based on proprietary technology or intellectual property often used to ensure competitive
advantages based on power relationships (Rindt & Mouzas, 2015). Involving multiple
participants tends to reduce the potential for industrial voluntary consensus standards to
be used as a method for excluding certain actors (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). Third,
involving multiple participants also increases the potential for knowledge experts with
potentially opposing views to be part of industrial voluntary consensus standards
processes. Including knowledge experts with potentially opposing views tends to
increase the flexibility of industrial voluntary consensus standards, making standards
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more adaptable for different stakeholders (Sandholtz, 2012; Simpson et al., 2012). Forth,
flexible industrial voluntary consensus standards tend to reduce resistance to normative
institutional isomorphism. Reducing resistance to normative institutional isomorphism
increases the chances of industrial voluntary consensus standards gaining support because
of the appearance of legitimacy of industrial voluntary consensus standards processes, the
legitimacy of industrial SDOs that develop standards, and the ability of adopting
organizations to more effectively harmonize institutional requirements with user
capabilities (van den Ende, van de Kaa, den Uijl, & de Vries, 2012; Simpson et al.,
2012). Fifth, employing a deliberative and inclusive democratic process is likely to
reduce the threat of legislative or regulatory intervention. Industrial voluntary consensus
standards are considered a form of soft-law and tend not to be legally enforceable
(Stranieri et al., 2015; Vogel, 2010). The soft-law aspect is of particular importance to
the U.S. market drive, bottom-up approach where an important component of the
industrial voluntary consensus standards process is to demonstrate that the process works
and there is no need for legislative intervention (Kaplan & Kinderman, 2015; Pirard,
Fishman, Gnych, & Obidzinski, 2015; Vogel, 2010).
Threats
The primary threat to the existing deliberative and inclusive democratic industrial
voluntary consensus standards development process in the United States is the increase in
the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs that are in direct competition with accredited
U.S.-based industrial SDOs (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et
al., 2012; Ernst, 2013; Yates & Murphy, 2015). The increase in the number of
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unaccredited industrial SDOs is thought to be a direct result of deregulation that became
politically and economically popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Coates, 2015;
Wijen, 2014). As a result of deregulation, any state or industry consortium in the United
States can create an SDO (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Timmermans
& Epstein, 2010). In the United States, the threat created by the increase in the number
of unaccredited industrial SDOs has several facets.
First, there is the threat that a process that has historically been politically and
economically neutral is becoming more exclusive and preferential, resulting in an
increase in conflicts between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs. Increases in
conflicts could reduce political and economic neutrality, and threaten public interests
(Fransen, 2011). Second, there is the threat to the legitimacy of accredited industrial
SDOs and the legitimacy of the industrial voluntary consensus standards process (Botzem
& Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012). Third, there is the threat of U.S. legislative
intervention driven by political and economic concerns and potential threats to public
interests (Brunsson et al., 2012; Coates, 2015). Some researchers concluded that reengagement on the part of governmental organizations will be necessary because the
current conflicts between accredited and unaccredited U.S. industrial SDOs may not be
something that can be resolved without legislative intervention (Coates, 2015; Delmas &
Montiel, 2008; Ernst, 2013).
Leaders
Industrial SDOs are typically set up as nonprofit organizations (Anheier & Krlev,
2015; Smith, 2014). However, there is a growing body of research that suggests
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nonprofit organizations like industrial SDOs are actually hybrid organizations because of
their funding generation activities (Pache & Santos, 2013; Schröer & Jäger, 2015).
Hybrid organizations present unique challenges in that leaders of such organizations must
deal with conflicting institutional logics that pit the economic institutional norms of
forprofit organizations against the mission driven institutional norms of nonprofit
organizations. The potential problem is that leaders of industrial SDOs may be
unprepared to deal with conflicting institutional logics due to lack of proper training
(Battilana, Lee, Walker, & Dorsey, 2012; Schröer & Jäger, 2015). Battilana et al. (2012)
suggested that most leaders of hybrid organizations come from forprofit backgrounds.
Lack of proper training may present a special challenge for leaders of industrial SDOs in
that they may only be familiar with the competitive and economic responsibilities of
forprofit organization leaders, and may be unprepared to deal with the politically and
economically neutral functions of nonprofit organizations. Specifically, collaboration
with competitors is not the norm with forprofit organizations (Anheier & Krlev, 2015),
and leaders of industrial SDOs who come from forprofit backgrounds may lack the
necessary collaboration skills. The challenge might not be as great for leaders of
unaccredited SDOs whose organizations are frequently motivated more by forprofit
institutional logics, thereby making unaccredited industrial SDO leaders less prone to
being incompatible with an unaccredited industrial SDOs leadership needs (van den Ende
et al., 2012; Hopper, 2013). The challenge is potentially the same for leaders who come
from a nonprofit background in that they may not be prepared to address the competitive
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and economic responsibilities required of forprofit organizational leadership (Battilana &
Lee, 2014).
The Role of Theory
Institutional theory deals with institutional isomorphism and the mechanisms by
which similar organizations tend to respond to pressure and resemble each other over
time (Modell, 2012, Scott, 2008; Suddaby, 2015; Zorn et al., 2011). The three most
common mechanisms are normative, coercive, and mimetic pressure (Brunsson et al.,
2012; Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Guerreiro, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2012; HerasSaizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013). Some researchers suggested that voluntary consensus
standards development, adoption, and diffusion driven by deliberative and inclusive
democratic processes are most compatible with normative isomorphic pressures (Behr &
Diaz, 2014; Olshan, 1993; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Wijen, 2014). These same researchers
indicated that coercive and mimetic isomorphic pressures are becoming more common
because of an increase in conflicts between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs.
Institutional theory provided a lens by which I expected to gain insight into what a panel
of SMEs believed was the effect of an increase in the number of unaccredited industrial
SDOs on institutional isomorphism, and the role of leaders of industrial SDOs in the
United States to affect institutional isomorphic mechanisms and pressures.
Stakeholder theory deals with how organizations could or should address the
needs and wants of affected stakeholders (Hasnas, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012).
Researchers suggested that one of the first steps that need to be taken is to understand the
motivations of different stakeholders (Eskerod & Huemann, 2013; Tashman & Raelin,
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2013; Tullberg, 2013; Verbeke & Tung, 2013). Stakeholders are not a homogeneous
group, and often have agendas that are not compatible (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014;
Garriga, 2014). Stakeholder agendas also change over time (Verbeke & Tung, 2013).
Stakeholder theory provided a lens by which I expected to gain insight into who a panel
of SMEs considered significant stakeholders, what these SMEs believed are the
stakeholder agendas, and the role of leaders of industrial SDO in the United States to
identify, understand, and work with significant stakeholders.
Figure 2 represents a current view of the tensions that exist between accredited
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs. Traditional SDOs that
have not subscribed to the ANSI essential requirements for accreditation (e.g., the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers) are not included in the unaccredited sector.
Figure 2 is meant to depict the potential conflicts that could or do exist between
accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs as they seek to retain or gain legitimacy.
The overlap between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs represents situations
where a member may be part of either type of SDO, or where there is some form of
interaction between accredited and unaccredited SDOs. The slight overlap between
unaccredited industrial SDOs and ANSI represents ANSI’s attempts to encourage
communication with unaccredited industrial SDOs through an abbreviated process known
as “Publicly Available Specifications” (Yates & Murphy, 2015, p. 32). The challenge for
leaders of industrial SDOs is to reduce the potential conflicts indicated by Figure 2.
Since the central research question deals with future collaborative practices designed to
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reduce the potential conflicts indicated by Figure 2, a qualitative method employing a
Delphi design was used to conduct the study.
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Figure 2. Existing tensions.
Literature Review
The Role and Value of Voluntary Consensus Standards
Voluntary consensus standards contribute greatly to how the world communicates
both locally and internationally (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013;
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Voluntary consensus standards contribute to
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communication primarily by opening discussion and dialog between interested parties
through a deliberative and inclusive democratic process (Allen & Ramanna, 2013). Van
den Ende et al. (2012) referred to this potential for communication through open
discussion and dialog as a form of collective action. Open discussion and dialog can
enhance voluntary consensus standards processes by bringing together a “community of
interest” (Behr & Diaz, 2014, p. 592). Voluntary consensus standards developed,
adopted, and diffused through a deliberative and inclusive democratic process can also
encourage “mutual and non-coercive justifications” (Yates & Murphy, 2015, p. 25).
Communication with the goal of creating voluntary consensus standards has long
benefited society by serving public interests through the establishment of coherent social
order, creating prescriptions for how to behave, and enabling and restraining social
behavior (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Sandholtz, 2012; Yates & Murphy, 2015).
Voluntary consensus standards often represent rules for organizing society (Brunsson et
al., 2012), and voluntary consensus standards often support social and global
convergence (Reinecke et al., 2012). Other benefits to society include the promotion of
innovation, interoperability, uniformity, mutual compatibility, and consistent interface
procedures (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Strauss, 2013). SDOs that
develop voluntary consensus standards can support the process by encouraging adopters
to seek direct or independent auditing and surveillance services that may strengthen the
legitimacy of voluntary consensus standards and the legitimacy of SDOs that create them
(Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013;
Slager et al., 2012). Voluntary consensus standards also act as a form of voluntary
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governance (Brunsson et al., 2012; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013). By acting as a
form of voluntary governance, voluntary consensus standards present opportunities for
adopters to increase perceptions of legitimacy among significant stakeholders by
increasing trust (Fernando et al., 2015; Sandholtz, 2012; Slager et al., 2012; Zorn et al.,
2011). Voluntary consensus standards also provide a level of protection for adopters by
helping to control risk (Rindt & Mouzas, 2015; Ringsberg, 2015; Stranieri et al., 2015;
Vogel, 2010). Risk control occurs by providing adopters with a safe haven for both
producers and users (Hopper, 2013). The greater the perceive legitimacy of voluntary
consensus standards and the SDOs that develop them, the greater the level of risk control
(Brunsson et al., 2012, Fernando et al., 2015; Slager et al., 2012).
Industrial Voluntary Consensus Standards
Industrial voluntary consensus standards help to ensure the quality and safety of
processes, products, and services, and to prevent negative impacts to public health and
the environment (Ernst, 2013; Fernando et al., 2015). In these ways, industrial voluntary
consensus standards can increase trust and perceived legitimacy of organizations, the
products they design, and the institutions that help organize societal and organizational
interactions (Ernst, 2013; Sandholtz, 20120). Botzem and Dobusch (2012) defined
voluntary consensus standards of all types as “detailed rules structuring interaction” (p.
739). When treated as rules, industrial voluntary consensus standards can act as artifacts
of legitimacy that in some cases are accentuated by displaying symbols of the SDOs that
created them (Fernando et al., 2015, Slager et al., 2012; Zorn et al., 2011). Industrial
voluntary consensus standards developed by SDOs with perceived legitimacy can
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encourage neutral participation among interested stakeholders (Farrell & Simcoe, 2012)
and help push the development of formalized and inclusive committees which then
potentially benefits adoption and diffusion (Gadinis, 2014). Industrial voluntary
consensus standards and the SDOs that create them can also educate potential adopters
and significant stakeholders by helping adopters and significant stakeholders “separate
objectives and policy considerations” (Gadinis, 2014, p. 9).
Industrial voluntary consensus standards often provide cost benefits. First, there
is the potential cost benefit to public organizations and governments. Industrial voluntary
consensus standards are often utilized by governments to create codes that reduce the cost
to government and indirectly to taxpayers and organizations (Abrams, 2014; Strauss,
2013). In the United States, the method is called incorporation by reference (IBR).
Incorporation by reference has the advantage of borrowing industrial voluntary consensus
standards that already exist, resulting in codes that are familiar to many stakeholders.
Industrial voluntary consensus standards can also have a cost benefit by keeping
switching costs high (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; van den Ende et al., 2012). At first
glance, keeping switching costs high may seem like a contradiction. But by keeping
switching cost high, some researchers suggested this helps ensure that considerations
such as uniformity and mutual compatibility remain relatively stable (Brunsson et al.,
2012; van den Ende et al., 2012). Industrial voluntary consensus standards can also have
positive economic value by improving efficiency within and between organizations by
establishing common rules (Brunsson et al., 2012; Gadinis, 2014). Industrial voluntary
consensus standard have the potential to improve traceability and reduce fraud, both of
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which can have positive economic impacts (Henrik, 2015). Industrial voluntary
consensus standards are often “nested” in other standards (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010,
p. 71) such as ISO 9001 and 14001. Nesting of standards in what Heras-Saizarbitoria and
Boiral (2013) refer to as Meta-Standards can help harmonize more specific standards
which then improves the potential for supporting uniform and harmonized globalization
through the coordination of interchanges. Industrial voluntary consensus standards can
therefore stimulate trade and reduce obstacles by providing a basis for reducing
information related transaction costs and reduce conflicts that can result from duplication
of effort (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Hopper, 2013; Pirard at al., 2015). Per
Timmermans and Epstein (2010), even if standards do not directly harmonize or
globalize interchanges they can help lead in that direction.
Industrial voluntary consensus standards can also benefit society when
governmental regulations are weak or incompatible. Like governmental regulations that
are supposed to be applicable to a wide segment of society, industrial voluntary
consensus standards are often considers common rules or “rules of the many” (Brunsson
et al., 2012, p. 621). In addition, industrial voluntary consensus standards are generally
considered voluntary rules or soft-law (Brunsson et al., 2012; Perkins & Neumayer,
2009; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Ringsberg, 2015). Soft-laws that result from industrial
voluntary consensus standards can help fill the voids between governmental regulations
and accepted societal norms (Sandholtz, 2012). By using industrial voluntary consensus
standards to fill voids, governments and society may enjoy the benefits of industrial
voluntary consensus standards that are already in place and may be more flexible than
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government created regulations. As a result, industrial voluntary consensus standards
may at times act as viable substitutes for regulations (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010;
Vogel, 2010; Wijen, 2014).
Flexibility tends to be another positive feature of industrial voluntary consensus
standards. Although flexibility may be considered an oxymoron, many researchers
suggested that flexibility is often what makes industrial voluntary consensus standards
strong and desirable (Sandholtz, 2012; Simpson at al., 2012; Slager et al., 2012;
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). By leaving room for flexibility, room is left for
interpretation by various stakeholders, which can then increase opportunities for adoption
and diffusion because adopters are better able to make the standard work within the
confines of their organizations’ existing structure and capabilities (Wijen, 2014).
Flexibility also allows firms to adopt industrial voluntary consensus standards in ways
that better comply with stakeholder concerns and demands (Perkins & Neumayer, 2009).
Industrial voluntary consensus standards are often a viable means to limit
government intervention (Coates, 2015; Delmas & Montiel, 2008; Gadinis, 2014; HerasSaizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Hopper, 2013; Krug et al., 2015; Pirard et al., 2015). The
ability to limit government intervention depends heavily on culture (Ernst, 2013; Strauss,
2013). In China, for example, industrial voluntary consensus standards are typically
developed, adopted, and diffused by the central government (Kim, Lee, Kwak, & Seo,
2014). Using this model, the government is essentially in control of industrial voluntary
consensus standards and industrial voluntary consensus standards have limited effects on
controlling government intervention. At the other extreme is the United States that

50
practices a market-driven, bottom-up approach to industrial voluntary consensus
standards development, adoption, and diffusion. The U.S. government has demonstrated
a willingness to let the free market drive the industrial voluntary consensus standards
process as long as the process works (Krug et al., 2015). The U.S. culture can encourage
collaboration between SDOs because all stakeholders recognize the potential economic
benefits of not inviting regulatory intervention (Ernst, 2013; Krug et al., 2015). Europe
and similar cultures represent a sort of middle ground in that governments participate in
industrial voluntary consensus standards processes, but the SDOs and SSOs tend to be
allowed to drive the processes (Strauss, 2013). Some researchers suggested the European
model may work the best because all stakeholders realize that governments can not only
step in at any time, but since governments are already involved in industrial voluntary
consensus standards processes, governments are better prepared to step in (Ernst, 2013;
Strauss, 2013; Vogel, 2010). In contrast, the same researchers suggested that the China
approach to tightly controlling industrial voluntary consensus standards may be too
restrictive, and the U.S. hands-off approach may result in insufficient oversight and
unfamiliarity with what has traditionally been a deliberative and inclusive democratic
process. For most of the world, when industrial voluntary consensus standards processes
work, there is reduced incentive on the part of governments to interfere (Ponte & Cheyns,
2013).
Finally, industrial voluntary consensus standards can help empower significant
stakeholders. The first way in which industrial voluntary consensus standards can help
empower significant stakeholders is by providing tools outside of state systems (Vogel,
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2010). Although not legally binding unless codified, if an industrial voluntary consensus
standard has been generally adopted, just the act of adoption may establish a precedent
that can be used to bring attention to perceived problems. The second way industrial
voluntary consensus standards can help empower significant stakeholders is that
industrial voluntary consensus standards can be used as a threat (Makiya & Fraisse,
2015). When industrial voluntary consensus standards are used as a threat, the threat
usually comes in the form of coercive pressure to adopt a standard (coercive
isomorphism). The ability to pressure organizations to adopt an industrial voluntary
consensus standard is enhanced when industrial voluntary consensus standards are made
legitimate through the process of adoption and diffusion, giving significant stakeholders a
benchmark with which to gauge performance. Such a benchmark can empower
significant stakeholders to apply pressure to other significant stakeholders to adopt a
standard or face economic penalties. The most common economic penalty usually comes
in the form of one party refusing to do business with another party unless an industrial
voluntary consensus standard is adopted (Olshan, 1993). Sandholtz (2012) suggested that
once an industrial voluntary consensus standard is perceived as being sufficiently
legitimate, the potential for economic penalties tends to drive adoption and diffusion
through processes that are more normative and mimetic, and less coercive.
The History of Industrial Voluntary Consensus Standards
Industrial voluntary consensus standards are a relatively recent phenomenon with
beginnings in the late 1800s as a way for the scientific community to communicate in a
consistent manner (Brunsson et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). As a result of
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the industrial revolution, knowledge experts (often engineers) had begun to create
societies of like experts in an effort to share experiences. Industries had also become
interested in these early societies because many processes were still based on the
craftsmanship mentality and few interoperability standards were available to help guide
how processes could be harmonized (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Interchangeability
of parts was, for example, a relatively new concept as parts produced individually were
just beginning to be replaced by parts manufactured on an industrial scale. So the sheer
volume of components being manufactured was one of the driving forces behind the need
for stakeholders to have a common platform or community for exchanging ideas
(Brunsson et al., 2012). Governments at the time were also playing an important role
because modern industries were in their infancy and governments often represented the
only central power for organizing societal behavior. Prior to the industrial revolution,
voluntary consensus standards were mostly civil interactions (Vogel, 2010). Voluntary
consensus standards of the civil variety had been in existence for hundreds if not
thousands of years and were used to govern activities like commerce and other forms of
trade. Industrial voluntary consensus standards were a relatively new phenomenon
driven by the rise in manufacturing activities, and the need for manufacturers and the
scientific and engineering communities that supported manufacturing to be able to
communicate using a common language (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Organizations
frequently had nowhere else to turn but to legislative bodies in order to have a central
authority that could coordinate standard development and setting activities. Part of this
turn to legislative bodies was also the result of resistance to involvement by firms. The
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rationale was that technical standards should be the domain of technical experts, not firms
(Yates & Murphy, 2015). Only later would the development of industrial voluntary
consensus standards become a more deliberative and inclusive democratic process (Yates
& Murphy, 2015). Complexity and scale of manufacturing activities and the number of
products produced were also increasing rapidly, and in many cases the lack of standards
produced devastating results. Pressure vessels such as boilers were a prime example of
the problems that could occur as the result of a lack of standardization. The failure of
such devices in the early 20th century because of a lack of standardization in construction
frequently had catastrophic consequences that often resulted in significant loss of
property and life (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Industrial voluntary consensus
standards were seen as a way to establish directives and norms (Sandholtz, 2012) so that
industrial firms could produce goods that were “comparable in their key aspects”
(Brunsson et al., 2012, p. 614). Consequently, in the early days of industrial voluntary
consensus standards, there was rarely a focus on industrial voluntary consensus standards
from an organizational perspective, but rather from a functional perspective (Brunsson et
al., 2012).
One of the first major standardization projects was ordered by the U.S.
government during World War I (WWI) as the result of numerous boiler explosions
aboard ships that had resulted from the lack of pressure vessel standards (Timmermans &
Epstein, 2010). This task fell to an organization that would eventually become the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), a currently accredited U.S.-based
industrial SDO. During the early part of the 20th century, the United States played a
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major role in industrial voluntary consensus standards development along with the United
Kingdom and Europe because the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe were
often the leaders at the time in large-scale manufacturing and technical innovation
(Brunsson et al., 2012; Lampland & Star, 2009; Olshan, 1993). Public pressure was also
starting to play a significant role in the development of industrial voluntary consensus
standards (Ernst, 2013). The public not only wanted consistency in the products they
used but concerns about an increasing number of catastrophic events was creating alarm
that essentially forced governments to act. It is important to point out that although
public pressure often provided a driving force behind the development of early industrial
voluntary consensus standards, the general public was frequently uninformed regarding
how industrial voluntary consensus standards processes actually worked (Lampland &
Star, 2009). During WWII, there were numerous situations where lack of standards
created problems for allied forces because items as simple as nuts and bolts were not
standardized between various forces (Yates & Murphy, 2015). After WWII, the United
Nations expanded upon the concept of institutionalized standards development and
created the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) whose purpose was to
encourage commerce through the establishment of international standards that focused on
everything from units of measure to manufacturing norms (Timmermans & Epstein,
2010). In the case of industrial voluntary consensus standards, the processes were based
on the premise that “technical evidence and argument encourages mutual and noncoercive justification” (Yates & Murphy, 2015, p. 25).
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After WWII, industrial voluntary consensus standards processes tended to take
different directions depending on the country and culture. In the United States, there was
a clear battle forming between two competing interest groups, the National Bureau of
Standards (now the National Institute of Standards and Technology or NIST) and the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI). ANSI, formed in 1918, was originally
intended to coordinate the activities of the National Bureau of Standards and other
organizations, but not necessarily have direct control. The battle was primarily one of
hard-law (regulation) versus soft-law (voluntary consensus standards), and who would
address which aspects of hard-law or soft-law (van den Ende et al., 2012). The battle was
also between governance of standards (Ernst, 2013). The United States never established
a centralized authority for creating and enforcing industrial voluntary consensus
standards, instead learning to rely on the free-market approach to sort out which
standards would dominate (Ernst, 2013). The argument made by proponents of little
government involvement or intervention was that the free-market approach promoted
innovation and suggested an optimistic approach where economic pressures would lead
to convergence (Fransen, 2011). This optimistic approach was that organizations were
considered logical and altruistic, therefore supporting the convergence argument. The
pessimistic view was that a free-market approach would only encourage organizations to
support whatever was in their best interests (Fransen, 2011). The pessimistic approach
was essentially the opposite of the optimistic approach in that organizations were
considered logical but self-serving, therefore supporting the best interests argument
(Fransen, 2011). Over time, the power to set premise for how industrial voluntary
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consensus standards should be developed in the United States was successfully claimed
by the private sector and led by ANSI (Olshan, 1993). The Nation Bureau of Standards
became specifically responsible for helping the U.S. government establish regulations
such as those used by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OHSA) and
government procurement activities. Per Ernst (2013), ANSI recently argued in 2009 that
there was no reason to change the U.S. approach because the market-driven, bottom-up
system worked well. This argument was predicated based on an increasing call by some
stakeholders for government involvement to address conflicts being caused by growing
standards wars. In 2010, ANSI suggested that convergence of industrial voluntary
consensus standards would be more efficient and involve less conflict if the rest of the
world adopted industrial voluntary consensus standards processes that followed the U.S.
market-driven, bottom-up approach (Ernst, 2013). One of ANSI’s responses to concerns
over the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach has been the establishment of essential
requirements for accredited SDOs which was implemented in 1993 (Hopper, 2013).
However, other researchers suggested that as the result of deregulation that started in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the U.S.-based market-driven, bottom-up approach has
created a more crowded field of SDOs which despite the activities of ANSI to created
essential requirements has promoted competition and conflict based on political and
economic motivations. Reinecke et al. (2012) suggested that the increasing tendencies of
accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs to “sell their brand” (p. 798) in the absence
of oversight should not be an unexpected outcome.
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Industrial Voluntary Consensus Standards Today
Industrial voluntary consensus standards processes have always been contested
and volatile (Behr & Diaz, 2014, Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012;
Hopper, 2013; Howard, Tallontire, Stinger, & Marchant, 2015). Even before
deregulation in the United States and the increase in the number of unaccredited
industrial SDOs, disagreements existed but were addressed through a deliberative and
inclusive democratic process. As mentioned earlier, in 2010 ANSI suggested that
convergence of industrial voluntary consensus standards would be more efficient and
involve less conflict if the rest of the world adopted industrial voluntary consensus
standards processes that followed the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach (Ernst,
2013). However, recent studies have indicated the United States is losing out to Europe
as the dominant industrial voluntary consensus standards driver (Ernst, 2013). If true, the
ANSI contention of 2010 may have been premature, or simply inaccurate due to an
increasing preoccupation among accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs to retain or
gain legitimacy for political or economic reasons (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et al.,
2012; Ernst, 2013; Farrell & Simcoe, 2012; Strauss, 2013; van den Ende et al., 2012).
Some researchers suggested that political and economic considerations are at the heart of
the convergence conflict (Fransen, 2011; Lampland & Star, 2009, Olshan, 1993; Perkins
& Neumayer, 2009; Slager et al., 2012; Stranieri et al., 2015) and are likely to continue
unless specific stakeholders alter their behavior (Gadinis, 2014, Strauss, 2013; Vogel,
2010). One group of researchers suggested that the private authority approach supported
by the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up process has resulted in a trend away from moral
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responsibility and towards a “here-and-now” rationale (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013, p. 471).
Part of this trend away from moral responsibility could also be the result of a lack of any
reason for SDOs to collaborate because of the absence of a credible threat from U.S.
regulatory bodies (Pirard et al., 2015). So while Botzem and Dobusch (2012) suggested
that industrial voluntary consensus standards processes still tend to follow a deliberative
and inclusive democratic approach, they also warned this may be changing towards a
more confrontational, exclusive, and preferential process.
Existing Tensions and Threats to Legitimacy
Today in the United States, there are three major non-state actors involved in the
industrial voluntary consensus standards process, all vying for legitimacy of one form or
another. These three major non-state actors include corporations, industry consortia
(often formed by corporations), and private organizations such as SDOs and SSOs
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012). Industry consortia and private organizations seem to be
playing the leading role in creating tensions between SDOs, the industrial voluntary
consensus standards developed by SDOs, and the resulting battle for legitimacy (Botzem
& Dobusch, 2012). The overarching tension in the battle for legitimacy is the tension
created by competition and conflict between the deliberative and inclusive democratic
process advocated by ANSI and accredited industrial SDOs, and the exclusive and
preferential process advocated by industry consortia and unaccredited industrial SDOs
(Behr & Diaz, 2014, Fransen, 2011; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013, Makiya &
Fraisse, 2015). The battle for legitimacy between accredited and unaccredited industrial
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SDOs is also a battle for market share (Pirard et al, 2015) and is likely to continue under
the current U.S. market-driven, bottom-up system.
The battle for legitimacy in general is being waged using several approaches.
First is the approach of legitimizing industrial voluntary consensus standards themselves
(Behr & Diaz, 2014; Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Fernando et al., 2015; Wijen, 2014, Yates
& Murphy, 2015). Botzem and Dobusch (2012) argued that the legitimacy of industrial
voluntary consensus standards is both a function of input and output legitimacy. From a
functionalist perspective that tends to define industrial voluntary consensus standards (an
engineering or technical approach), output legitimacy (a standards effectiveness) has
become more important than the legitimacy of the input (the need for the standard)
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012). Industrial voluntary consensus standards deemed most
effective are the ones that tend to garner greater perceptions of legitimacy by appealing to
a wide variety of stakeholders (van den Ende et al., 2012). When the output is deemed to
be legitimate, there is also a feedback loop that enhances the perceive legitimacy of the
SDOs that developed the standard (Hopper, 2013).
In addition to using industrial voluntary consensus standards to enhance an SDOs
perceptions of legitimacy, another approach to enhancing perceptions of legitimacy is
through the granting or selling of certificates (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013;
Perkins & Neumayer, 2009). When adopters agree to be certified by industrial SDOs, the
SDOs benefit because the adopter is essentially acknowledging the SDOs legitimacy
(Sandholtz, 2012). An increasingly popular approach for both adopters and industrial
SDOs to advertise certificates is for adopters to display what is effectively a symbolic
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seal of the adopters’ recognition of the industrial SDOs legitimacy (Sandholtz, 2012).
Slager et al. (2012) referred to this approach as encouraging the display of artifacts of
legitimacy. When an adopter displays an artifact of legitimacy, this can have a
snowballing effect, especially if the adopter is well known. Other organizations are
likely to copy well-known adopters through a process known as mimetic institutional
isomorphism (Zorn et al., 2011). If an industrial SDO is already considered legitimate,
adopters that agree to the certification process can increase their own perceptions of
legitimacy by showing affiliation with an already legitimate industrial SDO. One major
criticism of the current certification process is that certification is not only used by SDOs
to increase perceptions of legitimacy, but also used by SDOs to prevent the adoption of
competing standards (Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013;
Howard et al., 2015, Pirard et al., 2015; Reinecke et al., 2012; Stranieri et al., 2015;
Strauss, 2013). This process of preventing adoption through granting or selling
certificates has been referred to as capture (Coates, 2015). Several researchers suggested
this problem has only gotten worse with the increase in the number of unaccredited
industrial SDOs and is likely to continue (Brunsson et al., 2012; Ernst, 2013;
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
Along with issuing certificates, industrial SDOs have also begun to encourage
adopters to submit to auditing processes (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012). Auditing started to
gain popularity in the United States in the 1980s as a direct result of deregulation
(Brunsson et al., 2012; Ernst, 2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Encouraging
adopters to submit to an auditing process has become another way for industrial SDOs to
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increase perceptions of legitimacy. Some organizations like ISO have made auditing a
requirement for an adopter to display or otherwise use ISO’s artifacts of legitimacy
(Boiral & Gendron, 2011). Auditing can also enhance perceptions of an adopters’
legitimacy by demonstrating that adoption of the standard was more than just ceremonial.
Ceremonial adoption occurs when an organization adopts a voluntary consensus standard
primarily for economic or political reasons, but has little intention of actually complying
with the standard (Hopper, 2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Zorn et al., 2011).
Several researchers referred to ceremonial adoption as a form of decoupling (Brunsson et
al., 2012; Sandholtz, 2012; Wijen, 2014). When a voluntary consensus standard is
adopted but decoupled from an organizations business model, the standard becomes
symbolic only (Brunsson et al., 2012; Sandholtz, 2012; Wijen, 2014). Depending on the
perceived legitimacy of an industrial SDO, potential adopters may find themselves not
only compelled to adopt the SDOs industrial voluntary consensus standards, but also
compelled to agree to the SDOs terms of use. This form of coercive or memetic
isomorphism (Makiya & Fraisse, 2015) can be particularly effective if adoption of an
industrial voluntary consensus standard has become a requirement for conducting
business, but also tends to increase ceremonial adoption (Hopper, 2013; Timmermans &
Epstein, 2010; Zorn et al., 2011).
The current overarching criticism of auditing processes in the United States is that
there is little if any oversight of the auditing process, and this lack of oversight
encourages the ceremonial adoption of industrial voluntary consensus standards (Delmas
& Montiel, 2008; Fernando et al., 2015). Several researchers suggested the auditing
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process and the resulting competition between industrial SDOs have become nothing
more than a race to the bottom (Ashley, 2015; Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Henrik, 2015;
Reinecke et al., 2012). Adopters of industrial voluntary consensus standards are also
accused of being complicit in this alleged race to the bottom for two reasons. First,
adopters increasingly do not seem to care how industrial voluntary consensus standards
are developed if the standards are economically and competitively advantageous (Behr &
Diaz, 2014; Fernando et al., 2015). Second, adopters know that supporting perceptions of
legitimacy help keep the U.S. government playing the role of interested observer (Behr &
Diaz, 2014). One group of researchers indicated that the lack of a credible oversight
process favors unaccredited industrial SDOs because unaccredited industrial SDOs are
not bound by the essential requirements ANSI imposes on accredited industrial SDOs
(Yates & Murphy, 2015). Until the U.S. government is able or willing to engage in
oversight of the auditing processes, some researchers suggested the battle for legitimacy
between industrial SDOs is only going to get worse (Krug et al., 2015; Simpson et al.,
2012; Strauss, 2013; Vogel, 2010; Wijen, 2014).
Industrial Voluntary Consensus Standards Flexibility
A related tension in the competition between accredited and unaccredited
industrial SDOs, and part of the legitimacy battle, is that industrial voluntary consensus
standards are becoming less flexible. According to some researchers, flexibility is what
makes industrial voluntary consensus standards valuable by increasing the standards
appeal to a wider range of stakeholders (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Howard et al., 2015;
Simpson et al., 2012; van den Ende et al., 2012). These same researchers suggested that
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part of the explanation for a decrease in industrial voluntary consensus standards
flexibility is an increasing tendency on the part of industrial SDOs to try and block the
adoption of competing standards. Technology has played a large part in the apparent
trend towards decreasing flexibility, in particular, using essential patents (Behr & Diaz,
2014; Delmas & Montiel, 2008; Ernst, 2013; Fransen, 2011; Rindt & Mouzas, 2015).
One of the key components of the ASNI essential requirements document created in 1993
was a specific focus on the fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory availability of patent
licensing and the early and enforced disclosure of essential patents (Ernst, 2013).
Complying with ANSI essential requirements is mandatory for accredited industrial
SDOs. The same constraints do not apply to unaccredited industrial SDOs. Some
researchers suggested that suppliers who are part of industry consortia and unaccredited
industrial SDOs appear to be the biggest threat to the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial
voluntary consensus standards process because there is an unsupervised economic motive
for not sharing essential patents (Gadinis, 2014; Makiya & Fraisse, 2015; van den Ende et
al., 2012).
Knowledge Experts
Knowledge experts have always been a critical participant in the development,
adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards (Brunsson et al.,
2012). Accredited industrial SDOs have historically been national organizations and
knowledge experts helped industrial voluntary consensus standards support public
interests through respectful deliberation that involved a wide range of interested
stakeholders (Yates & Murphy, 2015). Vested interest participants where always
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assumed to be a component of developing industrial voluntary consensus standards, but
the involvement of a wide range of knowledge experts helped to create a balanced
process (Brunsson et al., 2012). The role of knowledge experts, although extremely
important to supporting the legitimacy of industrial voluntary consensus standards, has
largely been overlooked until recently (Sandholtz, 2012). Before deregulation, one
traditional benefit of knowledge expert participation was the willingness of the
government to accept industrial voluntary consensus standards as an alternative to
regulation (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). As an alternative to regulation, industrial
voluntary consensus standards promised adopters expertise without political
entanglements (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Postderegulation, and in the interest of
cost control, the U.S. government increasingly adopted industrial voluntary consensus
standards as code (Abrams, 2014; Straus, 2013) because the legitimacy of industrial
voluntary consensus standards was backed by knowledge experts (Hopper, 2013).
While the participation of knowledge experts has historically been important to
supporting perceptions of industrial voluntary consensus standards legitimacy, the role of
knowledge experts in the United States has changed considerably with the increase in the
number of unaccredited industrial SDOs (Brunsson et al., 2012; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013;
Slager et al., 2012). One change has been the availability of knowledge experts.
Knowledge experts are expensive, especially for long-term participation in developing
industrial voluntary consensus standards (Hopper, 2013). Cost has resulted in an
increasing lack of knowledge expert participation as employers of knowledge experts
have been reluctant to provide financial and logistical support unless there were clear
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economic and political benefits. Globalization has also had an impact as industrial
SDOs, especially accredited industrial SDOs, seek experts with global and/or diverse
credentials (Hopper, 2013; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). At the same time, knowledge experts
are becoming increasingly important in the pursuit of legitimacy by unaccredited
industrial SDOs who can often afford to be more selective and frequently do not need
experts with global or diverse credentials (Brunsson et al., 2012; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013;
Slager et al., 2012).
Unaccredited industrial SDOs, especially those created by industry consortia, tend
to focus on single issues driven by personal interests (Lampland & Star, 2009). As a
result, unaccredited industrial SDOs often seek out knowledge experts with similar vested
interests (Brunsson et al., 2012). This approach to the use of knowledge experts has
created conflict where knowledge experts are increasingly pitted against one another in
the battle for legitimacy (Brunsson et al., 2012; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). Per Ponte and
Cheyns (2013), using knowledge experts in this way lacks “principals of justice” (p. 472).
By selecting specific experts to support personal interests, industrial voluntary consensus
standards are often created in isolation (Sandholtz, 2012). Knowledge experts are also
used increasingly by all types of industrial SDOs to validate field testing claims (Ponte &
Cheyns, 2013) or to convince potential adopters that everyone is already using an
industrial voluntary consensus standard (Lampland & Star, 2009). Lampland and Star
(2009) suggested that the current approach to using knowledge experts to support
industrial voluntary consensus standards has had the net effect of turning knowledge
experts into technical bureaucrats.
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For accredited industrial SDOs, the use of knowledge experts is a necessity (Ponte
& Cheyns, 2013). For unaccredited industrial SDOs, the use of knowledge experts is a
convenience (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). What seems to be a consistent perception is that
all sides need knowledge experts (Hopper, 2013). The question seems to be, in what
capacity.
The Ubiquitous Black Box
Many researchers suggested that voluntary consensus standards processes of all
types are at risk of being dragged in to what has been characterized as an expanding
standards war (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Ernst, 2013; Farrell &
Simcoe, 2012; Pirard et al., 2015). Voluntary consensus standard today have become so
ubiquitous as to have been driven below the level of public awareness, become taken for
granted, and have simply become black boxes (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Fransen 2011;
Lampland & Star, 2009). Today, the inclusive De jure approach to industrial voluntary
consensus standards development, adoption, and diffusion is being replaced by the
personal interest De facto approach (Farrell & Simcoe, 2012). Olshan (1993) recognized
this over two decades ago and suggested that the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach
encouraged by the late 1970’s and early 1980s trend towards deregulation heralded an era
where SDOs were becoming the product of a struggle for organizational power and
survival. The net result per Olshan (1993) has been a procedure for developing an
“unending output of taken-for-granted standardized technologies” (p. 332). Several
groups of researchers suggested that social sciences need to play a greater role in
researching voluntary consensus standards processes (Lampland & Star, 2009; Ponte &
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Cheyns, 2013). Other researchers have gone further and suggested that voluntary
consensus standards are so pervasive and ubiquitous that they have become a sociological
concern that affect all individuals, and need to be treated as such (Botzem & Dobusch,
2012; Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Brunsson et al., 2012; Fransen, 2011; Olshan, 1993;
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
The Role of Theory
Many studies regarding industrial voluntary consensus standards have addressed
the processes behind standards development, adoption, and diffusion (Botzem &
Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Delmas & Montiel, 2008; Heras-Saizarbitoria &
Boiral, 2013; Kaplan & Kinderman, 2015; Krug et al., 2015; Perkins & Neumayer, 2009;
Reinecke et al., 2012; Simpson et al., 2012; Slager et al., 2012; Stranieri et al, 2015; van
den Ende et al., 2012; Vogel, 2010; Wijen, 2014). Frequently, these studies have alluded
to or directly mentioned institutional theory and stakeholder theory to explain the
dynamics involved in the development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary
consensus standards (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Farrell & Simcoe,
2012; Hopper, 2013; Howard et al., 2015; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Reinecke et al., 2012;
Ringsberg, 2015; Simpson et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; van den Ende et
al., 2012). Systems theory (although not mentioned in the voluntary consensus standards
literature and not a focus of this study) may also play a role in future research because the
development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards
represents a complex system that tends to operate on a long-term basis (Adams et al.,
2014; Andretta, 2014; Meadows, 2008; Senge, 2006).
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Institutional Theory
The majority of studies discovered during the literature review considered
institutional theory to play the primary role as the lens through which the tensions
surrounding development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus
standards can be viewed and potentially understood (Brunsson et al., 2012; Fernando et
al., 2015; Fransen, 2011; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Lampland & Star, 2009;
Makiya & Fraisse, 2015; Olshan, 1993; Sandholtz, 2012, Simpson et al., 2012; Slager et
al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Wijen, 2014; Zorn et al., 2011). Repeated
mention of institutional theory informed the decision to include institution theory in this
study.
Modern or neo-institutional theory had beginnings in 1991 as a theory that
organizations strategically responded to organizational pressures. The inclusion of a
strategic response to modern institutional theory replaced the previous view of
institutional theory that organizational responses were essentially reactive and naturally
resulted in organizations resembling each other over time (Suddaby, 2010). Modern
institutional theory did not replace the thought that organizations responded to pressure
and tended to represent each other over time, but modern institutional theory now
suggested the process was also strategic and proactive, and not merely reactive. The
primary approach used by researchers to incorporating institutional theory into the
development, adoption, and diffusion process was through the concept of institutional
isomorphism (Brunsson et al., 2012; Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Olshan, 1993;
Sandholtz, 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
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Some researchers referred to the process of institutional isomorphism as a form of
pressure (Brunsson et al., 2012; Zorn et al., 2011). Isomorphism is generally defined as
“A similarity of the processes or structures between organizations representing a trend
towards convergence or homogeneity” (Zorn et al., 2011, p. 6). Behr and Diaz (2014)
suggested that isomorphic pressures in the world of industrial voluntary consensus
standards development, adoption, and diffusion involved six key incentives that included
(1) advancing standards that promoted economic or business interests, (2) increasing the
ability to gain advanced knowledge of emerging standards, (3) a desire to avoid standards
that might create a competitive disadvantage, (4) gaining of corporate intelligence, (5)
avoiding an influence vacuum, and (6) engendering a sense of individual professionalism.
The types of isomorphic pressures described in industrial voluntary consensus standards
research included normative isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism, and coercive
isomorphism (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Grob & Benn, 2014; Guerreiro et al., 2012;
Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013; Modell, 2012; Scott, 2008: Sandholtz, 2012;
Suddaby, 2010; Suddaby, 2015).
Normative isomorphism. Normative isomorphism is convergence driven by
social or professional norms (Brunsson et al., 2012; Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Grob &
Benn, 2014; Guerreiro et al., 2012). In the realm of industrial voluntary consensus
standards, the general assumption as suggested by Brunsson et al. (2012) is that the
coexistence of multiple industrial voluntary consensus standards is perceived as being
counterproductive, and that convergence of industrial voluntary standards and their
adoption and diffusion will take a normative path that eventually results in consistent or
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normal behavior. Brunsson et al. (2012) also suggested that following the
recommendations made by industrial SDOs represents a normative response to the
adoption and diffusion of standards based on institutionalized practices. Normative
isomorphism tends to represent the most common form of industrial or technical
convergence with early adopters seeking economic benefits, and later adopters seeking to
comply with now established institutional practices in pursuit of legitimacy (Brunsson et
al., 2012; Chandler & Hwang, 2015).
Fransen (2011) suggested that an idealist institutional approach assumes
convergence is logical and will lead to normative adoption, but also suggested an idealist
institutional perspective may be increasingly naive with the rise of economic and political
motivations that have tended to drive convergence in a way that is beneficial to powerful
actors or those organizations with a specific economic and/or political agenda. In support
of this concern, other researchers suggested that the voluntary consensus standards wars
common among commodities such as coffee and timber are now becoming more
common with industrial voluntary consensus standards due to the increase in the number
of unaccredited industrial SDOs and the resulting battle for legitimacy (Botzem &
Dobusch, 2012; Reinecke et al., 2012).
Mimetic isomorphism. Mimetic isomorphism is convergence driven by the
perceived benefits of copying or mimicking the behavior of others. Copying or
mimicking the behavior of other groups has long been an accepted and normal practice
among potential adopters, and can increase perceptions of legitimacy for all stakeholders
(Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Grob & Benn, 2014; Guerreiro et al., 2012). While many
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organizations have embraced standards copied from others for both functional and
legitimacy reasons, some have used mimetic isomorphism as a form of ceremonial or
symbolic adoption strictly in pursuit of legitimacy (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et al.,
2012; Sandholtz, 2012; Zorn et al., 2011). The problem from an industrial SDO
perspective is that many organizations do not seek a standards designation for technical
reasons, but rather for gaining legitimacy in the eyes of significant stakeholders
(Sandholtz, 2012). ISO standards were often referenced by researchers as examples of
voluntary consensus standards adopted for ceremonial or symbolic reasons strictly in
pursuit of perceptions of legitimacy (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et al., 2012;
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Ceremonial or symbolic adoption, or the decoupling of
standards adoption from incorporation into actual practice (Wijen, 20140), has
ramifications for industrial SDOs who increasingly deal with potential adopters who do
not care if an industrial voluntary consensus standard comes from an accredited or
unaccredited SDO (Behr & Diaz, 2014).
The primary ramification is that industrial SDOs are increasingly more interested
in encouraging mimetic isomorphic adoption to enhance their own legitimacy and the
legitimacy of the industrial voluntary consensus standards they develop. Several
researchers suggested that mimetic isomorphic pressures dominate when innovations are
new or there is ambiguity, and then are replaced by normative and coercive isomorphic
pressures as the innovation becomes mainstream (Zorn et al., 2011). As technological
innovations advance at an ever-increasing pace, some unaccredited industrial SDOs have
attempted to take advantage of innovations using proprietary technology or essential
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patents and hope once adopted by a select group of organizations, mimetic isomorphism
will then drive further adoption and increase perceptions of legitimacy (Ernst, 2013).
Coercive isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism is convergence that is essentially
forced either through political and/or economic means (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Grob
& Benn, 2014, Guerreiro et al., 2012). Enforcement of the adoption of industrial
voluntary consensus standards by legislation is one form of coercive isomorphism that
happens when industrial voluntary consensus standards (soft-law) are converted to code
or codified (hard-law) through a process that in the United States is known as inclusion
by reference (IBR) (Abrams, 2014; Ernst, 2013; Ringsberg, 2015; Strauss, 2013). This
form of coercive isomorphism tends to combine both economic and legal pressures. A
more common form of coercive isomorphism regarding industrial voluntary consensus
standards occurs when both formal and informal pressure is exerted on organizations by
other organizations, or by cultural expectations (Grob & Benn, 2014). ISO is an example
of an SDO that has successfully moved from a position of mimetic isomorphism to one of
coercive isomorphism (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). ISO industrial voluntary
consensus standards that were once copied because of mimetic isomorphic pressures are
today frequently adopted because of coercive pressures exerted by other organizations
that carry an implicit or explicit economic threat, usually in the form of loss of business
and loss of legitimacy (Behr & Diaz, 2014). These types of threats tend to be tangible in
that there is a direct cause and effect, but rarely is there an explicit legal threat. Coercive
isomorphic pressure can be the result of current or future threats (Botzem & Dobusch,
2012; Fernando et al., 2015; Wijen, 2014). Liability concerns also represent situations
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where an organization may feel compelled (coerced) to adopt an industrial voluntary
consensus standard to shield themselves against future legal threats (Stranieri et al.,
2015). For industrial SDOs that wish to act in a more aggressive fashion, Vogel (2010)
suggested one approach is for industrial SDOs to harden the functions of their voluntary
consensus standards (soft-law) to raise the specter of certain threats, thereby creating a
coercive effect without changing soft-law into hard-law.
Regardless of the type of isomorphic pressures in play, researchers seem to agree
on two points. First, alignment with goals is what drives development, adoption, and
diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards and alignment of goals is a central
component of institutional theory (Guerreiro et al., 2012). Second, the primary goal
among primary stakeholders is the perception of legitimacy (Heras-Saizarbitoria &
Boiral, 2013; Hopper, 2013; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Reinecke et al., 2012; Sandholtz,
2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Applying institutional theory could help leaders of
industrial SDOs understand current institutional pressures and help them prepare for a
more collaborative future that protects public interests and is conducive to positive social
change (Ernst, 2013; Hopper, 2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
One important criticism of institutional theory is that it tends to be used
increasingly without the inclusion of a temporal factor (Chandler & Hwang, 2015;
Suddaby, 2015). By excluding temporal factors, institutional theory may be used to focus
only on real-time events while selectively ignoring antecedents or potential future
ramifications (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Modell, 2012; Suddaby, 2015). In the case of
industrial voluntary consensus standards, the speed at which technology is advancing
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may explain some of the trend away from temporal considerations in the use of
institutional theory. Convergence of industrial voluntary consensus standards takes time
and is often at odds with a desire to advance new technology or gain a competitive or
economic advantage (Gadinis, 2014; Yates & Murphy, 2015). The result from an
industrial voluntary consensus standards perspective is that institutional theory may
ultimately be relegated to considering only short-term views of institutional pressures
with consideration of long-term consequences tending to fade into the background (Yates
& Murphy, 2015). Potential solutions to the temporal criticism represent a gap in the
literature.
Stakeholder Theory
The majority of studies discovered during the literature review into voluntary
consensus standards made mention of the importance of stakeholders and the role
stakeholders play in the development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary
consensus standards (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Coates, 2015;
Ernst, 2013; Farrell & Simcoe, 2012; Hopper, 2013; Howard et al., 2015; Keenan, 2015;
Krug et al., 2015; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Reinecke et al., 2012; Ringsberg, 2015;
Stranieri et al., 2015; van den Ende et al., 2012). Repeated mention of stakeholders
informed the inclusion of stakeholder theory in this study.
Stakeholder theory first appeared in 1963 to challenge the notion that only
stockholders or shareholders mattered to organizations (Parmar et al., 2010). The core
assumption behind stakeholder theory was that anyone affected by business was a
stakeholder. Stakeholder theory addressed three problems that included how value was
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created and traded, connecting ethics and capitalism, and helping management think
about the first two problems (Parmar et al., 2010). Over time, there have been additional
refinements to stakeholder theory from the perspective of what stakeholder theory is and
is not. Stakeholder theory is not about who and what really counts, an excuse for
management opportunism, concern only with financial distributions, a suggestion that all
stakeholders must receive equal treatment, requires law changes, is a socialist construct,
or a comprehensive moral doctrine (Hasnas, 2013; Parmer et al., 2010). Stakeholder
theory is about procedural justice, fair stakeholder treatment, and a normative construct
based on fairness (Hasnas, 2013; Parmer et al., 2010).
Concerning ethics, Parmar et al. (2010) suggested one cannot discuss business
without discussing ethics. Tullberg (2013) supported the business/ethics link by
suggesting business and moral discourse should be integrated. The same researchers
suggested stakeholder theory is one of the dominant approaches to analyzing and
understanding the obligations of those engaged in business. The underlying assumption
appears to be that regardless of the type of stakeholder, all stakeholders want to be treated
fairly (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014). Another consistent perspective through the lens of
stakeholder theory was that organizations should consider all stakeholders with a valid
claim, not just those with the highest perceived value, and that stakeholder theory must be
applied to all stakeholders regardless of how stakeholder are defined (Hasnas, 2013).
The perception that organizations should consider all stakeholders, and that stakeholder
theory must apply to all is stakeholders is supported by other researchers who suggested
that there is an urgent need to have a more inclusive approach to stakeholders so that all
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organizations become better stewards of society (Laczniak & Murphy, 2012).
Researchers have also suggested that a more inclusive approach can improve
organizational performance while not damaging profits (Laczniak & Murphy, 2012).
This inclusive approach supports a hard form of dealing with stakeholders that looks at
all stakeholders as being important, rather than a soft form of dealing with stakeholders
that pays lip service to some stakeholders by only pretending that all stakeholders are
important. Many stakeholder theory researchers suggested that stakeholders are not
homogeneous, that different stakeholders can have different claims, and that stakeholder
values can and do change over time (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; Garriga, 2014; Hasnas,
2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012).
Current Schools of Stakeholder Theory
Current schools of stakeholder theory tend to classify stakeholder theory into four
categories that include normative, descriptive, instrumental, and managerial (Parmar et
al., 2010). The normative perspective focuses on what managers and/or corporations
should do (Parmar et al, 2010; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Verbeke & Tung, 2013). The
normative perspective includes a focus on the moral or ethical component of business
(Hasnas, 2013). The descriptive perspective focuses on research that factually reports
what organizations do (Parmer et al., 2010; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Verbeke & Tung,
2013). The instrumental perspective focuses on research that explores the outcomes of
specific organizational behavior (Parmer et al., 2010; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Verbeke
& Tung, 2013). The managerial perspective focuses on the needs of practitioners and
research that supports these needs (Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012;
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Tashman & Raelin, 2013). Variations to schools of stakeholder theory do exist, but
always appear to include normative, descriptive, and instrumental perspectives (Hasnas,
2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Verbeke & Tung, 2013).
Of the three schools that all researchers seem to agree upon, the instrumental and
normative schools are deemed most important from two perspectives. The first
perspective deals with what is ultimately most pertinent to supporting stakeholder theory.
Based on this perspective, the school deemed most important is the normative school.
The rationale for suggesting the normative school is most important is the claim that
stakeholder theory is primarily a vehicle for connecting ethics and business (Harrison &
Wicks, 2013). The second perspective deals with what is most often practiced. From the
perspective of practice, the instrumental school is deemed most important (Laczniak &
Murphy, 2012; Tashman & Raelin, 2013). This tends to make sense from an economic
point of view. Regardless of which school is favored, researchers tended to conclude that
normative and instrumental schools can and maybe should coexist in the same space at
the same time (Hasnas, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012; Parmar et al., 2010; Tashman
& Raelin, 2013).
Defining Stakeholders
Miles (2012) pointed out that as of 2011 there were over 435 definitions of
stakeholders, which in his opinion was too many for organizations to manage in any
consistent fashion, and has resulted in frequently contested approaches to defining and
dealing with stakeholders. For example, ISO defines stakeholders as “interested parties”
(Eskerod & Huemann, 2013, p. 43). Eskerod and Huemann (2013) questioned this
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definition because they claimed the ISO definition did not provide much guidance as to
what constituted an interested party. Yates and Murphy (2015) also appeared to take
issue with the interested party definition because they claimed that unaccredited
industrial SDOs tended to define interested parties based on who the SDO though would
support the SDO agenda and excluded interested parties they thought would not support
the SDO agenda. A different and maybe more inclusive definition of stakeholders
suggested by some researchers was anyone who could be affected (Eskerod & Huemann,
2014; Garriga, 2014). One objection to using this definition of stakeholders in the case of
industrial voluntary consensus standards was that society could be defined as a
stakeholder because standards affect everyone either directly or indirectly (Vogel, 2010).
Yet another definition of stakeholders was anyone that had something to offer (Hasnas,
2013). However, per Eskerod and Huemann (2013), all stakeholders have something to
offer. Still other researchers considered anyone who is a customer to be a stakeholder
(Harrison & Wicks, 2013). The problem with this definition is that there is no consistent
definition of what defines a customer, or what a customer brings in the way of value
(Harrison & Wicks, 2013). The problem per Parmar et al, (2010) and Hasnas (2013) with
describing stakeholders as anyone who has anything to offer is that everyone could be
defined as a stakeholder. Miles (2012) suggested that definitions of stakeholders are so
contested that depending on the chosen definition, any person or group could be
considered a stakeholder, “even terrorists” (p. 294). The contested perspective seems to
turn stakeholder theory and what defines a stakeholder into a catchall that can be
whatever one wants it to be. Per Tullberg (2013), stakeholder theory should not be used
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to “weave a basket big enough to hold the world’s misery” (p. 127). Miles (2012)
suggested the best that can be hoped for is working towards a common core. Tullberg
(2013) supported this sentiment and suggested the inability to agree on a definition of
stakeholders is what keeps the debate about stakeholder theory alive, and prevents
stakeholder theory from being properly or consistently implemented. The net result is
that stakeholder theory is in a constant state of flux (Parmar et al., 2010). Parmar et al,
(2010) suggested that until this state of flux is brought under control, confusion would
continue and stakeholder theory would remain at best a framework for deriving other
theories.
One solution to considering everyone a stakeholder was to view stakeholders
based on a stakeholders’ utility (Harrison & Wicks, 2013). The four utilities suggested
by Harrison and Wicks (2013) were based on what a stakeholder had to offer, how a
stakeholder viewed organizational justice, a stakeholders’ affiliation, and opportunity
costs presented by a given stakeholder. By considering stakeholders from a utility
perspective, potential stakeholders with no utility value could be eliminated from
consideration. Another school of thought was to view stakeholders from a capabilities
perspective. While a utilities perspective only considers what a stakeholder could offer, a
capabilities perspective suggested adding consideration of a stakeholders’ opportunity to
act, or what the stakeholder could offer (Garriga, 2014). Considering a stakeholders
capability or potential to provide value may add to the complexity of classifying potential
stakeholders, but adds another dimension that can be used to reduce or at least help
organizations map stakeholders, and only discard those with no utility or capabilities
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value (Garriga, 2014; Laczniak & Murphy, 2014). Garriga (2014) went further and
suggested a utilities approach is a subset of the more overarching capabilities approach
and that viewing stakeholders from a utility perspective should be replaced by a
capabilities perspective.
Another consideration for reducing confusion was to identify stakeholders by
classification (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014). Although Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2104)
suggested that all stakeholders want to be treated fairly, they also stated fairness is
subjective and what appears fair to one stakeholder may not be considered fair by
another. A solution offered by Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2014) was to classify
stakeholders in two ways to help organizations work through issues of fairness. The first
classification included those stakeholders considered to be self-regarding. Self-regarding
stakeholders tend to care only about personal payoff (an intrinsic reward), and definitions
of fair are directly related to definitions of personal payoff. Many unaccredited industrial
SDOs and potential adopters fit this description (Brunsson et al., 2012; Farrell & Simcoe,
2012; Lampland & Star, 2009). The second classification included stakeholders
considered to be reciprocating. Reciprocating stakeholders tend to care about fairness
(intrinsic and extrinsic) and will often punish treatment they consider unfair. Bridoux
and Stoelhorst (2014) conceded that reciprocating stakeholders may present organizations
with a greater challenge because determining what a reciprocating stakeholder defines as
fair can be more challenging than determining what a self-regarding stakeholder defines
as fair. Regardless of the potential difficulties in defining fair, Bridoux and Stoelhorst
(2014) suggested taking an arms-length approach to dealing with stakeholders identified
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as self-regarding, and to be more embracing towards stakeholders identified as
reciprocating.
Another attempt at classifying stakeholders was to sort stakeholders by groups.
Verbeke and Tung (2013) suggested five groups that included suppliers, consumers,
employees, competitors, and government/regulators. The assumption, per Verbeke &
Tung (2013), was that over time the values of each group of stakeholders would change
through isomorphic pressure and become stable. Verbeke and Tung (2013) drew heavily
from institutional theory and suggested that normative isomorphic pressures would reveal
to organizations what values were most important to various stakeholder groups. The
rationale was that although stakeholders are not homogeneous from a motivational
perspective, isomorphic pressures would only increase with time (a temporal
perspective); allowing organizations to detect patterns that could help an organizations’
leaders adjust their approach to different stakeholder groups and also allow time to give
voice to more stakeholders. From an isomorphic perspective, Parmar et al. (2010)
suggested that stakeholder theory and institutional theory were very similar, but the
connection on both sides has largely been ignored. Other researchers supported a
temporal view along similar lines to those proposed by Verbeke and Tung (2013) in that
stakeholder values would change over time, and successful organizations were those that
were aware of the potential for stakeholder value change and could adapt to these
changes (Eskerod & Huemann, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012). Eskerod and
Huemann (2013) considered a temporal view as being representative of stakeholder
management from a for perspective (more inclusive and fair) rather than an of perspective

82
(more superficial and biased). A temporal view was supported by other researchers, but
from the perspective of technology change. With the speed at which technology is
changing, organizations need to be aware of stakeholder temporal constraints (Parmar et
al., 2010; Tashman & Raelin, 2013). This approach was not unlike comments made by
researchers focused on industrial SDO motivations who suggested that one of the reasons
for the increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs was based on the fleeting
temporal relevance of new technology, and the slow speed at which accredited industrial
SDOs tended to move (Gadinis, 2014; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Researchers who
suggested that a temporal aspect was important when dealing with stakeholders agreed
that a temporal perspective was missing from current applications of stakeholder theory
and needed to be included as a future component of stakeholder theory (Eskerod &
Huemann, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012; Parmar et al., 2010; Tashman & Raelin,
2013; Verbeke & Tung, 2013).
Stakeholder Value
An important and original component to stakeholder theory was that stockholders
or shareholders were not the only stakeholders who mattered to organizations, and that
other stakeholders could contribute value (Parmar et al., 2010). This concept of value has
become a central part of stakeholder theory. An early focus was on the value
stakeholders potentially provided for organizations (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014). The
definitions of value have since expanded and now include a suggestion that stakeholders
have value in their own right (Eskerod & Huemann, 2013), and that stakeholders are real
people and not just placeholders (Garriga, 2014). Some researchers also suggested the
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value of stakeholders should not be viewed just from an economic return perspective, but
more holistically (Harrison & Wicks, 2013). Harrison and Wicks (2013) suggested the
economic return focus on value was primarily driven by organizational unwillingness to
deal with non-economic intangibles and was in retrospect, short sighted. Harrison and
Wicks (2013) also suggested that value is a grey area, which continues to cause
disagreement among researchers because of the subjective nature of values (Bridoux &
Stoelhorst, 2014).
Some researchers have claimed that there is a current focus on two few definitions
of value, not too many (Harrison & Wicks, 2013). According to these researchers,
expanding the definitions of value would only enhance the ability to see the potential
value presented by different stakeholders. Other researchers suggested that stakeholder
theory tries to include too many definitions of value and has resulted in stakeholder
theory becoming a dumping ground for any definition of value (Hasnas, 2013).
According to these researchers, reducing definitions of value could help organizations
move away from the concept that everyone is a stakeholder and encourage organizations
to focus on those that should be considered stakeholders (Tullberg, 2013). One point of
agreement among many researcher is that all stakeholders have value, but not necessarily
the same value (Garriga, 2014; Hasnas, 2013; Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Parmar et al.,
2010), and organizations need to spend time understanding stakeholder values. This
perspective is also supported by researcher claims that one of the consistent aspects of
stakeholders is that stakeholders are not homogeneous and have different claims that
must be explored (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; Garriga, 2014; Hasnas, 2013; Laczniak &
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Murphy, 2012). Such exploration would not only help surface different stakeholder
values, but could also lead to the discovery of “intersections of interest” (Garriga, 2014,
p. 495). Several researchers suggested the best way for organizations to understand
stakeholders was not to participate in discussion alone, but to include dialogue (Tashman
& Raelin, 2013; Tullberg, 2013; Verbeke & Tung, 2013). These researchers suggested
that too often organizations and their leaders attempt to interpret stakeholder values from
an arm’s length perspective (discussion), and never actually reach the point of getting to
know stakeholders (dialogue).
Trust
Organizations must also instill a level of trust among stakeholders. Per Harrison
and Wicks (2013), trust is an important aspect of stakeholder theory, but a largely ignored
aspect of actually dealing with stakeholders. As part of building trust, leaders must strive
for consistency in their dealings with stakeholders (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014). Being
consistent does not necessarily mean behaving in the same way. Many researchers
suggested that consistency is more about figuring out which stakeholders one is dealing
with, how stakeholder values may change over time, and modifying relationships that
address differences or potential changes in a consistent fashion (Bridoux & Stoelhorst,
2014; Eskerod & Huemann, 2013; Garriga, 2014; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Verbeke &
Tung, 2013). A suggestion made for building trust with stakeholders was to consider
enlisting the aid of arbitrators (Harrison & Wicks, 2013; Tashman & Raelin, 2013).
Arbitrators could be in the form of private third parties or government affiliated
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arbitrators. Involving arbitrators could help organizations resolve not only external
issues, but also internal issues.
Organizations as Stakeholders
So far, stakeholder theory has been discussed primarily from an external
perspective regarding how organizations might view stakeholders. However, the
literature review also demonstrated that many researchers suggested stakeholder theory
could benefit from a more inclusive perspective. Specifically, that when helping leaders
understand stakeholder value, power, and legitimacy, leaders must also understand the
role they and their own organization play in stakeholder theory (Tashman & Raelin,
2013). Currently when discussing stakeholder theory, organizations tend to be placed at
the hub, with external stakeholders forming the wheel (Laczniak & Murphy, 2012;
Parmar et al., 2010; Tashman & Raelin, 2013; Tullberg, 2013). Researchers suggested
that a large part of understanding stakeholders requires organizations and leaders to
understand themselves (Tashman and Raelin, 2013), which makes organizations a part of
the stakeholder mix (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; Eskerod & Huemann, 2013; Hasnas,
2013; Tullberg, 2013). Per Garriga (2014), the rationale for leaders and their
organizations to consider themselves as stakeholders assumes that external stakeholders
also consider organizations as stakeholders. By inserting themselves into the stakeholder
mix, leaders and their organizations may better understand who is a claimant, and who is
an influencer (Tashman & Raelin, 2013). The point being made by Tashman and Raelin
(2013) is that when organizations and leaders do not include themselves in the
stakeholder mix, they may miss important considerations regarding how an organization
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is seen by external stakeholders and how internal stakeholders can affect the external
stakeholder view. Parmar et al. (2010) were very direct in their suggestion that all
organizations should be moved towards the wheel, and away from the hub of stakeholder
theory. In this way, organizations are less likely to view stakeholders from an
ingroup/outgroup perspective, and realize that their organizations are also stakeholders.
Leadership
Possibly the greatest challenge for leaders of industrial SDOs is the structure of
SDOs (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Pache & Santos, 2013; Schröer & Jäger, 2015). SDOs
are incorporated as nonprofit organizations (Coates, 2015; Strauss, 2013), but a review of
the literature has indicated that looking at any organization incorporated as a nonprofit
from a strictly nonprofit perspective does not present an accurate representation of the
organization or the challenges faced by the organizations leaders. As suggested by Smith
(2014) and Schröer and Jäger (2015), there is almost no such thing as a purely nonprofit
organization because even nonprofit organizations have some financial requirements.
The financial requirements then result in most organizations that are incorporated as
nonprofit organizations acting as hybrid organizations in that they must address the
conflicting logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities. Regarding leadership from an
organizational perspective, there has been abundant research regarding leadership needs
in forprofit organizations, considerably less research regarding leadership needs in
nonprofit organizations, and even less research regarding leadership needs in hybrid
organizations. This lack of research into hybrid organization leadership needs represents
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a gap in the literature regarding specific challenges faced by leaders of hybrid
organizations (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Schröer & Jäger, 2015).
The Nature of Hybrid Organizations and Leadership Challenges
According to researchers, hybrid organizations have existed for some time, but it
is only in the last three decades that hybrid organizations have started to become a
mainstream phenomenon (Battilana et al., 2012). Originally, hybrid organizations were
primarily an outgrowth of nonprofit organizations that needed or wanted to address
forprofit issues in addition to their nonprofit missions, and were often the result of
unintended consequences of organizational development (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Pache
& Santos, 2013). As suggested by some researchers, the increase in the number of hybrid
organizations over the last three decades have become more planned, driven by
increasing concerns about internal governance and management challenges (Anheier &
Krlev, 2015). Other researchers suggested the increase in the number of hybrid
organizations is a result of governments’ abdication of responsibility (Smith, 2014). Still
other researchers suggested the increase in the number of hybrid organizations are the
result of increasing pressure from competition or as a defense mechanism against
regulatory intervention (Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Osula & Ng, 2014). Regardless of the
reasons for the increase in the number of hybrid organizations, Anheier and Krlev (2015)
suggested that hybrids are becoming the norm, with true nonprofit structures fading in
popularity.
The overarching feature of hybrid organizations has been their need to address the
conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities (Anheier & Krlev,
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2015; Osula & Ng, 2014). Battilana et al. (2012) and Benner and Pastor (2015) have
referred to these conflicting institutional logics as a source of friction both internally and
externally. Originally, these conflicting institutional logics were considered a form of
double hybridity, with economic versus mission focus forming the two extremes
(Battilana et al., 2012). Other researchers have used different terms to describe double
hybridity. Anheier & Krlev (2015) and Schröer and Jäger (2014) use the terms private
market (competition) versus civil society (cooperation). Hailey and James (2004) use the
terms competitive versus collaborative. McMurray et al. (2012) used the terms
competitive mission approach versus collaborative mission approach. Battilana et al.
(2012) used the terms market forces versus social forces.
More recently, the term triple hybridity has become popular as legitimacy has
been added to the challenges faced by hybrid organizations that try and balance the
conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities (Anheier & Krlev,
2015). While Anheier and Krlev (2015) suggested the appearance of integrity in pursuit
of legitimacy most accurately described the legitimacy component, other researchers
have simply used the term legitimacy (Battilana et al., 2012; Battilana & Lee, 2014;
Benner & Pastor, 2015; Pache & Santos, 2013; Smith, 2014). Anheier and Krlev (2015)
described the quest for legitimacy as a form of stability, primarily aimed at convincing
stakeholders that dealing with an organization that incorporated forprofit and nonprofit
institutional logics was not a threat to a hybrids’ legitimacy.
Hybrid organizations are a combination of multiple organizational identities and
forms (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Researchers have also described hybrid organizations
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more colorfully as a “locus of disorder” (Battilana & Lee, 2014, p. 398) and “arenas of
contradiction” (Pache & Santos, 2013, p. 972). Pache & Santos (2013) suggested that
hybrids by their very nature are confused constructs because of the challenges of dealing
with different institutional logics. Dealing with different institutional logics makes
hybrid organizations pluralistic, differentiating them from the more unitary structure of
organizations that are strictly focused on forprofit or nonprofit activities (ChadwickCoule, 2011; Pache & Santos, 2013). Battilana et al. (2012) suggested that one of the
first challenges hybrid organizations must face because of their pluralistic constructs is
one of planning. Hybrid organizations are frequently the result of plugging together
unfamiliar activities. Without planning, combining unfamiliar activities can result in
mission drift or goal ambiguity, and consequently leadership ambiguity (Battilana et al.,
2012; Cho & Perry, 2012). The resulting misalignment of mission and goal values can
present a threat to hybrid organizations (Osula & Ng, 2014). Workforce composition can
also be a source of tension because hybrid organizations are generally composed of
individuals steeped in nonprofit or forprofit traditions (Battilana & Lee, 2014). Hybrid
organizations must also deal with a larger and more diverse set of stakeholders (Benner &
Pastor, 2015). A larger and more diverse set of stakeholders translates into a greater need
for leaders of hybrid organizations to be skilled in the art of collaboration across
institutional logics (Hailey & James, 2004; Osula & Ng, 2014; Pinho et al, 2014).
Battilana & Lee (2014) suggested “leadership of hybrids may represent an extreme
leadership challenge” (p. 422).
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A common leadership challenge is the leadership structure of hybrid
organizations. Hybrid organizations, regardless of actual function, are generally
incorporated as nonprofit entities (Battilana & Lee, 2014). As a result, the board of
directors is critical to addressing leadership issues because leadership tends to be more of
a group activity than in organizations incorporated as forprofit entities (Battilana & Lee,
2014; Goldkind, 2015). A specific concern mentioned by several researchers is that the
board (hereafter referred to as leaders) may not be prepared to deal with the competing
institutional logics characteristic of hybrid organizations (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Benner
& Pastor, 2015). Being unprepared to address competing institutional logics could have
several causes. The first and overarching cause is that leaders of hybrid organizations
collectively tend to come from forprofit backgrounds and therefore have little experience
with nonprofit institutional logics (Chadwick-Coule, 2011). Conversely, and of less
concern, is that leaders of hybrid organizations collectively may come from nonprofit
backgrounds and therefore have little experience with forprofit institutional logics
(Dimitrios et al., 2013). A third cause may be the mix of leaders. Depending on the mix
of leader backgrounds, blending leaders who come from nonprofit and forprofit
backgrounds can be a source of tension, resulting in behavior that demonstrates a lack of
competence (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Osula & Ng, 2014). A forth cause may be the
background of the board president. If a president comes from either a nonprofit or
forprofit background, they may favor one approach or the other, resulting in
ingroup/outgroup tensions (Benner & Pastor, 2015). Regardless of the source of tension,
the overarching leadership challenge comes back to how to deal with the conflicting
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institutional logics that result from blending forprofit and nonprofit activities (Anheier &
Krlev, 2015; Battilana et al., 2012; Benner & Pastor, 2015).
In addition to leadership background issues, the literature review into hybrid
organizations revealed several other leadership considerations. First, leaders of hybrid
organizations must look at organizational design in order to understand how conflicting
logics need to be managed (Battilana & Lee, 2014, Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Pache &
Santos, 2013; Walston, 2014)). Understanding how to manage conflicting institutional
logics begins with figuring out what a hybrids’ mission really is (Brown & Yoshioka,
2003). If the leadership approach to dealing with conflicting institutional logics are at
odds with the organizations mission, legitimacy of the organization will be under threat.
This type of mismatch is particularly common when leaders try and force nonprofit and
forprofit structures together (Battilana et al., 2012). Leaders must also be aware of
incentives and what motivates various stakeholders (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Brown &
Yoshioka, 2003; Cho & Perry, 2012). Hybrid organizations tend to deal with a relatively
larger and more diverse group of stakeholders compared with pure forprofit and nonprofit
organizations, making an understanding of different incentives even more important from
a collaboration perspective (Benner & Pastor, 2015). At some point, leaders of hybrid
organizations will have to address stakeholders who adhere to either forprofit or nonprofit
institutional logics, or are themselves hybrid organizations (Anheier & Krlev, 2015). To
address specific institutional logics, leaders must be careful not to compartmentalize
stakeholders, but rather try and integrate stakeholders by understanding the boundary
conditions of each group of stakeholders (Battilana & Lee, 2014). A leader’s ability to
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demonstrate both advocacy and collaborative skills is a necessary leadership skill when
dealing with “diverse constituencies” (Benner & Pastor, 2015, p. 308). As suggested by
Benner and Pastor (2015), hybrid organizations and their leaders are not able to just
ignore or suppress stakeholder that may be seen as problematic. Rather, a mix of
coercion and participation skills are a leadership requirement from an internal and
external perspective for hybrid organizations to address both business and civil situations
(Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Benner & Pastor, 2015). Anheier and Krlev (2015) suggested
that the need to collaborate with diverse stakeholders makes leadership in hybrid
organizations a more adaptive process compared with leadership processes found in
forprofit and nonprofit organizations.
A review of the literature also indicated that researchers tended to suggest
volunteer employees represented a class of internal stakeholder that could present special
leadership challenges. In hybrid organizations, many if not most of the participants, are
volunteers (Bordia et al., 2011). Per Bordia et al. (2011), volunteers tend to want a
greater role in how a hybrid organization functions, tend to be motivated by mission
rather than money, and are not as easily threatened. Several researchers suggested that
getting input from internal stakeholders such as volunteers could be enormously
beneficial to creating a collaborative environment within hybrid organizations (Bordia et
al., 2011; Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Dimitrios et al., 2013; Hailey & James, 2004; Shiva &
Suar, 2010). Another suggestion was to get internal stakeholders to become advocates
for specific solutions (Benner & Pastor, 2015). Regardless of how internal stakeholders
were asked to become engaged, the rationale for enlisting internal stakeholders was that
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getting to know an organizations internal culture was more important for leaders of
hybrid or nonprofit organizations than for leaders of forprofit organizations (Pinho et al.,
2014). Getting to know an organizations’ internal culture may present a special challenge
for leaders who come from forprofit backgrounds because getting to know an
organizations’ internal culture is largely ignored by leaders in forprofit organizations
(Chadwick-Coule, 2011). As suggested by Benner and Pastor (2015), the best leaders of
hybrid organizations were those who can maintain credibility with internal stakeholders
while building ties with external stakeholders.
Although some researchers suggested understanding internal cultures was
important for leaders of hybrid organizations (Bordia et al., 2011; Pinho et al., 2014;
Walston, 2014), other researchers considered dealing with external stakeholders to be a
greater and maybe more important challenge for leaders of hybrid organizations (Anheier
& Krlev, 2015; Benner & Pastor, 2015; Dimitrios et al., 2013; Goldkind, 2015). As
mentioned, hybrid organizations tend to deal with a relatively larger and more diverse
group of stakeholders compared with pure nonprofit and forprofit organizations (Anheier
& Krlev, 2015; Benner & Pastor, 2015). Diverse external stakeholders can present a
special challenge for leaders of hybrid organizations because it is with external
stakeholders that hybrid organizations are most likely to encounter the different
institutional logics of nonprofit and forprofit activities (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Battilana
et al., 2012; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Dimitrios et al., 2013; Pache
& Santos, 2013).
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Overall, researchers tended to suggest that hybrid organizations that were
successful at achieving legitimacy did so because of leaderships’ ability to appropriately
address the blending of conflicting institutional logics of nonprofit and forprofit
activities. (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Battilana et al., 2012; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Benner
& Pastor, 2015, Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Cooper et al., 2011; Dimitrios et al., 2013;
McMurray et al., 2012; Osula & Ng, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2013; Pinho et al., 2014;
Schröer & Jäger, 2015; Smith, 2014). Just how leaders could achieve legitimacy through
blending was more nuanced. Benner and Pastor (2015) suggested success was based on
leaderships’ ability to adjust continuously between conflict and collaboration, and know
when and how to adjust. Benner and Pastor (2015) also described this leadership skill as
the practice of “collaboration during conflict” (p. 308). Pinho et al. (2014) suggested that
leaders of hybrid organizations needed to focus on collaboration through conflict
reduction, and that an important consideration in establishing collaborative practices was
to understand how and why various stakeholders conflict. Vessey, Barrett, Mumford, and
Johnson (2014) suggested the ability to collaborate in hybrid organizations was based on
leaderships’ ability to plan strategically. Other researchers supported this strategic
planning approach by suggesting that employing a strategic rather than operational form
of management would allow leaders of hybrid organizations to be more successful at
addressing multiple stakeholder identities and forms (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; ChadwickCoule, 2011; Dimitrios et al., 2013). Walston (2014) made a more general suggestion
that the solution for leaders of hybrid organizations was to manage better, not lead better.
Finally, Goldkind (2015) and Waters, Burnett, Lamm, & Lucas (2009) suggested that
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leaders in hybrid or nonprofit organizations needed to also focus on utilizing social media
to encourage collaboration, and pointed out that using social media was an under
developed skill set in hybrid and nonprofit organizations.
Leadership Styles
Leadership styles deemed conducive to reducing conflict and increasing
collaboration included transformational, transactional, transcendent, and servant styles
(Benner & Pastor, 2015, Bordia et al., 2011; Cooper & Santora, 2011; McMurray et al.,
2012; Shiva & Suar, 2010). McMurray et al. (2012) suggested blending transactional
(reward and punishment) and transformational (identification of motives and values)
styles, with a transactional style being potentially most appropriate when dealing with
external stakeholders. Benner and Pastor (2015) and Bordia et al. (2011) suggested either
transformational or transcendent styles might be most appropriate depending on the
specific situation. McMurray et al. (2012), Osula and Ng (2014), and Shiva and Suar
(2010) suggested a transformational style was best overall, with Osula and Ng (2014) and
Cooper and Santora (2011) suggesting a servant leadership style may be more appropriate
as the forprofit/nonprofit ratio shifted towards the nonprofit side. Stoker, Grutterink, and
Kolk (2012) suggested the importance of leadership style could be greatly reduced by
focusing on building a high feedback seeking top management team.
Preparing Leaders for Hybrid Situations
Regardless of leadership style, the common thread regarding why leaders in
hybrid organizations seem to face unique challenges came down to leadership
background and training rather than style. From a background perspective, researchers
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suggested that leaders familiar with only forprofit or nonprofit institutional logics were
not qualified to act as leaders of hybrid organizations (Anheier & Krlev, 2015; Battilana
& Lee, 2014; Chadwick-Coule, 2011; Dimitrios et al., 2013). The suggestions for how to
remedy this situation came down to screening and training. Screening of potential
leaders would in theory prevent unqualified individuals from being placed in a hybrid
leadership situation in the first place (Cho & Perry, 2012; Hailey & James, 2004; Osula
& Ng, 2014; Schröer & Jäger, 2015). While screening might be viable as a preventative
measure, training of leaders was considered the best long-term solution (ChadwickCoule, 2011; Cooper & Santora, 2011; Hailey & James, 2004; Lazurko et al., 2014;
Schröer & Jäger, 2015; Smith, 2014; Vessey et al., 2014; Walston, 2014). However, the
same researchers who suggesting training as the best long-term solution were not always
in agreement regarding how training should be approached and when training should
begin. Lazurko et al. (2014) made a firm suggestion that training needs to begin at the
college level. Battilana et al. (2012) were more vague and suggested training potential
leaders when they were young. Hailey and James (2004) suggested early screening was
needed to see if specific individuals were even trainable. The remaining researchers
either suggested that training during the early part of a leader’s tenure was important, or
that more research into hybrid organization leadership challenges might result in better
training programs.
Synthesis
The research question is, “what is the level of consensus among a panel of subject
matter experts (SMEs) regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of
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accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to
improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests?” Based on the literature
review, researchers tended to agree that there are conflicts between accredited and
unaccredited industrial SDOs (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012;
Fransen, 2011; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Conflicts are particularly intense in the
United States because of the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to the
development, adoption, and diffusion of industrial voluntary consensus standards (Ernst,
2013; Strauss, 2013). The literature review also showed that researchers made frequent
reference to institutional isomorphism and stakeholders when exploring and explaining
the tensions that exist in the battle for industrial voluntary consensus standards legitimacy
and accredited and unaccredited industrial SDO legitimacy (Brunsson et al., 2012;
Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Garriga, 2014; Tashman & Raelin, 2013. Regarding
organizational structure, the literature review showed that organizations like accredited
and unaccredited industrial SDOs are hybrid organizations in that they attempt to
incorporate the conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities, and
present a special challenge to leaders (Dimitrios et al., 2013; Osula & Ng, 2014; Pinho et
al., 2014). Researchers suggested that leaders of hybrid organizations like SDOs may be
unprepared to address hybrid organization challenges (McMurray et al., 2012; Schröer &
Jäger, 2015; Smith, 2014). The primary gap in the leadership literature which supports
the importance of this study was that researchers who concluded leaders of hybrid
organizations may not be qualified could only offer vague suggestions regarding potential
solutions (Cooper & Santora, 2011; Lazurko et al., 2014; Schröer & Jäger, 2015; Smith,
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2014). The selection of a qualitative modified three-round Delphi study design as
outlined in Chapter 3 was appropriate because this study is forward looking, and I sought
to explore gaps in the literature, provide answers to the research question, and gain
insight into the expert panel members’ opinions regarding desirable and feasible futureoriented solutions to the challenge of improving collaborative practices and better serving
public interests (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).
Summary and Conclusions
Several concepts emerged from the literature review. First, the increase in the
number of unaccredited industrial SDOs in the United States is creating conflicts that
threaten the legitimacy of what has historically been a deliberative and inclusive
democratic process for developing industrial voluntary consensus standards. Second,
institutional isomorphism and stakeholder considerations were key lenses for
understanding how conflicts are affecting development, adoption, and diffusion of
industrial voluntary consensus standards. Third, industrial SDOs represent hybrid
constructs that present leaders with unique challenges as leaders attempt to deal with
blending the conflicting institutional logics of forprofit and nonprofit activities. The
primary result that makes this study valuable is that while researchers generally
concluded leaders of industrial SDO are faced with unique challenges, little seemed to be
known about what actions could be taken to reduce these challenges, create a more
collaborative environment between all significant stakeholders, and better serve public
interests.
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Chapter 3 contains an analysis of the qualitative method and modified three-round
Delphi design selected for this study. Included is a description of the Delphi design in
general, the merits of using a modified three-round Delphi design for this study compared
with other designs, and details for how a modified three-round Delphi design is
anticipated to be applied in this study.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this qualitative modified three-round Delphi study was to discover
what consensus could be built among a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding
desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial
standard development organizations (SDOs) and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests. The specific focus
was on steps that could be taken to improve collaborative practices to preserve the
legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process, ensure
occupation/consumer safety and quality control, and protect public interests. In this
chapter, I address the research design and rationale, my role as the researcher,
methodology, expert panel member selection, instrument development, data collection
procedures, ensuring confidentiality (privacy and security), data analysis plans,
addressing rigor, ethical issues, and chapter summary.
Research Design and Rationale
Overarching Research Question: What is the level of consensus among a panel of
SMEs regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve
collaborative practices and better serve public interests? The sub-questions that
supported the primary question were:
Subquestion (SQ) 1: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs
regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions regarding competition that
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leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs
may take to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
SQ 2: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable
and feasible future-oriented actions in deregulation that leaders of accredited U.S.based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve
collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
SQ 3: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable
and feasible future-oriented actions in oversite that leaders of accredited U.S.-based
industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve
collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
SQ 4: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable
and feasible future-oriented actions in organizational structure that leaders of
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
SQ 5: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable
and feasible future-oriented actions in leadership training that leaders of accredited
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve
collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
SQ 6: What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding desirable
and feasible future-oriented actions in market-driven standards that leaders of
accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests?
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The phenomenon of interest was what desirable and feasible future-oriented
actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial
SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests.
Industrial voluntary consensus standards developed by unaccredited industrial SDOs are
frequently self-serving and are increasingly in competition and conflict with industrial
voluntary consensus standards developed by accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). To
date, most conflicts between competing SDOs and the voluntary consensus standards
they develop have been limited to commodity or sustainability related issues such as
fishing, coffee, timber, and palm oil production (Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Henrik, 2015;
Kaplan & Kinderman, 2015; Makiya & Fraisse, 2015). However, the problem is starting
to expand to voluntary consensus standards domains that deal with industrial
environments where voluntary consensus standards are designed to serve public interests
by promoting uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer safety and quality control
procedures (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012).
The research approach selected for this study was a qualitative method and a
modified three-round Delphi design (Davidson, 2013; Rowe & Wright, 2011). The
rationale for selecting this method and design and the approach was four-fold. First, the
data used in this study came from the subjective opinions of a group of SMEs. The use
of subjective data is a cornerstone of qualitative research (Patton, 2015). Second, the
central question being asked was one of future collaborative practices. This is a
predictive challenge for which a Delphi design is appropriate (Skulmoski et al., 2007;
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Withanaarachchi, Pushpakumara, & Nanayakkara, 2015). Third, multiple rounds are
often best for prognostication purposes. In the case of this study, three rounds were
selected because fewer rounds may not have been sufficient to explore the problem, and
more than three rounds could increase the study complexity and increase the chance of
expert panel member drop out (Davidson, 2013; Gill, Leslie, Grech, & Latour, 2013;
Green, 2012; Habibi, Sarafrazi, & Izadyar, 2014; Withanaarachchi et al., 2015). Fourth,
being forward looking, a Delphi approach did not require the use of established
instruments nor that those being questioned participate in the creation of the instrument.
In the case of this study, SMEs did not help create the questions for Round 1, and the first
round questionnaire was created by me based primarily on literature reviews. This
approach of not expecting SMEs to help craft the questions for Round 1 was also
recommended for novice researchers and is considered a modification to a classic or
traditional Delphi design (Asselin & Harper, 2014, Davidson, 2013; Skulmoski et al.,
2007).
In comparison with other qualitative designs, a Delphi design was appropriate for
conducting the study for several reasons. An ethnographic approach would have been
inappropriate because I did not focus on learning about the past or present culture of a
group of people (Sunstein & Chiseri-Strater, 2012). A phenomenological approach
would have been inappropriate because I was not trying to understand the meaning and
essence of the lived experience of the group or groups of people that make up U.S.-based
industrial SDOs (Brinkmann, 2012). A grounded theory approach would have been
inappropriate because I did not attempt to expand existing theories or create new theories
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(Birks & Mills, 2011). A narratological approach would have been inappropriate because
I did not attempt to obtain a narrative analysis of one individual in order to understand a
past or present life or culture (Holstein & Gubrium, 2012).
An argument could have been made that challenges facing uniformity and
harmonization proceedures with regard to occupational safety and quality control might
fit into a case study approach (Yin, 2014). However, such an approach would have been
a study in how the system currently functions and might not have illuminate how leaders
of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs approached
improving future collaborative practices. Since improving future collaborative practices
formed the basis of the primary research question, a case study approach was deemed
inappropriate.
Role of the Researcher
My method was qualitative using a modified three-round Delphi design. Based
on my method and design, my role as the researcher included research design, selecting
expert panel members, creation of the research instrument, administering the research
instrument, establishing themes and codes, data reduction and analysis, member
checking, providing controlled and timely feedback to expert panel members, controlling
or at least addressing personal biases, ensuring confidentiality (privacy and security),
interpreting questionnaire results, establishing trustworthiness, and adhering to ethical
standards.
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Professional Background and Relationships
I have worked for over 16 different organizations with cultural bases in North
America and Europe, but all with a global reach. These organizations are for the most
part considered suppliers as opposed to end users, and my primary roles involved middle
to upper-middle management activities in engineering, marketing, and sales. Many of
my responsibilities revolved around making sure products were compliant with existing
standards (soft or De facto law) or existing codes (hard or De jure law), and
understanding end user requirements. I have also been involved with domestic and
international industrial SDOs since the mid-1980s, and my involvement with industrial
standards has continued essentially without interruption from the mid-1980s up to the
present. I have also worked with governmental regulatory organizations such as the Food
and Drug Administration, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Governmental regulatory organizations
typically deal with codes, many of which have their roots in voluntary consensus
standards.
Based on my professional background, there were certainly professional
similarities between me and this study’s expert panel members, and I expected these
professional similarities to be beneficial to my research for several reasons. First, the
SMEs I recruited as expert panel members were typically in the middle to upper
management roles within their perspective organizations. These are roles I have shared.
Second, I shared many of the same experiences regarding industrial voluntary consensus
standards development, adoption, and diffusion activities. Third, I was not currently
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working for any end user or supplier and functioned as an independent industrial
consultant, which placed me in a relatively neutral and therefore trusted position. The
combination of similar professional and standards development experiences, in addition
to my independent consultant status, created a collegial environment between me and the
expert panel members. An abridged description of my career history was included in the
package sent to selected expert panel members.
Regarding issues relating to personal and professional relationships, I could not
say at the beginning of the recruitment process if I would have any personal or
professional relationships with SMEs who would become part of my panel. However,
since a SMEs qualifications were of primary importance to this study, personal or
professional relationships with SMEs were not considered an obstacle to recruitment.
The only potential limitation from a personal and professional relationship perspective
were situations where I was known to a potential expert panel member even though I was
not aware of this relationship. To the best of my knowledge, this potential limitation
never became a reality.
Personal Biases and Power Relations
I anticipated that controlling my own biases would be an important and
potentially challenging task based on my past professional experience. Even without the
support of literature that suggested industrial voluntary consensus standards development
was becoming a political and economic free-for-all in the United States (Timmermans &
Epstein, 2010), I was and continue to be of that mind. Other potential personal biases
included predilections for some suggestions discovered during the literature reviews
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regarding problems and solutions, which included biases related to desirability and
feasibility. For example, I tended to agree with some researchers that more government
oversight is needed to counteract the effects of deregulation. However, my views of
government oversight are a bias that I kept to myself as far as expert panel members were
concerned. The literature I reviewed presented another potential bias in how I might
have interpreted the literature, or the fact that I did not review every potentially
applicable piece of literature ever published (Cheung & Vijayakumar, 2016). Power
relations were not an issue as I was retired and not working for or being paid by any
industrial organization.
Ethical Issues
Ethical issues were primarily related to maintaining participant confidentiality
from one another and anyone other than myself (Paré, Cameron, Poba-Nzaou, &
Templier, 2013), securing information (Asselin & Harper, 2014), and following IRB
recommendations. The individuals that made up the panel of experts were not considered
at-risk populations. However, should potential participants have felt vulnerable (e.g.,
being pregnant, elderly, or injured), I encouraged them to make their vulnerabilities
known to me if they volunteered to become an expert panel member. As previously
mentioned, I was retired and did not select expert panel members from an organization
where I ever worked, so ethical conflicts of interest or power differentials were never
expected to be an issue. A personal ethical issue was my past work history, affiliation
with SDOs, and involvement in voluntary consensus standards development. I disclosed
my professional history to potential expert panel members in the package I sent to those
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who expressed interest. I expected that any potential panel member who was concerned
would simply decline to participate.
Methodology
My selected approach used a qualitative method based on a modified three-round
Delphi design. The Delphi design was named after the Oracle at Delphi, a character in
Greek mythology capable of forecasting future events. One of the first modern
applications of a Delphi design was the 1950’s study by the RAND Corporation to obtain
expert opinion and reach consensus regarding cold war prognostication issues. For
security reasons, the Delphi design was not published until 1963 by Dalkey and Helmer
(Birko et al., 2015). Since then, Delphi designs have been used with increasing
frequency as a forecasting tool in situations such as education, business, and health care
(Diamond, Grant, Feldman, Pencharz, Ling, Moore, & Wales, 2014). As suggested by
several researchers, a Delphi design is appropriate for situations where the goal is to
understand or deal with a complex problem when precise information is not available, or
where the goal is to understand opportunities and develop forecasts (Laick, 2012; Sobaih,
Ritchie, & Jones, 2012). The term “modified” has been used in many ways to refer to
variations on the classic or traditional Delphi design (Davidson, 2013; Gallego & Bueno,
2014; Withanaarachchi et al., 2015). In the case of this study, modified was used
primarily to refer to a design where the first round questionnaire is created by the
researcher based on literature reviews, and is not a collaborative effort between the
researcher and the expert panel members (Asselin & Harper, 2014). A modified Delphi
design where the first round questionnaire is created by the researcher based on literature
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reviews was also recommended for new practitioners because of the relative ease of study
management and general applicability to a wide range of situations (Asselin & Harper,
2014; Davidson, 2013; Green, 2013; Skulmoski et al., 2007). Other features of this
modified Delphi design included expert input, selection of experts based on the aims of
the research, limiting the study to three rounds, providing controlled feedback after each
round, on-line administration of rounds, defining levels of consensus, and protecting the
confidentiality of participants (Asselin & Harper, 2014; Sobaih et al., 2012).
Consensus measurements are typically an important feature of Delphi designs, but
there is considerable disagreement on definitions of consensus (von der Gracht, 2012). A
definition of consensus can be as simple as what the majority selects (von der Gracht,
2012), or can involve more complex definitions such as Kendal’s W (Skulmoski et al.,
2007; Worrell, Di Gangi, & Bush, 2013) or other statistical tests (Ju & Jin, 2013).
Researchers often define consensus using simple metrics such as the mean or median of
responses (Kalaian & Kasim, 2012; von der Gracht, 2012; Wakefield & Watson, 2014).
For Round 1, consensus was not an issue as the Round 1 questionnaire consisted of a
short number of open-ended questions created by me (see Table 1) based on the literature
review and that were designed to elicit suggested solutions that formed the basis for the
Round 2 questionnaire.
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Table 1
Main Theme Framework
Themes
Competition

Round 1 derived question
In what ways could collaborative practices be
improved between accredited U.S.-based industrial
standards development organizations and
unaccredited industrial standards development
organizations in order to reduce conflict?

Literature references
Ernst, 2013; Fernando et al.,
2012; Fransen, 2011; Gadinis,
2014

Deregulation

In what ways could leaders of accredited U.S.-based
industrial standards development organizations and
unaccredited industrial standards address the effects
of deregulation that since the 1980’s have resulted
in an increase in the number of unaccredited
industrial standards development organizations?

Brunsson et al., 2012; Ernst,
2012; Wijen, 2014; Yates &
Murphy, 2015

Oversight

In what ways could government or other third party
participants help leaders of accredited industrial
standards development organizations and
unaccredited industrial standards development
organizations improve collaborative practices?

Behr & Diaz, 2014; Coates,
2015; Henrik, 2015; HerasSaizarbitoria & Boiral, 2013

Organizational
structure

What changes to standard development organization
structures might improve collaborative practices
between accredited and unaccredited industrial
standards development organizations? Accredited
and unaccredited industrial standards development
organizations in the United States are currently
registered as nonprofit entities, but tend to be
considered hybrid organizations in that they pursue
both nonprofit and forprofit activities.

Anheier & Krlev, 2015;
Battilana et al., 2012; Schröer
& Jäger, 2015; Smith, 2014

Leadership
training

What training should be required of leaders (or
leadership) of accredited U.S.-based industrial
standards development organizations and
unaccredited industrial standards development
organizations to improved collaborative practices?

Battilana et al., 2012; Dimitrios
et al., 2013; Hailey & James,
2004; Walston, 2014

Market-driven

How can the unique market-driven, bottom-up U.S.
approach to the development of industrial voluntary
consensus standards be leveraged to improve
collaborative practices between accredited U.S.based industrial standards development
organizations and unaccredited industrial standards
development organizations?

Olshan, 1993; Pirard et al.,
2015; Reinecke et al., 2012;
Sandholtz, 2012
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Consensus for Rounds 2 and 3 were reached when the frequency of responses for
options 4 and 5 (agree and strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for
≥70% or more of the expert panel members’ responses (Asselin & Harper, 2014).
Questions that met this definition of consensus for Round 2 were moved forward to
Round 3. Questions that met this definition of consensus for Round 3 were moved to the
appropriate place in the results section because completion of Round 3 was the end of
this study. To mitigate the risk of not moving a primary question forward because of a
tendency to select option 3 (neither agree or disagree), a median score of ≥ 3.5 (a
tendency towards consensus) was left as an optional second test of consensus (Ju & Jin,
2013). An odd numbered Likert-type scale was recommended by several researchers to
avoid forcing expert panel members to take a stance for or against a position (Asselin &
Harper, 2014; Green 2013). Regarding this studies end point, study end-points could be
defined by levels of consensus, number of rounds, or some combination of definitions
(Laick, 2012; Skulmoski et al., 2007; Withanaarachchi et al., 2015). Three rounds was
the definition of end-point for this study. Three rounds was also supported by several
researchers as a good balance between having sufficient rounds to explore the problem
while maintaining study manageability (Asselin & Harper, 2014; Green, 2013; Habibi et
al., 2014; Skulmoski et al., 2007).
Also of potential interest in this study were issues of desirability, feasibility,
importance, and confidence of responses. Even if there was consensus regarding a
primary question, expert panel member opinions regarding desirability, feasibility,
importance, and confidence could be important considerations (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).
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Desirability, as defined by Linstone and Turoff (1975) is a worthwhile endeavor that has
few deleterious effects and is a choice worth including. Linstone and Turoff (1975)
defined feasibility as the ability to easily implement the desired policy or strategy.
Importance and confidence were defined by Linstone and Turoff (1975) as an indication
of a respondents’ belief in the practical importance of a concept, and the confidence the
respondent has in their rating of importance. Definitions of consensus for Rounds 2 and
3 primary questions were also applied to questions related to desirability, feasibility,
importance, and confidence.
Participant Selection Logic
Per Förster and von der Gracht (2014), the most appropriate type of panel
composition for a modified Delphi design continues to be a subject of debate. Critical
reflection about a study through the eyes of experts is one of the primary features of a
Delphi design, but there can be many ways in which panel selection and study design
impacts critical reflection (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014; Kalaian & Kasim, 2012).
The two primary categories of an expert panel are defined as homogeneous or
heterogeneous. Gallego and Bueno (2014) defined homogeneous participants as those
with similar levels of knowledge, while heterogeneous participants were defined as those
who exhibited different levels of knowledge or who possessed unique and different
characteristics. Förster and von der Gracht (2014) presented similar definitions of
homogeneous and heterogeneous, but expanded on the definition of heterogeneous to
include characteristics such as age, gender, culture, knowledge, profession, values, and
attitudes. Some researchers suggested a homogeneous panel was best for novice
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researchers (Davidson, 2013; Green, 2013; Skulmoski et al., 2007). The primary
rationale for this recommendation is that a homogeneous panel generally requires fewer
members than a heterogeneous panel, that studies using a homogeneous panel are easier
to manage, and that expert panel member dropout is not as serious a threat to
trustworthiness. The primary negative of a homogeneous panel is an increased
possibility of bias (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014; von der Gracht, 2012). Based on the
previous pros and cons, choosing a homogeneous panel was the approach selected for this
study.
Size of Panels
Although researchers seemed to agree that homogeneous panels could be smaller
in size than heterogeneous panels, the best expert panel member size continued to be a
subject of debate (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014; Gallego & Bueno, 2014;
Withanaarachchi et al., 2015). There was, however, consensus that between 10 to 15
homogeneous members was sufficient to explore a subject while not adversely affecting
manageability or affecting trustworthiness (Birko at al., 2015; Ju & Jin, 2013; Paré et al.,
2013). I sought upwards of 20 expert panel members as a buffer against expert panel
member dropout or non-response. Active voluntary participants in accredited U.S.-based
industrial SDOs were the source for my expert panel members. Per the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI), the only congressionally approved U.S. Standards
Setting Organization (SSO) authorized to represent the United States internationally
regarding industrial voluntary consensus standards and manage the U.S. SDO
accreditation process, there are currently over 240 active accredited U.S.-based industrial
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SDOs. I began by selecting large accredited SDOs that had been in existance for at least
50 years. This assured that the SDO had a history that extended to a time before
deregulation became popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s. I identified 10 SDOs that
met this time in existence criteria. Regarding the overall sample population, the number
of expert panel members being sought represented a small percentage of the thousands of
potential SMEs that are members of accredited SDOs. However, one of the features of
this Delphi design, and Delphi designs in general, is that expert panel member selection is
based on the assumption that selected expert panel members are experts regarding the
subject matter, not that their opinions are statistically representative of the population of
potential SMEs (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014). A small number of expert panel
members was therefore appropriate.
Participant Selection Criteria
For the purposes of this study, I kept the definition of SME simple and relatively
broad in order not to limit the number and type of SME who could function as expert
panel members. Selection criteria included:
1. Knowledge of expert panel members who


Were familiar with the technical jargon used in the world of industrial
voluntary consensus standards.



Could describe cases that illustrate good versus poor decisions regarding
the development of industrial voluntary consensus standards.

2. Performance of expert panel members who
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Could communicate effectively in the spoken and written U.S. English
language.

3. Experience of expert panel members who


Were currently active with an accredited industrial SDO on a voluntary
basis and have at least five years continuous involvement with developing
industrial voluntary consensus standards.



Have been employed with or worked with organizations or industries that
utilize industrial voluntary consensus standards.

Uncritical adoption was the biggest obstacle and limitation to selecting qualified
SMEs for my expert panel. Uncritical adoption occurs when one takes an individuals’
claim of expertise at face value (Rowe & Wright, 2011). This was an unavoidable risk
based on time and cost restraints associated with this study.
An important consideration for inclusion as an expert panel member, and listed in
the preceding panel selection criteria section, was the expert panel members’ ability to
communicate. Several researchers made a point that good communication skills are an
essential component of what defines a SME (Green, 2013; Laick, 2012). If a SME
cannot communicate well, especially regarding reading and writing skills, the fact that
they are a SME may be a moot point if they cannot adequately understand questions or
elucidate their positions. Although the expert panel members were expected to have
experience in the accredited U.S.-based industrial voluntary consensus standards process,
this does not necessarily mean that their grasp of the writen or spoken U.S. English
language would be sufficiently advanced. Unfortunately the same researchers who
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advocated the value of good communication skills did not offer much in the way of
techniques for gauging how to establish an appropriate level of communications
competency. To try and mitigate this concern regarding ability to communicate, I spoke
with each potential expert panel member befor accepting them as part of this study. All
of the potential expert panel members appeared to communicate verbally very well, and I
assumed they could also communicate well in writing.
Participant Selection Process
As stated earlier, the pool from which expert panel members were recruited was a
select number of the over 240 ANSI accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs. ANSI is the
only congressionally approved U.S. SSO authorized to represent the United States
internationally regarding industrial voluntary consensus standards and manage the U.S.
SDO accreditation process. I planned on using a purposive sampling and/or snowballing
strategy. To help streamline the selection process, ANSI provided me with a link to their
publicly available list of primary contacts at each ANSI accredited SDO. I selected 10
SDOs that had been in existence for at least 50 years so their history extended to a point
before deregulation became popular in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Based on ANSI’s
published contact list, I began the initial recruitment process by contacting individuals or
the appropriate department within the selected 10 accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs.
Initial contact was via phone. Each accredited U.S.-based industrial SDO was asked to
send the invitation to their member base. Forwarding the invitation would imply an
SDOs’ approval. As a backup recruitment plan, I reserved the option of contacting
specific potential expert panel members directly and asking them to participate or send
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the invitation to other potential expert panel members. The backup recruitment plan was
the method ultimately used for identifying, contacting, and selecting expert panel
members.
Potential expert panel members were given my Walden e-mail address as the
point of contact. Interested potential expert panel members were encouraged to contact
me using their own personal email in the interest of confidentiality and to avoid crossing
any potential expert panel members’ company server. All records were kept on my
password protected computer and in my locked filing cabinet. The recruitment process
continued until 18 potential expert panel members had been identified. I assigned each of
the potential panel members a unique identification code (“P” code), and only I had the
code key. Each potential expert panel member was informed that this study was about
industrial voluntary consensus standards, and not about a given expert panel members
company.
Conveying the importance of the study was another important aspect of the
participant selection process and for supporting claims of trustworthiness. Expert panel
member dropout or non-response is a potential problem regarding trustworthiness (Green,
2013; Kalaian & Kasim, 2012; Wakefield & Watson, 2014). Expert panel members that
are passionate about a topic of investigation are more likely to stay throughout the
necessary rounds, provide thoughtful answers, and enhance claims of trustworthiness
(Cafiso, Di Graziano, & Pappalardo, 2013). Another consideration was to note now
many of those who were contacted to be expert panel members actually accepted the
invitation. A low response rate could be indicative of an invitation that was not getting
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the message across regarding the importance of the study in a way that excited potential
expert panel members (Paré et al., 2013). Every effort was made to communicate the
importance of this study to potential expert panel members.
Potential expert panel members were notified individually by e-mail, provided
with an informed consent form, told of my intention to provide them with a unique
identification code, and given more detailed information about me and how the study
would proceed. An important component of this notification was a statement that during
the feedback portion of the study after each round, changes to answers from a previous
round would be included in the results and analysis, but would not be incorporated into
current rounds. Notification also included a statement that while suggestions and/or
general comments from expert panel members were encouraged and would be included in
the results, suggestions and/or general comments might not be included in subsequent
rounds. The rationale I offered was that to incorporate changes or comments may
invalidate the questions in current or subsequent rounds, may not support the research
questions, may slow down the entire process, and may place an additional burden on
expert panel members. Although I had plans to notify potential expert panel members
who were not selected and thank them for their interest, this never became an issue as the
total number of potential expert panel members never exceeded the cutoff point of 20
expert panel members. Of the 18 potential exert panel members who were contacted, 15
eventually responded to the informed consent form, “I consent”.
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Instrumentation
The instrument used during this study consisted of three independent
questionnaires. A well-designed instrument can help remove majority biases and let
strong opinions show through (Rowe & Wright, 2011). A well-designed instrument can
also help remove or at least control panel member and researcher biases (Davidson, 2013,
Skulmoski et al., 2007). Before addressing the various questionnaires that comprised the
instrument, it is important to point out some overarching considerations. First, the nature
of Delphi designs generally requires that instruments be created based on the specific
goal of the study (Hasson & Keeney, 2011; Sobaih et al., 2012). Using a custom
instrument is a potential problem regarding issues of rigor and a common criticism of the
Delphi design (Hasson & Keeney, 2011; Sobaih et al., 2012). One of the primary
considerations then when creating a specific instrument is to include details regarding
how rigor will be addressed (Habibi et al., 2014; Kalaian & Kasim, 2012; Laick, 2012;
Paré et al., 2013). Questions for Round 1 were reviewed by me for clarity. Questions
deemed ambiguous, redundant, or double barreled (e.g., “we believe in X and Y”) were
modified or eliminated (Schmiedel, Vom Brocke, & Recker, 2014).
Researchers suggested the first round questionnaire is potentially the most
significant (Ju & Jin, 2013; Paré et al., 2013; Wakefield & Watson, 2014). The
questionnaire for Round 1 is the starting point of data gathering and tends to be different
than the questionnaires for Rounds 2 and 3 which build off previous rounds. An
important consideration in developing the Round 1 questionnaire is how well the
questions support the primary research question (Laick, 2012; Sobaih et al., 2012;
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Worrell et al., 2013). If the research question is not properly defined or the Round 1
questionnaire does not support the research question, the instrument that results over the
span of rounds may be flawed from the beginning. Another important consideration for
Round 1 is the questionnaire form. The questionnaires for Round 1 tend to take on two
forms. The first form is basically that of encouraging a brainstorming session among
expert panel members. Some researchers suggested that upwards of 100 questions may
comprise a Round 1 brainstorming questionnaire (Paré et al., 2013). Other researchers
suggested as few as 30 questions are sufficient (Birko et al., 2015). Regardless of the
number of questions, the questions should be posed as broadly as possible to maximize
the potential for identifying topics that are most important (Cafiso et al., 2013), and are
primarily open-ended. The second form tends to be more focused and the questionnaire
is created by the researcher based primarily on the results of literature reviews. For this
form of questionnaire, Kalaian and Kasim (2012) recommended “a small number of
open-ended questionnaire questions” (p. 3). The idea behind the second form is that a
review of the literature and gaps in the literature would help create a questionnaire that is
more focused and potentially shorter (Kalaian & Kasim, 2012). In the second form, the
literature review derived questions would replace much of the brainstorming approach
suggested for the first form. Questions created following the second form approach are
also primarily open-ended. Several researchers recommended a Round 1 questionnaire
developed using form two (a modified Delphi design) is best for novice researchers
(Davidson, 2013, Skulmoski et at., 2007), and was the form used for this study.
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In the case of this study, the Round 1 questions were based on the six primary
themes discovered during the literature review, and that supported the research question.
Expert panel members were asked to suggest possible solutions that addressed the six
Round 1 questions. Responses to the Round 1 questionnaire were evaluated by me using
word frequency and interpretation of concepts using traditional text analysis to create
questions for the Round 2 questionnaire.
Round 2 and 3 questionnaires were based on closed-ended questions derived from
responses to the previous rounds. The form of responses to Round 2 and 3 questionnaires
were based on a five-point Likert-type scale. In addition to primary questions included in
the Round 2 and 3 questionnaires, there were also secondary questions based on
desirability, feasibility, importance, and confidence in relation to the primary questions.
All secondary questions were rated using the same type of five-point Likert-type scale
applied to the primary questions. Desirability and feasibility comprised the secondary
questions in Round 2, and importance and confidence comprised the secondary question
in Round 3. Responses to the Round 2 questionnaire were evaluated by me and
responses that met the test of consensus were moved forward to the Round 3
questionnaire. Responses to the Round 3 questionnaire were evaluated by me and
responses that met the test of consensus were moved to the final results. Consensus
regarding primary questions in Round 2 and 3 were used as metrics for moving a primary
question to the next round or to the final results. Consensus regarding secondary
questions was part of the data analysis but was not used as a metric for moving a primary
question forward.
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Another consideration when designing the instrument was the potential for fatigue
on the part of the expert panel members (Förster & von der Gracht, 2014). As suggested
by Green (2013), experts will only spend the minimum amount of time on a questionnaire
or may drop out completely. Even if expert panel members do not drop out, a complex
questionnaire can increase fatigue that promotes answers that do not represent critical
reflection from the expert panel member in order to get through the questionnaire as
quickly as possible. Birko et al. (2015) suggested designing questionnaires that take no
more than 30 to 45 minutes to complete. Time between providing feedback and next
round questionnaires can also affect panel participation (Green, 2013). An overly
complicated questionnaire can slow down data analysis and timely feedback, and could
potentially affect panel member fatigue, dropout, and response rate (Asselin & Harper,
2014; Wakefield & Watson, 2014; Worrell et al., 2013). Another aspect of time is simply
the pace of modern life and the need for controlling complexity in the interest of
timeliness (Wakefield & Watson, 2014). Per one study, life happens, which can cause
response problems for expert panel members because of time conflicts (Asselin &
Harper, 2014). Every effort was made to create questionnaires that did not violate the 30
to 45 minute suggestion to reduce the potential for fatigue, drop out, and non-response.
Each questionnaire was tested by me and an information technology individual I employ
to assure each questionnaire could be completed in 30 to 45 minutes. I also relied on
tools provided by SurveyGizmo that measured test time, fatigue, and accessibility. While
some expert panel members chose to spend more than 45 minutes completing the
questionnaires, the average time per SurveyGizmo never exceeded 35 minutes.
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In the following sections, I address specific considerations for the creation of the
instrument. These considerations include the questionnaires used in each round, and how
each round built on the previous round, and the ultimate goal of the instrument.
Round 1
Once the panel was assembled and the Round 1 questionnaire was ready, the
Round 1 questionnaire was distributed via e-mail to the expert panel members along with
Round 1 instructions. Each panel member was provided a link to the questionnaire
created in SurveyGizmo and instructed to log on. Expert panel members were not able to
access any other expert panel members’ questionnaire or responses.
The purpose of the Round 1 questionnaire was to elicit thoughts and possible
solutions from the expert panel members for each question. These suggested solutions
were then used to create the Round 2 questionnaire. The Round 1 questionnaire was
comprised of six questions based on the six themes that emerged from the literature
review and only questions that supported the primary themes identified during the
literature review were part of the Round 1 questionnaire. A seventh question was also
included but was only included to give expert panel members a platform for providing
additional information if they felt the need. Each expert panel member was encouraged
to include explanations for question responses, but that these explanations should be short
in the interest of completing the questionnaire in 30 to 45 minutes. Each expert panel
member was requested to provide between three and five responses for each of the
questions. The feedback report from Round 1 included the questionnaire results,
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interpretation of the results, and the Round 2 questionnaire along with Round 2
instructions.
The protocol for converting responses to the Round 1 questionnaire to Likert-type
items for Round 2 was to create a small number of closed-ended primary questions based
on Round 1 responses. This small number of closed-ended primary questions was
designed to support the original six themes and resulting range of subthemes that emerge
from evaluating the results of Round 1 and that supported the research question (Gallego
& Bueno, 2014; Laick, 2012; Withanaarachchi et al., 2015). The number of questions
selected for the Round 2 questionnaire was based on the recommendation that no
questionnaire should take longer than 30 to 45 minutes to complete (Birko et al., 2015),
while at the same time covering the range of subthemes that emerged from Round 1.
Round 2
The Round 2 questionnaire was created based on the results of Round 1. The
primary difference between the Round 1 questionnaire and subsequent round
questionnaires was the fact that questions presented in subsequent rounds were closedended and rated on a five-point Likert-type scale. The goal for Round 2 was to determine
which primary questions created from Round 1 met the definition of consensus and
should move to Round 3. The feedback report from Round 2 included the questionnaire
results, interpretation of the results, and the Round 3 questionnaire along with Round 3
instructions. Log on procedures used in Round 1 to access the questionnaire were
duplicated for Round 2 to assure confidentiality.

125
The protocol for moving a Round 2 primary question forward was based on
consensus defined as when the frequency of responses for options 4 and 5 (agree and
strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more of the
expert panel members’ responses. To mitigate the risk of not moving an item forward
because of a tendency to select option 3 (neither agree or disagree), a median score of
≥3.5 (a tendency towards consensus) was kept as an optional second test of consensus to
justify moving an item forward. This second test of consensus was never used as the
primary test of consensus was deemed sufficient.
While the same tests for consensus were applied to secondary questions regarding
desirability and feasibility of responses to primary questions, consensus regarding
secondary questions was only part of data analysis and not used to determine if a primary
question moved forward.
Round 3
The Round 3 questionnaire was created based on the results of primary questions
that were moved forward from Round 2. As with Round 2, Round 3 primary questions
were closed-ended and rated on a five-point Likert-type scale. The goal for Round 3 was
to determine which primary questions that moved forward from Round 2 met the
definition of consensus and should be moved to the final results. The feedback report
from Round 3 included the questionnaire result and interpretation of the results. The
final report was sent to the expert panel members once the study was complete. Log on
procedures used in Round 2 to access the questionnaire were duplicated for Round 3 to
assure confidentiality.
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The protocol for moving a Round 3 primary question forward was based on
consensus defined as when the frequency of responses for options 4 and 5 (agree and
strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more of the
expert panel members’ responses. To mitigate the risk of not moving an item forward
because of a tendency to select option 3 (neither agree or disagree), a median score of
≥3.5 (a tendency towards consensus) would be kept as an optional second test of
consensus to justify moving as item forward. This second test of consensus was never
used as the primary test of consensus was deemed sufficient.
While the same tests for consensus was applied to secondary questions regarding
importance and confidence of responses to primary questions, consensus regarding
secondary questions were only part of data analysis and not used to determine if a
primary question moved forward.
Procedures for Data Collection
A homogeneous panel of SMEs provided the data for this study. Data collection
began with the first round of this three-round study. All communication regarding
questions were between the individual expert panel members and me either by phone,
video conference, web based tools such as SurveyGizmo, or e-mail. A log on password
(unique identification code) was sent to all expert panel members to access the online
questionnaire for each round created through SurveyGizmo, and all panel members were
identify on the online questionnaires by their unique identification code to protect
confidentiality. The online questionnaires were the primary method used for data
collection. Expert panel members did not have access to any other expert panel
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members’ on-line responses. A secondary method of data collection was through
member checking. All communications between expert panel members and me were
kept confidential, documented, and kept on my password protected computer and in my
locked filing cabinet.
For Round 1, each expert panel member was asked to answer a small number of
open-ended questions relating to the research question and based on the six primary
themes that resulted from the literature review. For Rounds 2 and 3, each expert panel
member was asked to rate a small number of closed-ended questions developed based on
the results of the previous round. Instructions for each round were included with that
rounds questionnaire link. Each questionnaire was submitted to each expert panel
member via individual e-mail that included a link to the questionnaire and a unique log
on code. Each expert panel member was given an opportunity to comment on the results
of the previous round, but was reminded that changes to responses or additional
comments would only be included in the results. Log on procedures used in Round 1
were followed for Rounds 2 and 3 to assure confidentiality.
For each primary question in Round 2 and 3 where the expert panel members
were asked to rate their responses, there was a set of secondary questions where the
expert panel members were asked to rate their responses to the primary question based on
desirability and feasibility in Round 2, and importance and confidence in Round 3
(Linstone & Turoff, 1975). Each expert panel member was given a fixed amount of time
to respond to each questionnaire which did not exceed 3 weeks from the time the
questionnaire was sent. Expert panel members that did not respond in the required period
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could be removed from the panel. At least two attempts were made by me to contact
non-respondents before they were removed. Valid explanations for late responses or
non-responses were duly considered. Answers to the questionnaires that were deemed
incomplete by me were addressed in a follow up communication between me and the
expert panel member before evaluating the data. Once any issues were resolved, the data
collection process for that round was complete. Data from each round, including expert
panel member comments, were entered into an appropriate computer aided qualitative
data analysis system (CAQDAS). The total time between rounds did not exceed 6 weeks,
and time between the last round feedback report and distribution of a final report did not
exceed 6 weeks.
Data Analysis Plan
Data Analysis was an ongoing process starting with the results of the first round.
Major themes were determined a priori for Round 1 based on the literature reviews.
Major themes were selected that supported the research question (Vaismoradi, Turunen,
& Bondas, 2013). Codes for major themes were created a priori using an open coding
approach (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). From the Round 1 data, additional subthemes and
codes were developed. Codes for subthemes were developed using open coding or axial
coding techniques (Vaismoradi et al., 2013). All data from Round 1 was nominal, and
word count and interpretation of the responses using traditional text analysis was the
primary statistical approach (Bright & O’Connor, 2007). For Rounds 2 and 3, all rated
data was ordinal. In addition to the primary questions that resulted from Round 1, there
were two additional rated questions in Round 2 and 3. Additional rated questions for
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Round 2 were based on desirability and feasibility of the primary question, and for Round
3 were based on importance of the primary question and confidence of response to the
primary question (Linstone & Turoff, 1975).
Round 2 and 3 were focused on consensus. Consensus for Rounds 2 and 3 were
reached when the frequency of responses for options 4 and 5 (agree and strongly agree)
on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more of the expert panel
members’ responses to the primary question (Asselin & Harper, 2014). Primary
questions that met the definition of consensus for Round 2 were moved forward to Round
3. Primary questions that met the definition of consensus for Round 3 were moved to the
final results section because completion of Round 3 was the end point of this study. To
mitigate the risk of not moving a primary question forward because of a tendency to
select option 3 (neither agree or disagree), a median score of ≥3.5 (a tendency towards
consensus) was kept as an optional second test of consensus (Ju & Jin, 2013). The same
definitions of consensus were applied to secondary questions in Rounds 2 and 3, but
consensus regarding secondary questions was only recorded and not used to determine if
a primary question moved forward.
Issues of Trustworthiness
This study used a qualitative method and a modified three-round Delphi design.
Several studies have focused on rigor through the lens of the methodological trinity of
reliability, trustworthiness, and validity (Hasson & Keeney, 2011; Rowe & Wright,
2011). However, according to other studies, the implication of blending reliability,
trustworthiness, and validity is that there is also a blending of quantitative and qualitative
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paradigms. Per Wakefield and Watson (2014) for example, validity and reliability are
characteristic of quantitative research while credibility and trustworthiness are
characteristic of qualitative research. This differentiation was supported by other
researchers (Asselin & Harper, 2014). Ju and Jin (2013) argued that when using a Delphi
design, rigor is the umbrella under which all definitions fit, regardless of whether a study
is qualitative or quantitative; while Diamond et al. (2014) claimed there is so much
variation in the settings in which a Delphi design can be applied that there is no definition
of validity, and that the best a researcher can hope for is to establish credibility by clearly
defining how rigor was established. These differences in opinion may explain why in
addition to discussions of reliability, trustworthiness, credibility, and validity; there are
studies that also employed terms such as transferability (Rowe & Wright, 2011), and
confirmability and dependability (Green, 2013) without specifying whether the research
was qualitative or quantitative. Rounds 1 through 3 of this study did not extend beyond
collecting ordinal date, which qualified this study as qualitative research (Elo,
Kääriäinen, Kanste, Pölkki, Utriainen & Kyngäs, 2014; Houghton, Casey, Shaw, &
Murphy, 2013). The same researchers suggested trustworthiness is the defining feature
of qualitative research under which fall all other terms such as credibility, dependability,
conformability, confirmability, transferability, and authenticity. From a Delphi design
perspective, trustworthiness is a function of rigor, and lack of rigor continues to be a
major criticism of Delphi designs (Gallego & Bueno, 2014; von der Gracht, 2012;
Hasson & Keeney, 2011; Meijering, Kampen, & Tobi, 2013; Paré et al., 2013).
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Credibility
Common strategies for establishing rigor under the definition of credibility
include prolonged engagement and observation, triangulation, peer debriefing, and
member checking (Houghton et al., 2013). This study employed three rounds of
engagement with the expert panel members that included controlled feedback or member
checking between rounds. The entire process took approximately 4 to 6 months once
data collection began, which included communication on a regular basis. I submit this
regular communication and the length of the study supported the concept of prolonged
engagement and observation. Triangulation was addressed through a combination of
literature review, committee involvement, and feedback from the expert panel members
(Laick, 2012). Peer debriefing was an ongoing process with my doctoral committee.
Member checking was a built-in feature of this Delphi design from the perspective of
providing feedback and allowing expert panel members to comment on their own input
(von der Gracht, 2012). Although no changes resulted from member checking, a clear
audit trail was still proved to support claims of rigor (Paré et al., 2013).
Transferability
Transferability as noted by Green (2013) and Gallego and Bueno (2014) can be a
strength and a weakness of a Delphi design, and is typically a function of study
uniqueness. In the medical profession for example, transferability can be relatively high
because of similarities in operations. Ju and Jin (2013) suggested transferability was
enhanced when there were clusters of similar studies looking at similar situations. While
studies regarding standards development are not new (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et
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al., 2012; Ernst, 2013; Hopper, 2013), this study’s focus on accredited U.S.-based
industrial SDO and unaccredited SDO leadership challenges may be unique enough to
limit transferability. A detailed account of events along with an a priori establishment of
methodology, a specific focus on establishment of rigor, and the use of triangulation were
used to improve transferability (Gallego & Bueno, 2014; Rowe & Wright, 2011), but I
submit transferability was a potential limitation of this study.
Dependability
Dependability has been defined as the “stability of data over time and under
different conditions” (Elo et al., 2014, p. 4). Houghton et al. (2013) suggested that a
robust audit trail combined with reflexivity can enhance dependability. The robust audit
trail began with detailed descriptions of panel selection criteria and a priori definitions of
how rigor would be addressed. Several researchers suggested that a priori definitions of
consensus and under what circumstances the study would be terminated can support
rigor, and therefore dependability (Kalian & Kasim, 2012; Meijering et al., 2013).
Throughout the process, I maintained a robust audit trail. The feedback process between
rounds aided in establishing the audit trail. Reflexivity was addressed by clearly
disclosing my involvement with SDOs and SDO processes, along with my personal
biases. As suggested by Houghton et al. (2013), the researcher is part of the research
process and demonstrating the researcher’s ability to be self-aware can enhance
perceptions of dependability. Demonstrating self-awareness was accomplished by
recording my rationale for decision making and personal challenges faced by me during
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the study. My primary goal was to demonstrate transparency with regard to my
involvement in the entire process.
Confirmability
Confirmability often refers to neutrality of the researcher and the accuracy of the
data (Houghton et al., 2013). Some researchers have also suggested that confirmability
and dependability are closely related and that the processes for ensuring confirmability
and dependability are similar (Houghton et al., 2013). A robust audit trail was essential
for supporting accuracy of the data, including a detailed description of the qualifications
of all the selected expert panel members. Another important consideration I addressed
was the potential for ulterior motives on the part of the expert panel members. Birko et
al. (2015) suggested that consideration must be given to who panel members may be
beholding too, and emphasized how assurances of confidentiality can reduce beholding
biases. Regarding neutrality of the researcher, Elo et al. (2014) suggested it is impossible
for the researcher to be totally neutral, and the best way to support confirmability is to
make sure the researchers interest in the study (including biases) are clearly stated. My
interest and biases were presented to the expert panel members before and during the
study.
Ethical Procedures
Throughout this study, I adhered to the ethical guidelines as approved by IRB
(approval number 06-10-17-0159246). The ethical guidelines included:


Participant recruitment



Participant selection
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Data collection



Privacy and security



Data storage



Sharing results



Addressing risks



Conflicts of interest



Participant exclusion



Estimated time commitment



Informed consent

Greater detail can be found in Appendixes A – H.
The pool from which I selected my panel of SMEs are legally considered
nonprofits. One way to support ethical procedures was to only select panel members who
were volunteer members of accredited SDOs and not paid SDO employees. There were
two potential advantages to this approach. The first potential advantage was that none of
the panel members would be at financial risk should their involvement become known to
paid members. The second potential advantage was that I would not need to get a letter
of cooperation from selected SDOs because all I was asking of the SDOs was to send my
invitation to their members. There was the potential disadvantage that an expert panel
members’ involvement might become known to their employer, but these issues were
brought to potential expert panel members’ attention during the initial direct contact
phase, along with steps I proposed to limit exposure. I did not expect the potential for
employee discovery to be a significant concern for potential expert panel members, and
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none of the expert panel members expressed concern. There was always the risk that an
expert panel member might become concerned about employer discovery during the
study, which could contribute to dropout. Through experience, I have learned that what
an expert panel member may say in private versus what they would tell their employer
can be very different. Assurances of confidentiality (privacy and security) were provided
throughout the study to allay any expert panel members’ concerns regarding employer
discovery.
An ethical concern I did and still do have is how the results of the study may
affect SDO nonprofit status. The primary research question asks what desirable and
feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better
serve public interests. Part of what I hope is a partial answer to the research question is
how leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDO
will deal with the hybrid nature of SDOs (blending nonprofit and forprofit activities). I
believed the best way to assure these legally incorporated nonprofits that my study posed
no external threat was to point out that, in addition to preserving expert panel members
confidentiality, the final report would be distributed only to expert panel members, and if
approved by all exert panel members, relevant stakeholders. Names of the SDOs would
also be stored so as to assure confidentiality not only of the expert panel members, but of
the SDOs as well. As part of the initial panel selection process, I included a statement
that the expert panel members should not share their involvement or the results with
anyone. Since responses from expert panel members were be coded and kept completely
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confidential by me, there should be no way for paid members of the SDOs to know who
panel members were and what a particular panel member contributed to the study unless
an expert panel member decided to make that information known. I also established and
made known how data would be archived, and that records would only be kept for a
predetermined amount of time. At the end of this time (five years currently), all physical
and electronic records would be destroyed. SDOs and expert panel members did not
express concerns regarding threats to nonprofit status.
In the informed consent form, each expert panel member was also informed of
their ability to withdraw at any time and should they chose to withdraw, any records of
their involvement would be securely stored until destroyed. While I expected drop out to
be primarily a function of a members’ inability to commit to the full study, there could
have been other reasons. Again, each expert panel member was informed of their right to
drop out at any time regardless of the reason. Expert panel members were also informed
that non-response to questionnaires within the allotted period could be grounds for
elimination from the panel.
A final ethical concern was that expert panel members might become known to
each other through third party means. Sobaih et al. (2012) suggested this is generally
only a concern when the pool from which experts is drawn is so small that maintaining
confidentiality is virtually impossible. This concern was addressed during the initial
contact with potential expert panel members, and that part of the selection process
included such considerations. Potential expert panel members that, for example, worked
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for the same company at the same location, were not considered appropriate choices for
inclusion.
Summary
In Chapter 3, I started with a restatement of the research question. I then
addressed the phenomenon of interest and central concepts, along with the research
method and design, and rationale for the research method and design. This section
included comparisons with other research methods and why the specific design was
selected. The next section addressed the role of the researcher. Attention was paid to
explaining how claims of rigor would be supported. Following the section on the role of
the researcher, I described the methodology. The next section focused on participant
selection rationale, the pool from which expert panel members would be selected, and
participant qualifications. I then addressed the data collection instrument and how each
section of the instrument would be constructed and vetted so that each section of the
instrument would support the research question. Since the instrument was composed of
three sections (three separate questionnaires), I also discussed how the feedback process
worked. The next section addressed specifics of the data analysis plan, which included
themes, subthemes, coding, and data analysis. I then addressed issues of trustworthiness,
transferability, dependability, and confirmability. I finished Chapter 3 with a review of
ethical procedures. Chapter 4 will cover the actual study, how data was collected and
analyzed, how each round built upon the previous round(s), approaches to data analysis,
and any changes to the approaches outlined in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 4: Results
Purpose of the Study
Industrial voluntary consensus standards development was originally a relatively
informal process on the part of the scientific community to establish common practices.
Today the use of industrial standards has expanded greatly and tends to affect all aspects
of life (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). However, the legitimacy of industrial standard
development organizations (SDOs) in the United States and the industrial voluntary
consensus standards they develop are being threatened by contentious political and
economic processes driven by an increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs
(Botzem & Dobusch, 2012). The Delphi design was appropriate based on the need for
significant stakeholders to develop more collaborative practices in the United States and
for reducing industrial voluntary consensus development conflicts and maintaining the
legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus development process (Allen &
Ramanna, 2013; Fransen, 2011). Focusing on the need for more collaborative practices,
the following research question guided this qualitative Delphi study: What is the level of
consensus among a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) regarding desirable and
feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs may take to improve collaborative practices and better
serve public interests? This chapter provides information on the research setting,
participant demographics, data collection, data analysis, and study results.
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Field Test of Round 1 Questionnaire
The six questions ultimately submitted to the expert panel members in Round 1
were field tested and modified from the original list of questions shown in Table 1.
Modifications included the following:
1. Shortening some questions to improve consistency regarding interpretation and
reduce fatigue. The rationale was that shortening the questions would reduce the
chances of expert panel members having different interpretations of the questions.
Shortening the questions could also decrease expert panel member fatigue,
resulting in a decrease in dropout rate and a tendency towards central response.
2. Reducing the description of accredited and unaccredited SDOs to simple
acronyms. The rationale was that the descriptions of accredited and unaccredited
SDOs was too long to be used repetitively without causing unnecessary fatigue.
A suggestion was made to use ASDOs as the acronym for accredited U.S.-based
industrial standard development organizations and UASDOs as the acronym for
unaccredited industrial standard development organizations.
The revised Round 1 questions are listed in Appendix I.
Research Setting
The research setting was industrial voluntary consensus SDOs in the United
States, with data collection occurring by electronic means. Selected SMEs (hereafter
referred to as experts) were given a list of requirements by electronic means that would
qualify them as expert panel members and as viable candidates to participate in this
study. Expert panel members were also provided by electronic means with an outline of
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the study and an informed consent form. Aside from statements provided by participants
that they did qualify as expert panel members and agreed to participate in the study, no
other personal demographic information was requested. The instruments used in this
study did not ask expert panel members to divulge personal or organizational
information. At the time of the study, and based on the electronic nature of data
collection and data sharing, I was not able to observe directly any personal or
organizational conditions. Consequently, I had no knowledge of any personal or
organizational conditions on the part of expert panel members that may have influenced
their responses or my interpretation of the data.
Demographics
Each expert panel member in this study claimed to possess the following
characteristics: (a) familiarity with the technical jargon used in the world of industrial
voluntary consensus standards, (b) could describe cases that illustrate good versus poor
decisions regarding the development of industrial voluntary consensus standards, (c)
could communicate effectively in the spoken and written U.S. English language, (d) were
currently active with an accredited industrial SDO on a voluntary basis and had at least 5
years continuous involvement with developing industrial voluntary consensus standards,
and (e) had been employed with or worked with organizations or industries that used
industrial voluntary consensus standards. These five characteristics represented expert
panel member eligibility criteria. No additional personal demographic was required, and
each expert panel member acknowledged meeting these eligibility criteria.
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Recruitment
My original plan for identifying expert panel members involved contacting
selected accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and asking them to forward my request
for expert panel members to their volunteer members. My rationale was based on
contacting the International Society of Automation (ISA) and the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) membership departments prior to completing Chapter 3.
The response from these two accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs was very positive.
The secondary plan was to contact potential expert panel members directly using contact
lists I had developed over many years. After receiving IRB approval, I approached the
International Society of Automation and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
before contacting other accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs. At least 6 months had
passed since my initial contact and I reminded each organization of our original
conversation. This time, both organizations declined to forward my request for expert
panel members to their volunteer members. In both cases, I was told that sending a
request that was not directly related to accredited SDO business was not appropriate.
Rather than pursue this original plan, I decided to switch to my secondary plan that
involved contacting potential expert panel members directly. Contacting potential expert
panel members directly worked well in that responses were timely and allowed for
greater control over diversity of expert panel members. Although I had identified 200
individuals I could contact directly, I decided not to do a group invitation of all 200 and
instead identified 20 individuals who represented a broad spectrum of experience. Of the
20 individuals contacted, two did not respond, three declined, and 15 agreed to participate
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in this study. Recruitment began on June 28, 2017 and was complete by July 13, 2017.
Data Collection
This qualitative modified Delphi study was built around three rounds of
questionnaires with each round questionnaire being sent sequentially. Each questionnaire
was created using SurveyGizmo. For each round, expert panel members were provided
with a unique link to the questionnaire. I had originally envisioned assigning each expert
panel member with a unique log on code to gain access to the questionnaires. However,
during the Round 1 questionnaire creation phase, both SurveyGizmo and my information
technology person convinced me that creating a unique link to each round for each expert
panel member was an easier approach and would still result in the same level of security
and confidentiality. The results from each questionnaire were downloaded to my
personal password protected computer and analyzed by me. This protocol was followed
for each of the three rounds.
Round 1 Data Collection
The Round 1 questionnaire was comprised of six primary questions and an
optional seventh question (See Appendix I). All questions were open-ended, and the
resulting data were nominal. The six primary questions were developed based on themes
that emerged from the literature review. The six themes included competition,
deregulation, oversight, organizational structure, leadership training, and market-driven.
The seventh question allowed expert panel members to provide additional comments if
they felt the need. The Round 1 questionnaire instructions asked each panel member to
provide at least three but no more than five suggestions/comments/opinions for the six
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primary questions and stated question seven was optional. None of the questions were
mandatory (the questionnaire would let the expert panel members leave a question blank
of they so desired). No limits were placed on the length of an expert panel members’
response.
Each expert panel member was given 3 weeks to complete the questionnaire. The
Round 1 questionnaire was sent to each expert panel member on July 14, 2017. On July
30, 2017, a first reminder was sent to panel members who had not completed the
questionnaire. On August 3, 2017, a second reminder was sent to expert panel members
who had not completed the questionnaire. The questionnaire was closed on August 7,
2017.
During Week 1, several expert panel members commented that the questionnaire
link was slow and timed out. Potential problems of this nature were verified by
SurveyGizmo, but SurveyGizmo anticipated this being a “short term” problem (3-5 days
maximum). In the interest of not frustrating the expert panel members, I sent a wordversion of the Round 1 questionnaire to each expert panel member on July 18, 2017 and
gave them the option of completing the questionnaire in word. One expert panel member
did use the word document and emailed me the document upon completion. The word
document was downloaded to my personal computer and the data was analyzed by me
along with the data obtain via SurveyGizmo.
Of the 15 expert panel members who were sent a questionnaire link, 14
responded. Of the 14 responses, 11 were complete and three were partially complete.
The number of responses and response rate were sufficient to meet minimum
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requirements and support claims of rigor (Asselin & Harper, 2014; Birko et al., 2015;
Cafiso et al., 2013). I did speak with the non-responding expert panel member by phone
after the close of the Round 1 questionnaire. They explained they were too busy, but
expressed a desire to continue as an expert panel member. I felt their continued
participation was valuable and they were not removed from the study. Three expert panel
members who had responded to the Round 1 questionnaire asked to be removed from the
study after Round 1 was complete. Their requests were honored and noted in an e-mail
sent to each of the three expert panel members acknowledging and accepting their request
to be removed. This e-mail was sent individually to all three expert panel members on
August 24, 2017.
Round 2 Data Collection
In Chapter 3, the original plan was to ask expert panel members to rate each
question in Round 2 on a five-point Likert-type scale. Questions that met the definition
of consensus would be passed to Round 3. Expert panel members would also be asked to
rate each Round 2 question based on desirability and feasibility separately although
consensus regarding desirability and feasibility would not be used as a basis for moving a
question to Round 3. Since asking the expert panel members to rate the questions based
on desirability and feasibility would not impact which questions move to Round 3, I
decided to eliminate the request that expert panel members also rate the questions based
on desirability and feasibility.
The Round 2 questionnaire was comprised of 54 questions developed on the basis
of the Round 1 answers (See Appendix J). Each question was closed-ended and expert
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panel members were asked to rate their responses on a five-point Likert-type scale. All
data resulting from rating questions was ordinal. Each of the 54 questions included a
section for comments. All data resulting from comments was nominal. None of the
rating requests or the comment requests were mandatory (the questionnaire would let the
expert panel members leave a rating or comment blank if they so desired).
Expert panel members were given 3 weeks to complete the questionnaire. The
Round 2 questionnaire was sent to each expert panel member on August 22, 2017. On
August 31, 2017, a first reminder was sent to panel members who had not completed the
questionnaire. On September 6, 2017, a second reminder was sent to expert panel
members who had not completed the questionnaire. The questionnaire was closed on
September 9, 2017.
Of the remaining 12 expert panel members who were sent a questionnaire link, 11
responded. Of the 11 responses, all were complete based on the rating request. The
number of responses and response rate were sufficient to meet minimum requirements
and support claims of rigor (Asselin & Harper, 2014; Birko et al., 2015; Cafiso et al.,
2013). Not responding to one or more optional comments sections was not counted
towards the questionnaire being complete. I did speak with the non-responding expert
panel member by phone after the close of the Round 2 questionnaire. They explained
they were too busy, but expressed a desire to continue as an expert panel member. I felt
their continued participation was valuable and they were not removed from the study.
None of the responding expert panel members asked to be removed from the study.
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Round 3 Data Collection
In Chapter 3, the original plan was to ask expert panel member to rate each
question on a five-point Likert-type scale. Question ratings that met the definition of
consensus would be passed to the final results. Expert panel members would also be
asked to rate each Round 3 question based on importance and confidence separately
although consensus regarding importance and confidence would not be used as a basis for
moving a question to the final results. Since the research question focused on the
desirability and feasibility of future-oriented actions, and since Round 3 terminated the
questionnaires for this study, I decided to ask the expert panel member to only rate each
question based on desirability and feasibility (two ratings for each question).
The Round 3 questionnaire (See Appendix K) was comprised of the 31 questions
from Round 2 that met the definition of consensus from the original 54 questions. Each
question was closed-ended and expert panel members were asked to rate their responses
on a five-point Likert-type scale regarding desirability and feasibility. Desirability and
feasibility were separate questions. All data resulting from rating questions was ordinal.
Each of the 31 questions included a section for comments. All data resulting from
comments was nominal. I made rating each question regarding desirability and
feasibility mandatory. My rationale was that during the creation and testing of the Round
3 questionnaire by me, I found it was easy to miss a response and once the questionnaire
was submitted, there was no way to go back and fill in ratings that had been missed. I
surmised the issue was in Round 3, two rating responses (desirability and feasibility) on a
five-point Likert-type scale were being sought for each question, making it easier to
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unintentionally miss a response. Each expert panel member was notified of my decision
and rationale for making rating responses mandatory and told to select the neutral
response if they did not wish to answer all or part of a question regarding desirability and
feasibility. There were no objections. Providing comments remained optional (the
questionnaire would let the expert panel members leave a comment blank if they so
desired).
Each expert panel member was given 3 weeks to complete the questionnaire. The
Round 3 questionnaire was sent to each expert panel member on September 21, 2017.
On October 5, 2017, a first reminder was sent to panel members who had not completed
the questionnaire. On October 10, 2017, a second reminder was sent to expert panel
members who had not completed the questionnaire. The questionnaire was supposed to
be closed on October 13, 2017, but I was out of town and the questionnaire was closed on
October 16, 2017.
Of the 12 expert panel members who were sent a questionnaire link, 11
responded. Of the 11 responses, all were complete based on the rating request. The
number of responses and response rate were sufficient to meet minimum requirements
and support claims of rigor (Asselin & Harper, 2014; Birko et al., 2015; Cafiso et al.,
2013). Not responding to one or more optional comments sections was not counted
towards the questionnaire being complete.
Data Analysis
This qualitative modified Delphi study was comprised of three separate
questionnaires administered over a 4-month period. This was an iterative process where
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data analysis built on the results of the previous round. Data was nominal in Round 1. In
Rounds 2 and 3, rating data used to determine consensus was ordinal. Any data based on
comments in Rounds 2 and 3 was nominal and only used to support interpretations of
ordinal data. The following sections explain how data was analyzed.
Round 1 started with open-ended questions (See Appendix I) that were derived
from the literature review and fit under one of six themes developed from the literature
review. Expert panel member were asked to comment on questions, and those responses
were used to create closed-ended questions for Round 2. In Round 2, expert panel
members were asked to rate each question on a five-point Likert-type scale, and provide
additional comments as appropriate. Questions whose ratings met a predetermined
definition of consensus passed on to Round 3. Consensus was defined as when the
frequency of responses for options 4 and 5 (agree and strongly agree) on a five-point
Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more of the expert panel members’ responses.
In Round 3, expert panel members were asked to rate each question on a five-point
Likert-type scale regarding desirability and feasibility separately, and provide additional
comments as appropriate. Questions whose ratings for both desirability and feasibility
met the same definition of consensus used in Round 2 passed to the final results. The
following sections describe the processes used to move inductively from the initial
themes used for Round 1 to subthemes, and how subthemes were used to create questions
that appeared in Rounds 2 and 3.
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Round 1 Data Analysis
All data from Round 1 was nominal. From the responses to the Round 1
questionnaire, I looked for concepts either shared or stand alone. I then generated a list
of potential subthemes under each main theme using traditional text analysis (Bright &
O’Connor, 2007). Subthemes were based on my interpretation of comments made by the
expert panel members and the frequency of concepts. From these subthemes, I then
created over 300 initial closed-ended questions. Many of the 300 initial questions were
redundant by design as I experimented with a consistent way to present questions. I then
reduced the over 300 closed-ended questions to 54 closed-ended questions.
Round 2 Data Analysis
The data resulting from Round 2 that determined if a question moved to Round 3
was ordinal. Expert panel members were asked to rate each of the questions based on a
five-point Likert-type scale. Questions whose ratings met the definition of consensus
were passed to Round 3. Consensus was defined as when the frequency of responses for
options 4 and 5 (agree and strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for
≥70% or more of the expert panel members’ responses. There was also an option for
each question where the respondent could enter a comment. Comment data was nominal.
Comment data was only used to support interpretation of ordinal data.
Round 3 Data Analysis
The data resulting from Round 3 that determined if a question moved to the final
results was ordinal. Expert panel members were asked to rate each of the questions based
on desirability and feasibility. Desirability and feasibility were separate questions for
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each of primary questions (two ratings for each primary question). Questions whose
desirability and feasibility ratings both met the definition of consensus were passed to the
final results. Consensus was defined as when the frequency of responses for options 4
and 5 (agree and strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or
more of the expert panel members’ responses. There was also an option for each
question where the respondent could enter a comment. Comment data was nominal.
Comment data was only used to support interpretation of ordinal data.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility
The strategy I used throughout this study was constant communication. During
the data collection phase, I was in contact with each panel member at least three times via
e-mail during each round. The first contact was to present the round instructions and
provide a link to each round questionnaire. The second contact was to remind expert
panel members about completing the study if they had not already. This second contact
generally occurred twice during the third week of data collection. The third contact was
to close each round questionnaire. During each contact, expert panel members were
encouraged to ask questions. In some cases, I spoke with expert panel members either by
phone are face-to-face. I submit that this approach to interacting with expert panels
members satisfied prolonged engagement and observation requirements. Questionnaire
questions were based on the literature review, my own personal understanding of how
standards development works, input from the expert panel members, and input from my
chair. I submit that this approach to organizing the study met triangulation requirements.
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In between data collection phases, I was in contact with the expert panel members
at least twice to advise them of data analysis progress and when they could expect a full
report of the particular round, and again with a recap of the preceding round. Contact in
between data collection period also gave expert panel members an opportunity to
comment, and gave me the opportunity to question any responses. Each contact I made
with expert panel members always included an invitation to contact me.
Transferability
Transferability as noted by Green (2013) and Gallego and Bueno (2014) can be a
strength and a weakness of a Delphi design, and is typically a function of study
uniqueness. I submit that this study was relatively unique for the following reasons.
First, the study addressed the development of industrial voluntary consensus standards
from a U.S. perspective and may not be applicable to voluntary consensus standards
development processes outside of the United States. Second, the organizations focused
on during this study represented U.S. SDOs and may not be representative of SDOs
outside of the United States. The most transferable component of this study may be that
understanding the scope and motivations of what are often competing organizations could
be beneficial to other types of organizations and could also be beneficial across cultures.
I mentioned in Chapter 3 that transferability could be a weakness of this study, and I still
maintain that position.
Dependability
Dependability has been defined as the “stability of data over time and under
different conditions” (Elo et al., 2014, p. 4). I submit that the stability of the data is high
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if the current U.S. approach to deregulation is stable. Per Coates (2015) and Wijen
(2014), deregulation is the primary reason for the rise in the number of unaccredited
industrial SDOs in the United States and the primary reason the legitimacy of the
industrial voluntary consensus standards process in the United States is under threat. As
long as the deregulation landscape in the United States remains stable, then the data
should remain stable. Should the deregulation landscape in the United States change over
time, then the stability of data over time may suffer.
Houghton et al. (2013) also stated the researcher is part of the research process
and demonstrating the researcher’s ability to be self-aware can enhance perceptions of
dependability. I tried to be transparent to all expert panel members regarding my own
involvement with industrial voluntary consensus standards development and biases that
existed prior to and during this study. The reader is left to determine how well I
addressed transparency.
One note of importance was that several expert panel members felt the questions
in Round 1 may be leading. I shared these concerns with all my expert panel members
after the concerns were voiced and explained the Round 1 questions were based on
themes derived from the literature review, not my own personal perspectives. There were
no more apparent concerns.
Confirmability
Confirmability often refers to neutrality of the researcher and the accuracy of the
data (Houghton et al., 2013). Regarding neutrality of the researcher, I do (as already
stated) believe there is a problem to be researched. Based on my belief that there is a
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problem, one could argue that I am not neutral in that I have effectively taken a stance.
As I stated in the dependability section, I have tried to address the potential neutrality
concern by being transparent.
What I submit is a larger concern regarding confirmability is accuracy of the data
based on the number of expert panel members, the makeup of the expert panel, and the
diversity of the expert panel members. The expert panel members were for the most part
suppliers or consultants. Only two expert panel members were actual end users, and only
one of these expert panel members who represented end users had experience with being
a supplier. The end users tended to respond in ways similar to non-end users, but many
statements that either demonstrated consensus or not only did so by a few percentage
points. A different expert panel make up could have changed some of the outcomes.
Similarly, I tried to select panel members I felt would provide honest answers. While I
believe this goal was achieved, I cannot say with certainty that all results would have
been the same had the panel been made up of a different group of expert panel members.
Finally, although the size of this homogeneous panel of experts was determined to be
acceptable for the purposes of claiming trustworthiness (Birko at al., 2015; Ju & Jim,
2013; Paré et al., 2013), a cannot say with certainty that a different panel size would not
have produced different results.
Study Results
The six themes that emerged from the literature review included competition,
deregulation, oversight, organizational structure, leadership training, and market-driven.
Each theme was based on what researchers had determined were specific issues related to
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the current conflict between accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited
industrial SDOs. The first six questions in the Round 1 questionnaire were based on
these six themes and were designed to explore the overarching question of how
collaborative practices could be improved between accredited U.S.-based industrial
SDOs (ASDOs in the questionnaires) and unaccredited industrial SDOs (UASDOs in the
questionnaires). A seventh open-ended question was presented that gave the expert panel
members an opportunity to comment as they wished, and not be constrained by any
particular theme. The responses that resulted from expert panel members formed the
basis for the iterative process that culminated in the study findings.
Round 1
Expert panel members were asked to provide at least three but no more than five
responses to each of the six questions that were based on literature deduced themes. Data
provided in the seventh question was used be me to gain a deeper understanding of expert
panel members’ responses to the six theme based questions. The questionnaire was
created using SurveyGizmo and the resulting data was entered into an Excel spreadsheet.
In one case, data was collected from a word doc because the expert panel member was
having issues with the online questionnaire, and then entered into the Excel spreadsheet.
A partial set of responses from each expert panel member is shown in Appendix L. A
document showing all responses is available upon request.
From the data collected in Round 1, subthemes were created that were used to
create the 54 closed-ended questions that formed the Round 2 questionnaire. Some
responses that informed the creation of subthemes are showed in Table 2.
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Table 2
Sample of Round 1 Reponses

Themes
Competition

P Codes
P20

Responses
“ASDOs and UASDOs need to align on the intent and
purpose of both types of organizations, and focus on
benefits of the end user (consumer) of the products and
services they provide to the relevant market. If they only
focus on their own interests, without genuine collaboration,
end users will suffers [sic] and industry progress will slow.”

Competition

P8

“ASDOs should/could provide representation within
applicable UASDOs for the purpose of cross-pollination
and an-fact, adoption of best practices. The inverse should
be in-place also. The goal is to provide the best consensus
standards and then facilitate the conformity assessment
systems needed to maintain their integrity.”

Deregulation

P6

“Setting legal requirements for ASDOs and UASDOs to be
recognized and legally referenced.”

Deregulation

P8

“Deregulation should be tailored to intent and not letter so
that improvements to industrial (or other) standards will
continually be encouraged.”

Oversight

P6

“Require referenced bodies to be peer-reviewed by nonmembers of the standard.”

Oversight

P2

“Third party (non-governmental) oversight could sponsor
collaborative efforts (i.e. joint conferences), at which
representatives from the two types of standards groups
could meet and discuss their concerns.”

Organizational P8
structure

“As the collaborative links between ASDOs and UASDOs
are strengthened, consideration should be given to either
scheduled joint sessions, or at a minimum, invitations to
leadership of opposite numbers to attend meetings.”

Organizational P6
structure

“Review of collaboration by organizational leadership –
regular evaluation of the status of collaboration can be
added to committee agendas.”
(table continues)

156
Themes

P Codes

Responses

Leadership
training

P20

“Leadership training should be focused on the development
of collaborative organizations.”

Leadership
training

P2

“Leverage internal ASDO and UASDO members to
determine which internal members are trainers in their
respective field(s) of expertise. The utilization of internal
trainers would be more cost effective, and would likely be
more well received by the other members.”

Market-driven

P7

“Since these standards are beneficial to the industry, the
industry should push bottom up to the ASDOs and the
UASDOs. They should demand standards that will help the
industry with safety, lowering operating costs and
increasing profits.”

Market-driven

P8

“Market reaction and acceptance is critical to the
establishment of collaborative practices. The effort will be
self-correcting in the sense that widespread industry
adoptions based on collaborative ASDO-UASDO efforts
are the ultimate report card.”
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A complete list of themes, theme codes, subthemes, subtheme codes, and frequencies
created from the responses to the Round 1 questionnaire are shown in Table 3.
Table 3
Themes & Codes From Round 1 & Resulting Subthemes, Subtheme Codes, & Frequency

Themes
Competition

Theme
codes
101





Frequency
5

1012
1013

2
17

1014

1

Liaisons Between
Organizations

1015

5



Joint Meetings/Cross
Training/Shared Information
Industries/Trade
Groups/Guidance
Incentives
Coordination of Activities

1016

10

1017

4

1018
1019

7
6

More Laws
Less Laws
State Laws
Federal Laws
Laws Do Not Matter (with
regard to collaboration)
Laws Do Matter (with regard
to collaboration)

1021
1022
1023
1024
1025

5
6
1
6
8

1026

15



102

Regular and Formalized
Communication
Advanced Planning
Alignment of intent and
purpose/Assignment of
Responsibilities
Industry Expectations

Subtheme
codes
1011





Deregulation

Subthemes








(table continued)
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Themes

Theme
codes
103


Subthemes
Consumer Based

Subtheme
codes
1031

Frequency
13

Oversight


Government Based (note:
most comments were
negative)
Mandatory
Voluntary
Active
Passive
External
Internal
Value

1032

10

1033
1034
1035
1036
1037
1038
1039

6
9
12
5
14
2
13

1041

12

1042
1043
1044
1045

4
4
4
9





Charters/Collaboration/Appre
ciation
Size
Form
Sub-Committees
Formalized Liaison Functions
(charter)
Political Differences (charter)
Protocols
Joint Reviews

1046
1047
1048

8
5
8



Shared Leadership

1049

1



Voluntary

1051

2











Mandatory
In Collaboration
In Empowerment
In Leading by Example
In Servant-Leadership
In Feedback
In Emotional Intelligence
Clarity of Function
In Understanding Other

1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
10510

4
5
1
2
1
2
1
12
7








Organization
al structure

104







Leadership
training

105

(table continued)
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Themes

Theme
codes

Subthemes

Subtheme
codes

Frequency

Organizations




Marketdriven

106












Function of Standards
Familiarity with Nonprofit
Organizations
Training at all Levels
Joint Training
Consumer Needs

10511
10512

4
2

10513
10514
1061

4
4
4

Industry Needs
SDO Needs
Industries/Trade
Groups/Guidance
Fragmentation Issues
Joint Activities/Meetings
Market Forces (drivers)
Reward Structures/Incentives

1062
1063
1064

9
6
10

1065
1066
1067
1068

5
6
10
10

Round 2
Subthemes generated from the results of Round 1 were then used to create 54
closed-ended questions that were presented to the expert panel members in Round 2. The
54 closed-ended questions are shown in Appendix J. Expert panel members were asked
to rate each of the 54 closed-ended questions on a five-point Likert-type scale. A partial
list of responses to the Round 2 questionnaire are showed in Appendix M. A document
showing all responses is available upon request. Questions that demonstrated consensus
with consensus being defined as when the frequency of responses for options 4 and 5
(agree and strongly agree) on a five-point Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more
of the expert panel members’ responses were moved to the next round. Of the original 54
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questions, a list of questions that met the definition of consensus along with the
corresponding question number are shown in Table 4.
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Table 4
Round 2 Questions That Resulted in Consensus
Question
No. from
Round 2
1

Questions

% Agree or
strongly agree

Theme(s)

Regular communication between ASDOs and UASDOs
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

100.0%

Competition

2

Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs by clarifying jointly to
both ASDOs and UASDOs what industry expects of both
groups.

100.0%

Competition

3

Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could
improve if both groups were incentivized to support each
other’s work.

72.8%

Competition

4

Having formal liaisons (reciprocal representation)
between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve
collaboration.

81.9%

Competition

5

Defining clear areas of responsibility could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs.

81.8%

Competition

6

Publishing Agendas well before an event (including
schedules of events) could help collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs.

100.0%

Competition

7

Better coordination of meetings could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs.

100.0%

Competition

9

Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could be
improved by introducing regulations that promoted
collaboration.

72.8%

Deregulation

17

Oversight could only improve collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs if both organizations were willing
to accept oversight.

90.9%

Oversight

21

Honoring ASDO and UASDO work in references,
contracts, etc..., could improve collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs without the need for oversight.

81.8%

Oversight

(table continued)
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Question
No. from
Round 2
24

Questions

% Agree or
strongly agree

Theme(s)

Oversight that encouraged collaboration with innovators
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

90.0%

Oversight

26

Flattening organizational structures (less hierarchical)
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

72.7%

Organizational
structure

27

Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could
improve if ASDOs and UASDOs shared similar
protocols.

81.8%

Organizational
structure

28

Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and
UASDOs if both types of organizations changed their
charters to include a department whose function was to
collaborate with other organizations.

100.0%

Organizational
structure

29

Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could
improve if both types of organizations changed
subcommittee mandates to include a specific venue to
present findings.

72.7%

Organizational
structure

30

Charters that included specifics for working with other
organizations could improve collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs.

81.8%

Organizational
structure

31

Shared leadership could improve collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs.

72.7%

Organizational
structure

32

Joint reviews of collaborative efforts between ASDOs and
UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs.

90.9%

Organizational
structure

35

Leaders trained in the concept of “leading by example”
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

72.7%

Leadership
training

38

Collaborative leadership training could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs.

72.7%

Leadership
training

42

Leadership training that included a focus on
understanding the scopes and goals of similar ASDOs and
UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs.

81.8%

Leadership
training

43

Mandatory training of new members at all levels could
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs.

72.8%

Leadership
training

45

Increased training for leaders on the benefits of standards

90.9%

Leadership

(table continued)
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Question
No. from
Round 2

Questions

% Agree or
strongly agree

to both society and business, with a focus on similarities
of ASDOs and UASDOs, could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs.

Theme(s)

training

46

Joint leadership cooperation training between ASDOs and
UASDOs in the form of workshops could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs.

80.0%

Leadership
training

47

Including relevant Industries and Trade Groups in a more
broad discussion with ASDOs and UASDOs could
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs.

100.0%

Market-driven

49

Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs if such groups made
collaboration beneficial to both types of organizations.

90.9%

Market-driven

50

Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs if they promoted both
types of organizations.

100.0%

Market-driven

51

Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs if they encouraged joint
participation at trade shows and other venues.

72.8%

Market-driven

52

Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs by publishing the benefits
of both organizations types of work.

100.0%

Market-driven

53

Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and
UASDOs if both types of organizations agreed upon joint
and/or shared articles of legitimacy.

72.7%

Market-driven

Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could
81.8%
improve if ASDOs were more inclined to accept input
from UASDOs and use this input to establish priorities.
Note. Consensus Definition = “Agree” & “Strongly Agree” are ≥70% of Responses

Market-driven

54

Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development Organizations) UASDOs
(Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations)

Thirty-one of the 54 questions in Round 2 met the definition of consensus and were
moved to Round 3.
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Round 3
In Round 3, the expert panel members were asked to rate each question on a fivepoint Likert-type scale based on desirability and feasibility. Desirability and feasibility
were separate ratings. A partial set of responses from each expert panel member is
shown in Appendix N. A document showing all responses is available upon request.
None of the statements that demonstrated consensus with regard to feasibility failed to
demonstrate consensus with regard to desirability. Consensus was defined as when the
frequency of responses for options 4 and 5 (agree and strongly agree) on a five-point
Likert-type scale accounted for ≥70% or more of the expert panel members’ responses.
A list of questions that met the definition of consensus regarding desirability regardless
of whether or not they met the definition of consensus regarding feasibility are shown in
Table 5. The question numbers were carried over from the Round 2 questions.
Table 5
Round 3 Questions That Resulted in Consensus Based on “Desirability” Only

Question
No. from
Round 3
1

Questions

Regular communication between
ASDOs and UASDOs could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

Desirability
(% agree or
strongly agree)
100.0%

Feasibility
(% agree or
strongly agree)
72.7%

Themes

Competition

2

Industry/Trade Groups could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs by clarifying jointly to both
ASDOs and UASDOs what industry
expects of both groups.

100.0%

90.9%

Competition

3

Collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs could improve if both groups
were incentivized to support each other’s

91.0%

63.6%

Competition

(table continued)
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Question
No. from
Round 3

Questions

Desirability
(% agree or
strongly agree)

Feasibility
(% agree or
strongly agree)

Themes

work.
4

Having formal liaisons (reciprocal
representation) between ASDOs and
UASDOs could improve collaboration.

81.8%

100.0%

Competition

5

Defining clear areas of responsibility
could improve collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs.

91.0%

81.8%

Competition

6

Publishing Agendas well before an event
(including schedules of events) could
help collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

100.0%

90.9%

Competition

7

Better coordination of meetings could
improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs.

100.0%

90.9%

Competition

21

Honoring ASDO and UASDO work in
references, contracts, etc..., could
improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs without the need for
oversight.

81.8%

72.7%

Oversight

24

Oversight that encouraged collaboration
with innovators could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

81.8%

63.6%

Oversight

27

Collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs could improve if ASDOs and
UASDOs shared similar protocols.

72.7%

45.5%

Organizational
Structure

28

Collaboration could improve between
ASDOs and UASDOs if both types of
organizations changed their charters to
include a department whose function
was to collaborate with other
organizations.

81.8%

54.6%

Organizational
Structure

(table continued)
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Question
No. from
Round 3
29

Questions

Collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs could improve if both types of
organizations changed subcommittee
mandates to include a specific venue to
present findings.

Desirability
(% agree or
strongly agree)
72.7%

Feasibility
(% agree or
strongly agree)
54.6%

Themes

Organizational
Structure

30

Charters that included specifics for
working with other organizations could
improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs.

81.8%

63.6%

Organizational
Structure

32

Joint reviews of collaborative efforts
between ASDOs and UASDOs could
improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs.

100.0%

63.6%

Organizational
Structure

35

Leaders trained in the concept of
“leading by example” could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

90.9%

54.6%

Leadership
Training

38

Collaborative leadership training could
improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs.

81.9%

81.8%

Leadership
Training

42

Leadership training that included a focus
on understanding the scopes and goals of
similar ASDOs and UASDOs could
improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs.

81.9%

63.6%

Leadership
Training

43

Mandatory training of new members at
all levels could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs.

90.9%

45.5%

Leadership
Training

45

Increased training for leaders on the
benefits of standards to both society and
business, with a focus on similarities of
ASDOs and UASDOs, could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

100.0%

54.6%

Leadership
Training

(table continued)
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Question
No. from
Round 3
46

Questions

Joint leadership cooperation training
between ASDOs and UASDOs in the
form of workshops could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

Desirability
(% agree or
strongly agree)
72.8%

Feasibility
(% agree or
strongly agree)
36.4%

Themes

Leadership
Training

47

Including relevant Industries and Trade
Groups in a more broad discussion with
ASDOs and UASDOs could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

100.0%

72.7%

Market-driven

49

Industry/Trade Groups could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs if such groups made
collaboration beneficial to both types of
organizations.

100.0%

81.8%

Market-driven

50

Industry/Trade Groups could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs if they promoted both types of
organizations.

100.0%

90.9%

Market-driven

51

Industry/Trade Groups could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs if they encouraged joint
participation at trade shows and other
venues.

91.0%

54.5%

Market-driven

52

Industry/Trade Groups could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs by publishing the benefits of
both organizations types of work.

100.0%

72.7%

Market-driven

53

Collaboration could improve between
ASDOs and UASDOs if both types of
organizations agreed upon joint and/or
shared articles of legitimacy.

72.8%

45.5%

Market-driven

Collaboration between ASDOs and
90.9%
54.5%
UASDOs could improve if ASDOs were
more inclined to accept input from
UASDOs and use this input to establish
priorities.
Note. Consensus Definition = “Agree” & “Strongly Agree” are ≥70% of Responses

Market-driven

54

Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development Organizations)
UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations)
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Twenty-seven questions met the definition of consensus for desirability. As
already mentioned, none of the questions that met the definition of consensus for
feasibility failed the definition of consensus for desirability. For this reason, I believe
Table 5 is important because it demonstrates that questions that were deemed desirable
based on consensus were not always considered feasible based on the same definition of
consensus. A list of questions that met both the definition of consensus for both
desirability and feasibility are shown in Table 6. The question numbers were carried over
from the Round 2 questions.
Table 6
Round 3 Questions That Resulted in Consensus Based on “Desirability” & “Feasibility”
Question
No. From
Round 3

Questions

Desirability
(% Agree or
Strongly
Agree)
100.0%

Feasibility
(% Agree or
Strongly
Agree)
72.7%

1

Regular communication between ASDOs
and UASDOs could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

2

Themes

Competition

Industry/Trade Groups could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs by clarifying jointly to both
ASDOs and UASDOs what industry
expects of both groups.

100.0%

90.9%

Competition

4

Having formal liaisons (reciprocal
representation) between ASDOs and
UASDOs could improve collaboration.

81.8%

100.0%

Competition

5

Defining clear areas of responsibility
could improve collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs.

91.0%

81.8%

Competition

(table continued)
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Question
No. From
Round 3

Questions

Desirability
(% Agree or
Strongly
Agree)
100.0%

Feasibility
(% Agree or
Strongly
Agree)
90.9%

6

Publishing Agendas well before an event
(including schedules of events) could
help collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

7

Competition

Better coordination of meetings could
improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs.

100.0%

90.9%

Competition

21

Honoring ASDO and UASDO work in
references, contracts, etc..., could
improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs without the need for
oversight.

81.8%

72.7%

Oversight

38

Collaborative leadership training could
improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs.

81.9%

81.8%

Leadership
Training

47

Including relevant Industries and Trade
Groups in a more broad discussion with
ASDOs and UASDOs could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs.

100.0%

72.7%

Market-driven

49

Industry/Trade Groups could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs if such groups made
collaboration beneficial to both types of
organizations.

100.0%

81.8%

Market-driven

50

Industry/Trade Groups could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs if they promoted both types of
organizations.

100.0%

90.9%

Market-driven

52

Themes

Industry/Trade Groups could improve
100.0%
72.7%
Market-driven
collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs by publishing the benefits of
both organizations types of work.
Table Notes: Consensus Definition = “Agree” & “Strongly Agree” are ≥70% of Responses
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development Organizations) UASDOs
(Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations)
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Twelve questions met the definition of consensus for both desirability and
feasibility and were passed to the final results.
Summary
The answers to the research questions indicated the expert panel members did
believe there were solutions to improving collaborative practices, however, there were
caveats. Answers generally focused on solutions that did not require an increase in
regulations, did not involve increased governmental participation, and did not disregard a
SDOs motivations. Solutions were also not considered to be primarily the responsibility
of accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs, and the potential role of industry and
trade groups was pronounced. Harmonization of motives was the overarching suggestion
for improving collaboration, and until that happened, organizations would continue to do
what they perceived to be in their best interests.
Chapter 5 contains my evaluations of the expert panel members’ responses to the
questions posed, my attempts to conclude what solutions were considered promising
based on consensus, which suggestions may be better than others, and why some
solutions were not considered viable. In Chapter 5, I also address the limitations of this
study, recommendations, and implications.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to discover what consensus could be built among
expert panel members (previously called subject matter experts or SMEs) regarding
desirable and feasible future-oriented actions leaders of accredited U.S.-based industrial
standard development organizations (SDOs) and unaccredited industrial SDOs may take
to improve collaborative practices and better serve public interests. This study was
conducted using a qualitative method and modified three-round Delphi design.
Qualitative research is consistent with the goal of exploring how leaders of industrial
SDOs approach industrial voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and
diffusion, and what changes might be conducive to improving collaborative practices
between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs in the United States. The selection
of a Delphi design was deemed appropriate because of the desire to compare expert
opinions regarding desirable and feasible future-oriented actions (Hasson & Keeney,
2011). Gaining insight into activities that may improve collaborative practices was
important because industrial voluntary consensus standards are a critical social function
that affects all members of society (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). If lack of
collaborative practices in the United States is threatening the legitimacy of the U.S.
industrial voluntary consensus standards process, then what has traditionally been a
democratic and inclusive process designed to serve public interests is also at risk
(Brunsson et al., 2012; Osula & Ng, 2014; Sandholtz, 2012).
The results of this study demonstrated consensus on 12 approaches that may
improve collaborative practices and alter what is becoming a more contentious process in
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the United States. These 12 approaches could affect how leaders of industrial SDOs
work internally and externally to improve collaborative practices, and how external
stakeholders participate in improving collaborative practices. The 12 final consensus
items consisted of (a) formalizing communication processes – statements related to
establishing liaison and communication functions within SDOs and communication
between SDOs and external entities; (b) defining clear areas of responsibility –
statements related to clarifying accredited and unaccredited industrial SDO functions,
expectations of industry and trade groups, and expectations of third party participants
such as government; (c) better coordination of activities – statements related to
publication of agendas, coordination of meetings, honoring work, and general
improvements in communication; (d) leadership training – statements related to training
leaders and participants in the art of collaboration; and (e) industry and trade group
involvement – statements related to communicating to SDOs what industry expects,
extoling the benefits of both accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs, and helping all
stakeholders understand the benefits of collaboration.
The key findings of this study indicate that more regulation was not considered a
viable solution to improving collaborative practices in the United States and that
significant stakeholders had it within their power to improve collaborative practices
without the necessity of forced intervention. In this chapter, I compare my findings with
the peer-reviewed literature presented in Chapter 2, consider the implications based on
my findings and in the context of stakeholder and institutional theory, identify
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limitations, and communicate recommendations. I end this study with a final message
that captures the importance of this study.
Interpretation of Findings
Researchers agreed that industrial voluntary consensus standards are critical to
promoting communication between significant stakeholders and that voluntary consensus
standards are vital to servicing public interests (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Ponte & Cheyns,
2013; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Researchers also agreed that industrial voluntary
consensus standards processes in general are becoming more contentious as various
organizations fight for legitimacy (Osula & Ng, 2014). The challenge is of importance in
the United States because of the unique U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to
industrial voluntary consensus standards development, adoption, and diffusion (Strauss,
2013). None of the expert panel members appeared to disagree with these findings, but
opinions varied regarding potential solutions, and potential solutions did not always
match with opinions expressed by researchers. My interpretation of the results of this
study are presented based on the 12 final suggestions and within the confines of the six
themes that emerged from the literature review.
Deregulation
Deregulation was considered by some researchers to be the primary reason for the
increase in the number of unaccredited industrial SDOs in the United States and the
resulting increase in competition and conflict between accredited and unaccredited
industrial SDOs (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Coates, 2015; Fransen, 2011; Wijen, 2014).
Reinecke et al. (2012) suggested that the increasing tendencies of accredited and
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unaccredited industrial SDOs to “sell their brand” (p. 798) should not be an unexpected
outcome given the current state of deregulation and lack of oversight that has contributed
to a more crowded field of industrial SDOs, each fighting for legitimacy. As suggested
by some researchers, seeking improvements in collaborative practices may be a moot
point without reengagement on the part of legislative bodies (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012;
Brunsson et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Most expert panel members were
not in favor of legislative solutions, and none of the final 12 suggestions included a
legislative solution. As suggested by one expert panel member,
I don't think the collaborative practices, good or not good are affected in any way
by regulation laws, nor by deregulation laws so I cannot believe that leveraging or
changing regulation laws will make any impact at all on the collaborative
practices. (P4)
This perspective was echoed by other expert panel members. My interpretation is that
expert panel members felt efforts to improve collaborative practices would be better
served by helping significant stakeholders realized the benefits of collaboration, and not
by trying to force collaboration. As suggested by one expert panel member, “Convince
ASDOs and UASDOs that collaborative practices are to their benefit. Identify the
problem” (P10).
Oversight
A potential solution suggested by researchers was that as a result of deregulation
in the United States, participation or oversight on the part of legislative or third party
entities needed to be increased because any state or industry consortium can create an
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SDO (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al., 2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010).
The rational offered was that from an economic perspective, unaccredited industrial
SDOs are often motivated by business related objectives more so than accredited
industrial SDOs (Reinecke et al., 2012). An increase in oversight could help mitigate the
differences in motivations and protect a process that has historically favored a
deliberative and inclusive democratic approach. While increased oversight was not
generally rejected by the expert panel members, there tended to be consensus that passive
oversight in the form of recognition of contributions could improve collaborative
practices and was more desirable that a controlling type of oversight. This perception
was supported by one of the 12 final suggestions that focused on oversight in the form of
honoring SDO activities as a desirable and feasible approach to improving collaborative
practices. My primary interpretation is that expert panel members felt active oversight
had the potential for producing winners and losers and that passive oversight that
recognized contributions was a more desirable approach to improving collaborative
practices. As one expert panel member suggested, “too much stick—need more carrot”
(P8). A secondary interpretation regarding oversight was potential concern on the part of
expert panel members regarding oversight qualifications. Although researchers often
suggested oversight could improve collaboration, I could not find any suggestions in the
literature for how an oversight function could be qualified. As one expert panel member
suggested regarding legislative oversight, “The government does not have the technical
expertise or organizational structure to enact or enforce clear and non-conflicting [sic]
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standards” (P10). Expert panel members may have similar concerns regarding other
types of oversight organizations.
Organizational Structure
Researchers pointed out that SDOs are generally incorporated as nonprofits, but
that even as nonprofits, there is still an economic component to their structure (Pache &
Santos, 2013). Researchers referred to this type of structure as a hybrid structure, and
suggested this could be a particular challenge for leaders of SDOs because leaders of
SDOs typically came from forprofit backgrounds and might not be familiar with or
qualified to address organizational situations where there is no single goal (Benner &
Pastor, 2015; Osula & Ng, 2014; Smith, 2014). Also mentioned by researchers was that
organizations incorporated as nonprofits tend to have a leadership structure that relies
more heavily on a board of directors than in forprofit organizations. As a result, boards
of nonprofits are more critical to addressing leadership issues because leadership tends to
be more of a group activity in organizations incorporated as nonprofits than in
organizations incorporated as forprofit (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Goldkind, 2015). Expert
panel members acknowledged these potential problems, but none of the final 12
suggestions supported improving collaborative practices by changing U.S.-based
industrial SDO organizational structures. The closest suggestion to improving
collaborative practices within the confines of existing organizational structures was
consensus on the part of expert panel members that establishing liaison functions within
and between industrial SDOs could improve collaboration. As suggested by one expert
panel member, “All organizations, ASDOs and UASDOs alike, would need an office or
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directorate to perform the formal liaison functions with their opposite numbers” (P8).
My interpretation is that expert panel members felt improving collaborative practices was
more a function of reward structures, and that reward structures could be modified
without the need for changing organizational structures. The formation of liaison
functions was not a solution suggested by researchers per se.
Leadership
Researchers made numerous references to the challenges of leadership in
nonprofit or hybrid organizations and three overarching observations surfaced. First,
understanding desirable characteristics of leaders of hybrid organizations could
illuminate potential collaborative practice improvements (McMurray, Islam, Sarros, &
Pirola-Merlo, 2012). Second, collaboration was not the norm within forprofit
organizations leaders of industrial SDOs tended to come from (Benner & Pastor, 2015;
Cho & Perry, 2012). Third, leaders of hybrid organizations may need to be specifically
selected or trained to do justice to a hybrid organization’s unique leadership challenges
(Schröer & Jäger, 2015). Expert panel members acknowledged that SDO leaders in the
United States may not have the skill sets required for a collaborative environment and
one of the 12 final suggestions focused on the need for collaborative training of SDO
leaders and leadership. As suggested by one expert panel member, “Leadership training
should be focused on the development of collaborative organizations” (P20). My
interpretation is that while expert panel members were in agreement with researchers that
leaders of industrial SDO may not be qualified, collaborative training was considered
more desirable and feasible than other types of training or special selection criteria.
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Market-Driven
Some researchers suggested that what helped give rise to the increase in
unaccredited industrial SDOs in the United States as a result of deregulation was the
unique U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to the development, adoption, and
diffusion of voluntary consensus standards (Ernst, 2013; Kaplan & Kinderman, 2015;
Lampland & Star, 2009; Strauss, 2013). Researchers tended to focus on two aspects of
the market-driven, bottom-up environment. These included the role of politics and
economics (Allen & Ramanna, 2013; Fransen, 2011) and the supposition that once
formed, organizations like SDOs were reluctant to let go of what was publicly claimed to
have added value, and privately perceived to be more about power (Fransen, 2011).
Expert panel members did not appear to disagree with researchers with regard to the
importance of market drivers within the U.S. context. Five of the 12 final suggestions
from expert panel members focused on the importance of market drivers and generally
put the burden on industry and trade groups to provide the guidance that would allow
market drivers to generate the type of collaborative behavior that would be beneficial to
all stakeholders. My interpretation is that expert panel members agreed with researchers
that behavior in the U.S. market-driven, bottom-up environment is largely about profit
and power. However, I believe the consensus among expert panel members was that,
rather than try and change the system, provide incentives that would encourage marketdriven solutions. As one expert panel member suggested, “Since these standards are
beneficial to the industry, the industry should push bottom up to the ASDOs and the
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UASDOs. They should demand standards that will help the industry with safety, lowering
operating costs and increasing profits” (P7).
Competition
Increased competition and resulting conflict tended to be the overarching concern
of researchers and the reason that more collaboration was needed, especially in the
United States. A reduction in competition and conflict was deemed critical by
researchers for protecting public interests and promoting positive social change by
maintaining a deliberative and inclusive democratic process that supported the legitimacy
of industrial SDOs and the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process (Behr &
Diaz, 2014; Brunsson et al., 2012; Hopper, 2013; Olshan, 1993; Sandholtz, 2012;
Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Yates & Murphy, 2015). Expert panel members did not
disagree with researchers and felt communication was a key component to finding a
solution. Three of the final 12 suggestions focused on the benefits of communication
within and between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs. As suggested by expert
panel members, “Liaisons should be assigned between the two organizations, allowing
for the open and honest transfer of ideas” (P2), “Have more joint meetings. First each
organization must now [sic] it's purpose and then they must come to the table and agree
what each organization is best suited to publish” (P5), and “Providing liaisons regular
scheduled time in regular meetings of related standards organizations enhances
collaboration and promotes both groups” (P6). My interpretation is that promoting
communication was considered a more desirable and feasible solution to reducing
conflict based competition than a more forced reduction in conflict. Several of the final
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12 suggestions that focused on industry and trade group particiaption also included a
communication component within and between accredited and unaccredited industrial
SDOs.
Limitations of the Study
This study had several limitations. One of the features of this Delphi design, and
Delphi designs in general, is that expert panel member selection is based on the
assumption that selected expert panel members are experts regarding the subject matter,
not that their opinions are statistically representative of the population of potential experts
(Förster & Von der Gracht, 2014). This feature brings into question the trustworthiness
of this study. Different expert panel members could have produced a different set of
suggestions. A second limitation is my use of purposive sampling to selected expert
panel members. Such an approach could have produced a panel that resulted in biases
that skewed the results. I attempted to address this concern by selecting expert panel
members who represented different stakeholders and potentially different perspectives.
A third limitation was non-response error. As already mentioned, expert panel member
selection is based on the assumption that selected expert panel members are experts
regarding the subject matter, not that their opinions are statistically representative of the
population of potential experts (Förster & Gracht, 2014). Non-response error has the
potential to exacerbate the potential problem of statistical representation (Hsu &
Sandford, 2007). Hsu and Sandford (2007) recommended contacting non-responders as
soon as possible in order to promote participation in subsequent rounds. I did contact
non-responders and none asked to be removed from the panel. This approach was used at
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the end of Round 1 and Round 2 in an effort to reduce statistical representation error. A
forth limitation was participant drop out. Drop out is a potential problem in a Delphi
study due to the iterative nature of the Delphi design (Green, 2013; Kalaian & Kasim,
2012). Every effort was made to reduce drop out by expressing the importance of this
study and creating instruments that could be completed in 30 to 45 minutes (Birko et al.,
2015). Three expert panel members asked to be removed after the completion of Round
1. No expert panel members asked to be removed during or after subsequent rounds. A
fifth limitation is that this study appears to be unique. Transferability is therefore a
potential weakness. There was nothing I could do about study uniqueness, and all I could
do was focus on establishing rigor.
Recommendations
Industry and Trade Groups
This study was primarily focused on collaborative practices between accredited
U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs. Several of the 12 final
suggestions for improving collaborative practices included more industry and trade group
participation. The rationale per the expert panel members was that standards greatly
impact industry, and industry and trade groups would benefit by supporting collaborative
practices. As suggested by one expert panel member, “Since these standards are
beneficial to the industry, the industry should push bottom up to the ASDOs and the
UASDOs. They should demand standards that will help the industry with safety, lowering
operating costs and increasing profits” (P7). Researchers also suggested that trade
benefited from industrial voluntary consensus standards (Heras-Saizarbitoria & Boiral,
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2013; Hopper, 2013; Pirard at al., 2015). Per Timmermans and Epstein (2010), even if
standards do not directly harmonize or globalize interchanges, they can help lead in that
direction. Considering the importance expert panel members placed on industry and
trade group participation, researchers may wish to conduct studies focused specifically on
industry and trade group perceptions regarding improving collaborative practices in the
area of industrial voluntary consensus development, adoption, and diffusion.
Legislative Bodies
None of the 12 final suggestions included intervention by legislative bodies as
desirable or feasible for improving collaborative practices in the United States. However,
converting industrial voluntary consensus standards to code though a process known in
the United States as inclusion by reference (IRB) has become popular with legislative
bodies (Abrams, 2014; Ernst, 2013; Ringsberg, 2015; Strauss, 2013). The IRB process
can reduce cost and accelerate codification processes. Even if not codified, some
researchers suggested that industrial voluntary consensus standards can benefit society
when governmental regulations are weak or incompatible (Brunsson et al., 2012), or can
act as viable substitutes for regulations (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010; Vogel, 2010;
Wijen, 2014). Other researchers suggested that reengagement on the part of legislative
bodies might be necessary in order to maintain the legitimacy of industrial voluntary
consensus standards processes (Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Brunsson et al.,
2012; Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Based on researcher suggestions, legislative
bodies have a vested interest in how the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus process
works. The more legitimate the process, the more confidence legislative bodies have in
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allowing standards to substitute for regulation (code), and the more confidence legislative
bodies have in the codes that result from industrial voluntary consensus standards.
Researchers may wish to conduct studies that focus on the U.S. industrial voluntary
consensus standards process from a legislative perspective. The results could encourage
greater participation by legislative bodies, or at least help legislative bodies gain greater
understanding of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process. Research of
this nature may also help motivate non-governmental stakeholder to take a greater
interest in improving collaborative practices.
Accredited and Unaccredited Industrial SDOs
In this study, expert panel members were asked to comment on questions related
to improving collaborative practices between accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs. This study did not focus on gathering input from
accredited or unaccredited industrial SDOs, especially paid SDO members. As suggested
by researchers, accredited industrial SDOs typically have different motivations from
unaccredited industrial SDOs. As suggested by one researcher, the increase in
competition between accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial
SDOs could be leading to conflicts that are not politically and economically neutral, and
threaten public interests (Fransen, 2011). More specifically, some researchers suggested
that moral responsibility of industrial SDOs to serve public interests primarily by
promoting uniform and harmonized occupational/consumer safety and quality control
procedures was in danger of being replaced by political and economic motivations that
placed special interests ahead of public interests (Ponte & Cheyns, 2013). The rationale
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offered by some researchers was that unaccredited industrial SDOs are often motivated
by business related objectives more so than accredited industrial SDOs (Reinecke et al.,
2012). This difference in motivation could result in a standards war as each side
competes for legitimacy (Behr & Diaz, 2014; Botzem & Dobusch, 2012; Ernst, 2013;
Farrell & Simcoe, 2012; Pirard et al., 2015). This potential difference between accredited
and unaccredited industrial SDO motivations in the United States was encapsulated by
one expert panel member who suggested,
“It ends up being about politics in the end and who has the leverage. Is it the
accredited organization because they have governmental backing as law or the
industry consortium because they have the money and power of the market?”. (P9)
Researchers should consider studies that attempt to gain greater understanding of how
U.S.-based accredited industrial SDOs and unaccredited industrial SDOs see the role
each type of organization plays. Research that focused on the perceptions of accredited
and unaccredited industrial SDOs could increase external understanding of what
motivates each type of SDOs. Such research could also help SDOs understand their own
internal motivations. Understanding internal motivations could be especially helpful
because some researchers suggested organizations benefit from knowing themselves as
well as other stakeholders (Tashman & Raelin, 2013). The focus of research could be on
senior volunteer members, paid members, or a combination of both. Research that
focused on paid members could be particularly enlightening because of the financial
implications.
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Leaders of Hybrid Organizations
During this study, I tended not to focus just on leaders of U.S.-based industrial
SDOs and broadened the scope of research to include other organizational components.
My rationale was that while some researchers suggested leading hybrid organizations
could present leaders with special leadership challenges (Bordia et al., 2011), the role of
leaders was considered by researchers to represent a specific component of voluntary
consensus standards development processes and was not representative of all challenges.
Only one of the 12 final recommendations by expert panel members focused on
leadership training as a way to improve collaborative practices in the United States.
Research that focused more specifically on leaders in hybrid organizations like industrial
SDO could be very useful. As suggest by some researchers, there has been abundant
research regarding leadership needs in forprofit organizations, considerably less research
regarding leadership needs in nonprofit organizations, and even less research regarding
leadership needs in hybrid organizations. Researchers also pointed out that leadership of
hybrid organizations tend to rely on boards, and that leadership is more of a group
activity than in organizations incorporated as forprofit (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Goldkind,
2015). This lack of research into hybrid organization leadership needs represents a gap in
the literature regarding specific challenges faced by leaders of hybrid organizations
(Battilana & Lee, 2014; Schröer & Jäger, 2015). Further research that focused more
specifically on leadership skills required in hybrid organizations such as U.S.-based
industrial SDOs could contribute to improving collaborative practices as well as
expanding the understanding of hybrid leadership needs in general.
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Different Experts and Researchers
In the limitations section, one of the limitations I mentioned was that a feature of
Delphi designs in general is that expert panel member selection is based on the
assumption that selected expert panel members are experts regarding the subject matter,
not that their opinions are statistically representative of the population of potential experts
(Förster & Von der Gracht, 2014). Researchers also suggested that instruments often had
to be created based on the uniqueness of the study (Hasson & Keeney, 2011; Sobaih et
al., 2012). Research that used a different set of experts and different researchers could
make two important contributions to the body of knowledge. First, opinions of different
experts familiar with the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process could
result in different recommendations for improving collaborative practices. Second,
different researchers may create instruments that guide the experts in different directions.
Both changes could support or bring into question the trustworthiness of the current
study.
Open Question Evaluation Techniques
The interpretation of responses to Round 1 questions were made by me using
traditional text analysis versus computer text analysis. These interpretations formed the
basis for questions used in subsequent rounds. As suggested by Bright and O’Connor
(2007), traditional text analysis has both strengths and weakness compared to computer
text analysis. One of the primary strengths of traditional text analysis is that the
researcher can bring unique perspectives to the analysis process. One of the primary
weaknesses of traditional text analysis is the potential for inconsistent analysis. Based on
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the iterative nature of Delphi designs and potential uniqueness of a study, additional
research into traditional text analysis versus computer text analysis could help future
researchers select the best way to analyze nominal data, and add more credibility to
qualitative Delphi studies.
Implications
Positive Social Change
The overarching implication for positive social change as a result of improving
collaborative practices regarding the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards
process is that all of society would benefit because all of society is affected by industrial
voluntary consensus standards (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). Regarding how positive
social change might be realized in tangible ways, I submit that organizational and
societal/policy benefits are the most likely to surface as a result of this study, with
organizational benefits being the most obvious. From an organizational perspective,
reduced conflict between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs through
communication and understanding is the most important implication drawn from the
expert panel members’ final 12 recommendations. Industrial SDOs tend to be where
voluntary consensus standards development starts. This is not to say that industrial SDOs
create the need for a voluntary consensus standard, but industrial SDOs are where
concepts are often first given tangible form. In some respects, the role of industrial SDOs
may be compared to the first round of a Delphi study in that the first round tends to set
the tone for the iterative processes that follow. Defining responsibilities, improving
agreement on standards development priorities, reducing the number of conflicting
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standards, faster standards development time, better working relationships with industry
and government, an increase in communication, and less government incentive to
interfere with market processes are all positive implications as a result of improving
collaborative practices between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs.
Industry could enjoy many of the benefits of improved collaborative practices
between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs. As suggested by several expert
panel members, industry is directly impacted by voluntary consensus standards. When a
voluntary consensus standards process is not in harmonization, there is a cost associated
with lack of harmonization. This cost is often passed on to the public and may not be
beneficial to society. This may be why at least five of the 12 final recommendations for
improving collaborative practices between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs
involved industry and trade group participation. The implication is that industry would
benefit if they were to actively help with collaborative practices, and that this benefit
would then pass to the public and benefit society. By helping to improve collaborative
practices between accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs, industry may help reduce
legislative burdens. Legislative burdens are another form of cost that industry must
absorb or pass on to others. The implication is that if the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial
voluntary consensus standards process benefits from improved collaborative practices,
there would be less incentive for government to impose regulatory solutions, which could
reduce cost to industry and benefit society.
Government could also benefit from more collaborative practices between
accredited and unaccredited industrial SDOs. Legislative solutions are not free and the
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U.S. market-driven, bottom-up approach to developing industrial voluntary consensus
standards has kept legislative solutions in check by supporting a deliberative and
inclusive democratic process that allowed the market to drive the process. The
implication is that improving collaborative practices between accredited and unaccredited
industrial SDOs would reduce cost to both government and industry. Government would
benefit from not having to incur the cost of creating legislative solutions, and industry
would not have to deal with the cost of addressing increased legislation. Cost savings to
government and industry would ideally benefit society who would not have these costs
passed to them. Codification of industrial voluntary consensus standards by Government
could also benefit from improved collaborative practices. The implication is that
maintaining the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus standards process
would give the government more confidence in industrial voluntary consensus standards
that government wished to codify. Increased confidence could result in more
codification, reduce bureaucracy, reduce cost, and benefit society through a more
streamlined and consistent process.
Another implication of the 12 final recommendations provided by expert panel
members is that by improving collaborative practices in the United States, there would be
a reduction in winners and losers. SDOs, industry, and government would be motivated
to improve collaborative practices because each organization would be inclined to see
collaboration as being in their best interests. The implication for society is that society
would benefit, although maybe more indirectly than with organizations, by not being the
victim of standards wars created by lack of collaboration between SDOs, industry, and
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government. Benefits to society could be in the form of reduced monetary costs, fewer
conflicting standards, less fragmentation regarding adoption of standards, and more rapid
access to technology.
Theoretical Implications
Regarding theory, the 12 final suggestions of expert panel members supported
both stakeholder theory and institutional theory. In the case of stakeholder theory, the
results of this study tended to confirm that expert panel members believed understanding
one’s own organization as a stakeholder is important for understanding other
stakeholders. This perception was supported by researchers who claimed mutual
understanding would improve if stakeholders included their own organization in the
stakeholder mix (Tashman and Raelin, 2013). Expert panel members also acknowledged
that while society benefits from a functioning industrial voluntary consensus standards
process, there was a tendency to focus on SDOs, industries, and governments as the most
valuable stakeholders. This perception of value was supported by researchers who
suggested that stakeholders are not homogeneous, and have different claims to value
(Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014; Garriga, 2014; Hasnas, 2013; Laczniak & Murphy, 2012).
Implications for stakeholder theory are support for the belief that stakeholder value
varies, and that understanding one’s own organization can improve stakeholder relations.
In the case of institutional theory, the results of this study showed a preference
among expert panel members for normative and memetic isomorphic solutions as being
more desirable and feasible than coercive isomorphic solutions. This perspective was
supported by researchers who suggested desirable behavior was more likely to occur if
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compliance was voluntary rather than coerced (Chandler & Hwang, 2015; Grob & Benn,
2014, Guerreiro et al., 2012). The implications for institutional theory are that coercive
isomorphic pressure should be a last resort if voluntary collaboration is the goal.
A More Collaborative Process
Figure 2 in Chapter 2 presented a visual interpretation of the current situation
based on the literature review. In Figure 2, accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and
unaccredited industrial SDOs were shown in competition with each other in a battle for
legitimacy with other significant stakeholders being the prize. Figure 3 shows the
situation that could be realized if accredited U.S.-based industrial SDOs and unaccredited
industrial SDOs where working together, guided by industry and trade groups. The
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the key player in representing the United
States on the world stage, would still occupy an important role. However, I submit
ANSI’s role would now be more focused on presenting the best of U.S. developed
industrial voluntary consensus standards locally and globally rather than playing the role
of referee in regard to bridging the gap between accredited and unaccredited industrial
SDOs, industry, and government. This role would now be assumed more by industry and
trade groups, and could result in a less continuous process that promoted organizational
cooperation, did not produce winners and losers, and ultimately served public interests
more effectively.
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Figure 3. Reduced tensions and greater collaboration.
Conclusions
The market-driven, bottom-up approach to the U.S. industrial voluntary consensus
standards process has served the United States, the world, and public interests well over
the past two centuries. However, over that time the world has changed, and old
approaches may no longer be viable. One solution is to try and roll back certain events so
that previous ways of accomplishing tasks that historically were beneficial to society
could still be viable. Another solution is to consider new ways of accomplishing tasks
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that are more in alignment with current and future realities, but that still keep social
interests at the forefront.
If positive social interests are to prevail while not being perceived as threats to
significant stakeholders, the focus needs to be on finding the right reward structures that
promote desirable behavior. In the case of industrial voluntary consensus standards in the
United States, an improvement in collaborative practices whose aim is to find the right
balance of rewards could be a viable solution. By focusing on establishing the right
balance of rewards by gaining understanding of all significant stake holders, and possibly
led by industry and trade groups, the legitimacy of the U.S. industrial voluntary
consensus standards process may be preserved and produce results that are ultimately in
the best interests of society.
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Appendix A: Request to SDOs to Forward the Invitation to Their Volunteer Members

Dear :
Thank you for agreeing to consider my request to send this invitation to your members.
As per our conversation, I am looking for people who are familiar with Industrial
Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) and Voluntary Consensus Standards
(VCS) processes to answers questions about the dynamics that exist between Accredited
U.S.-based Industrial SDOs (ASDOs) and Unaccredited Industrial SDOs (UASDOs).
Participation will help pave new ground in research that may improve collaborative
practices between Accredited and Unaccredited Industrial Standards Development
Organizations. Interested parties can contact me directly at XXX@waldenu.edu.
I have also attached a document that explains what I am doing in more detail so potential
volunteers can make a more informed decision. If your organization agrees to forward
this invitation, simply reply to this email with your intentions, and include me on the
email list when you send it out so I know it has been done.
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you for your time
and consideration.
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Appendix B: Detailed Attachment to SDO Request/Invitation E-mail
(The same information was sent to potential expert panel members I contacted directly)

My name is Joel Blumenthal. I am an engineer who has spent many years working with
industrial instrumentation. I am also a doctoral student at Walden University pursuing a
PhD in management with a specialization in leadership and organizational change. My
dissertation is focused on exploring the dynamics between Accredited U.S.-based
Industrial Standards Development Organizations (ASDOs) and Unaccredited Industrial
Standards Development Organizations (UASDOs).
I am seeking subject matter experts (SMEs) in the field of Industrial Voluntary
Consensus Standards (VCSs) to answer questions related to how ASDOs and UASDOs
interact. This study is being conducted separate from any of my other roles.
If you participate in this three-round Delphi study, you and other members of the study
panel will be asked to complete three separate electronic questionnaires (one
questionnaire per round) over approximately a four month period. You will have 3
weeks to complete each questionnaire, with an expectation that each questionnaire will
take no more than 30 to 45 minutes to complete.
Inclusion criteria includes familiarity with technical jargon used in the world of
industrial voluntary consensus standards, ability to describe cases that illustrate good
versus poor decision regarding the development of industrial voluntary consensus
standards, ability to communicate effectively in the spoken and written U.S. English
language, currently active with an accredited industrial SDO on a voluntary basis with a
least five years continuous involvement, and have been employed with or worked with
organizations or industries that utilized industrial voluntary consensus standards.
Your participation will help pave new ground in research that may improve collaborative
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs. I hope that you will be willing to provide your
insight and expertise to my study. Given the importance of Industrial VCSs to industry
and society, I believe that learning from the shared wisdom of experts will continue to
expand knowledge in this important field. All participant information including identities
will be kept anonymous from other participants.
If you are willing to participate in this study, please reply to me at XXX@waldenu.edu.
If you know someone else who may qualify as an expert and be interesting in
participating, please forward this message to him or her.
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If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you kindly for
your time and consideration.
Sincerely,
Joel Blumenthal
MS, MBA
Doctoral Student, Walden University
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Appendix C: Notification to Potential Expert Panel Members Accepted Invitation
Dear :
Thank you for showing an interest in participating in this study. As per the original
invitation, I am a Doctoral Student at Walden University. This qualitative Delphi study is
directly towards U.S.-based industrial standards development organizations (SDOs), with
a specific focus on exploring leaderships role in addressing how accredited and
unaccredited industrial SDOs could collaborate in the creation of voluntary consensus
standards (VCSs). Your role would be that of a Subject Matter Expert (SME) and you
would be asked to answer questions related to the state of industrial standards
development processes in the United States. The attached informed consent letter
describes the research in more detail. For more information on Delphi study designs, the
following link may be useful (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Delphi_method).
Regarding my background, I have an engineering degree from the University of
Washington and an MBA from the University of Phoenix. After spending several years
selling specialty chemicals to the Pulp & Paper Industry, I found myself becoming
increasingly involved in the marketing and sales side of industrial instrumentation. Over
the years, I have worked with and for a variety of instrumentation companies and also
become heavily involved in a variety of standards organizations, either contributing
content or developing VCSs. My past and current work with SDOs helping to develop
VCSs is what led me to this dissertation topic.
You should review the attached informed consent letter. If you are satisfied with what is
being requested, please respond to this e-mail. A simple “I Consent” will do. Assuming
you consent, and after I have finished identifying expert panel members, I will send you
and the other expert panel members the first round questionnaire. This communication
will also include your individual identification code which you will use to protect
confidentiality.
Industrial VCSs are an important way in which the world communicates and one of the
primary mechanisms for protecting public safety and serving public interests. I look
forward to working with you on this important subject.
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.
Thank you.
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Appendix D: Notification to Potential Expert Panel Members Not Selected
Dear :
Thank you for showing an interest in participating in this study. However, I currently
have a sufficient number of volunteers.
I will certainly keep your name on file until I have confirmation that those who have
already expressed an interest do in fact follow through. If not, I may contact you again
and see if you are still available.
Again, thank you for your interest. I hope that the results will point to areas of future
research, and maybe some actionable items! In my experience, the Industrial Voluntary
Consensus Standards process is just too important to take for granted.
If you have any further comments or questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at
XXX@waldenu.edu. Thank you.
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Appendix E: First Reminder to Complete Questionnaire
Dear :
Just a friendly reminder that the round [select round] questionnaire is due in one week. If
there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.
Thank you.
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Appendix F: Second Reminder to Complete Questionnaire
Dear :
Just a friendly reminder that the round [select round] questionnaire is due in three days.
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.
Thank you.
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Appendix G: Notification to Expert Panel Member of Removal From Panel
Dear :
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. However, it is important for
demonstrating study rigor that all panel members participate. Non-participation is
potentially harmful to the study as it leaves data gaps, could delay data analysis and
timely data feedback to other panel members, and could place additional burden on other
panel members by extending the length of this study.
This e-mail serves as notice of your removal from the study. No one will treat you
differently as a result of being removed from the study. Any data you may have provided
including your identity will remain confidential and will be destroyed at the end of the
five-year period that began with the start of this study.
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.
Thank you for your understanding.
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Appendix H: Acknowledgement of Expert Panel Member Resignation
Dear :
I am sorry to hear of your decision to resign from this study. However, I understand and
thank you for agreeing to participate in this study in the first place.
No one will treat you differently as a result of your decision to resign. Any data you may
have provided including your identity will remain confidential and will be destroyed at
the end of the five-year period that began with the start of this study.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu. Thank
you.
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Appendix I: Round 1 Questions
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations)


In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition)



How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or changed to improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation)



In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight)



What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might
improve collaborative practices? (Theme - Organizational Structure)



What leadership training could improve collaborative practices between ASDOs
and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training)



In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the
development of industrial voluntary consensus standards be leveraged and/or
changed to improve collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs?
(Theme - Market-driven)



Additional comments and/or suggestions regarding how to improve collaborative
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Optional Question)
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Appendix J: Round 2 SurveyGizmo Instrument and Questions

Round 2 Questionnaire
Round 2 Questionnaire
The following statements were created based on responses to the Round 1
questionnaire. In this round, the primary goal is to see which statements generate
consensus on the part of panel members. Some statements fit into multiple themes (listed
at the end of the statement). None of the statements require an answer, but if you wish to
abstain answering any statement, checking option 3 (Neutral) would be preferable rather
than no answer at all - your call. Comments are also optional. In the interest of time, I
would suggest you not provide comments unless you feel the comments are necessary.
Theme Codes Legend (Theme Codes at end of statement)

C = Communication
DE = Deregulation
OV = Oversight
OS = Organizational Structure
LT = Leadership Training
MD = Market Driven

Statement 1: Regular communication between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [C]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
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____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 2: Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs by clarifying jointly to both ASDOs and UASDOs what industry
expects of both groups. [C]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 3: Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if both
groups were incentivized to support each other’s work. [C]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 4: Having formal liaisons (reciprocal representation) between ASDOs
and UASDOs could improve collaboration. [C][OS]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 5: Defining clear areas of responsibility could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs. [C][DE]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 6: Publishing Agendas well before an event (including schedules of
events) could help collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [C]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 7: Better coordination of meetings could improve collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs. [C]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 8: Deregulation of laws that hinder cooperation between ASDOs and
UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [DE]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 9: Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could be improved by
introducing regulations that promoted collaboration. [DE]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 10: Regulations that establish clear lines of demarcation (boundaries and
responsibilities) for ASDOs and UASDOs could reduce duplication of effort and
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [DE]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

229
Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 11: Government actions that could help set goals for ASDOs and
UASDOs through accreditation and legal reference could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs. [DE]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 12: Deregulation could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs because deregulation would encourage development of new standards or
adoption of other standards to fill the regulatory void. [DE]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 13: Non-Government Based Oversight Committees could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 14: Government Based Oversight Committees could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 15: Passive government oversight that rewarded joint results could
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 16: Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs through oversight
could only improve if oversight committees were willing to use the court system if
collaboration was not being observed. [OV][DE]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 17: Oversight could only improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs if both organization were willing to accept oversight. [OV]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 18: Facilitation of collaboration rather than oversight of collaboration
would improve collaborative between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 19: Greater oversight with at least the specter of authority could
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV][DE]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 20: Making ASDOs and UASDOs realize that regulated oversight is
potentially a common enemy could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs. [OV][DE]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 21: Honoring ASDO and UASDO work in references, contracts, etc...,
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs without the need for
oversight. [OV]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 22: Oversight that changed ASDO and UASDO attitudes could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 23: Some form of regulatory oversight would be required to improve de
jure (by entitlement or law) collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 24: Oversight that encouraged collaboration with innovators could
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OV]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 25: Reducing ASDO size or splitting ASDOs into smaller organizations
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 26: Flattening organizational structures (less hierarchical) could
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 27: Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if
ASDOs and UASDOs shared similar protocols. [OS]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 28: Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and UASDOs if both
types of organizations changed their charters to include a department whose
function was to collaborate with other organizations. [OS]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 29: Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if both
types of organizations changed subcommittee mandates to include a specific venue
to present findings. [OS]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 30: Charters that included specifics for working with other organizations
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 31: Shared leadership could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs. [OS]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 32: Joint reviews of collaborative efforts between ASDOs and UASDOs
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 33: Including a statement in the charter and/or bylaws that an
organization values the work performed by other organizations could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 34: Charters that reduced political differences between ASDOs and
UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [OS]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 35: Leaders trained in the concept of “leading by example” could
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 36: Making leadership training a mandatory component of accreditation
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 37: Leadership training that emphasized the necessity to demystify the
“black box” of standards could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 38: Collaborative leadership training could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 39: Leadership training that emphasized the importance of
“empowerment” at all levels could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 40 “Servant-Leadership” training could improve collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 41: Feedback training at all levels could for improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 42: Leadership training that included a focus on understanding the
scopes and goals of similar ASDOs and UASDOs could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 43 Mandatory training of new members at all levels could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 44: Leadership training (both leaders of ASDOs and UASDOs) on the
concept of “emotional intelligence” could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 45: Increased training for leaders on the benefits of standards to both
society and business, with a focus on similarities of ASDOs and UASDOs, could
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 46: Joint leadership cooperation training between ASDOs and UASDOs
in the form of workshops could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs. [LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 47: Including relevant Industries and Trade Groups in a more broad
discussion with ASDOs and UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs. [MD]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 48: ASDOs that are responsive to how market forces motivate UASDOs
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. [MD][LT]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 49: Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs if such groups made collaboration beneficial to both types of
organizations. [MD]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 50: Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs if they promoted both types of organizations. [MD]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 51: Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs if they encouraged joint participation at trade shows and other
venues. [MD]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 52: Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs by publishing the benefits of both organizations types of work. [MD]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 53: Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and UASDOs if both
types of organizations agreed upon joint and/or shared articles of legitimacy. [MD]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Round 2 Questionnaire
Statement 54: Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if
ASDOs were more inclined to accept input from UASDOs and use this input to
establish priorities. [MD]
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neutral
( ) Agree
( ) Strongly agree
Comments? (Optional):
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Thank You!
Thank you for taking our questionnaire. Your response is very important to
us.
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Appendix K: Round 3 SurveyGizmo Instrument and Questions

Third & Final Questionnaire
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Statement 1: Regular communication between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 100%.
Theme = Competition)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 2: Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs by clarifying jointly to both ASDOs and UASDOs what industry expects of
both groups. (Consensus from Round 2 = 100%. Theme = Competition)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Statement 3: Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if both
groups were incentivized to support each other’s work. (Consensus from Round 2 =
72.8%. Theme = Competition)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 4: Having formal liaisons (reciprocal representation) between ASDOs and
UASDOs could improve collaboration. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.9%. Theme =
Competition & Oversight)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Statement 5: Defining clear areas of responsibility could improve collaboration
between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.8%. Theme =
Competition & Deregulation)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 6: Publishing Agendas well before an event (including schedules of events)
could help collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 =
100%. Theme = Competition)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 7: Better coordination of meetings could improve collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 100%. Theme = Competition)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree
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It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 9: Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could be improved by
introducing regulations that promoted collaboration. (Consensus from Round 2 =
72.8%. Theme = Deregulation)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 17: Oversight could only improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs if both organization were willing to accept oversight. (Consensus from Round
2 = 90.9%. Theme = Oversight)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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____________________________________________

Statement 21: Honoring ASDO and UASDO work in references, contracts, etc...,
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs without the need for
oversight. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.8%. Theme = Oversight)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 24: Oversight that encouraged collaboration with innovators could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 90.0%.
Theme = Oversight)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Statement 26: Flattening organizational structures (less hierarchical) could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%.
Theme = Organizational Structure)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 27: Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if ASDOs
and UASDOs shared similar protocols. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.8%. Theme =
Organizational Structure)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 28: Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and UASDOs if both
types of organizations changed their charters to include a department whose function
was to collaborate with other organizations. (Consensus from Round 2 = 100%. Theme
= Organizational Structure)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree
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It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 29: Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if both
types of organizations changed subcommittee mandates to include a specific venue to
present findings. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%. Theme = Organizational
Structure)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 30: Charters that included specifics for working with other organizations
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2
= 81.8%. Theme = Organizational Structure)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
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____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 31: Shared leadership could improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%. Theme = Organizational Structure)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 32: Joint reviews of collaborative efforts between ASDOs and UASDOs
could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2
= 90.9%. Theme = Organizational Structure)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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Statement 35: Leaders trained in the concept of “leading by example” could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%.
Theme = Leadership Training)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 38: Collaborative leadership training could improve collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%. Theme = Leadership
Training)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 42: Leadership training that included a focus on understanding the scopes
and goals of similar ASDOs and UASDOs could improve collaboration between
ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.8%. Theme = Leadership
Training)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree
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It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 43: Mandatory training of new members at all levels could improve
collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 72.8%.
Theme = Leadership Training)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 45: Increased training for leaders on the benefits of standards to both
society and business, with a focus on similarities of ASDOs and UASDOs, could
improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 =
90.9%. Theme = Leadership Training)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
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____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 46: Joint leadership cooperation training between ASDOs and UASDOs in
the form of workshops could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs.
(Consensus from Round 2 = 80.0%. Theme = Leadership Training)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 47: Including relevant Industries and Trade Groups in a more broad
discussion with ASDOs and UASDOs could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs. (Consensus from Round 2 = 100%. Theme = Market Driven)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

263
Statement 49: Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs if such groups made collaboration beneficial to both types of
organizations. (Consensus from Round 2 = 90.9%. Theme = Market Driven)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 50: Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs if they promoted both types of organizations. (Consensus from Round 2
= 100%. Theme = Market Driven)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 51: Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs if they encouraged joint participation at trade shows and other venues.
(Consensus from Round 2 = 72.8%. Theme = Market Driven)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree
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It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 52: Industry/Trade Groups could improve collaboration between ASDOs
and UASDOs by publishing the benefits of both organizations types of work.
(Consensus from Round 2 = 100%. Theme = Market Driven)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Statement 53: Collaboration could improve between ASDOs and UASDOs if both
types of organizations agreed upon joint and/or shared artifacts of legitimacy.
(Consensus from Round 2 = 72.7%. Theme = Market Driven)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
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____________________________________________

Statement 54: Collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs could improve if ASDOs
were more inclined to accept input from UASDOs and use this input to establish
priorities. (Consensus from Round 2 = 81.8%. Theme = Market Driven)
It is Desirable*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

It is Feasible*
( ) Strongly Disagree ( ) Disagree

( ) Neutral

( ) Agree

( ) Strongly Agree

Optional Comments
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________
____________________________________________

Thank You!
Thank you for taking our questionnaire. Your response is very important.
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Appendix L: Sample of Raw Round 1 Results
Round 1 - Themes and Expert Panel Member Responses
P Code

P20

Questionnaire Themes
ID Number
Competition

Themes

Themes

Themes

Deregulation

Oversight

Organizational Structure Leadership Training

ID 8

SG1. Deregulation
laws should focus
on current industry
practices and reduce
regulations that
stopping progress.

SG1. Third party
oversight should come
from independent
consumer
organizations, not
government.

SG1. ASDOsSDOs and UASDOsSDOs
need to align on the intent and
purpose of both types of
organizations, and focus on benefits
of the end
user (consumer) of the products
and services they provide to the
relevant market. If they only focus
on their own interests, without
genuine collaboration, end users
will suffers and industry progress
will slow.
SG2. ASDOsSDOs and UASDOsSDOs
should continuously communicate
with industry users to understand
their needs and challenges, and
come up with realistic plan to
improve industry practices and
standards to reduce bureaucracy.
Knowledge sharing between
ASDOsSDOs and UASDOsSDOs will
benefit both organizations.

P4

ID 9

SG1. ASDO or
UASDO
organizational
structures should be
simplified to
minimize autocracy
and support
SG2. Independent
democracy, so
consumer organizations everybody's opinion
should work with federal can be heard and
and local government
count.
departments to ask for
support in the promotion SG2. ASDO or UASDO
of collaborative practices organizational
between ASDOsSDOs and structures should be
UASDOsSDOs.
of a manageable size.

SG2. Deregulation
laws should focus
on prevention of
the competition
between
ASDOsSDOs and
UASDOsSDOs by
giving them
flexibility to apply
standards based on
SG3. Government should
specific
periodically audit ASDO
applications.
and UASDO practices to
prevent potential conflict
of interest.

SG3. Both types of organizations
should "market" their benefits to the
end user in front of federal and states
regulators.
SG1. I will have to make the argument SG1. I don't think
that an
the collaborative
'unaccredited standard' is not a
practices, good or
standard. A group of companies can not good are
join a trade organization; for
affected in any
membership, payment is required.
way by regulation
They can all agree on putting out
laws, nor by
publications that further their
deregulation laws
agenda; they might represent some so I cannot believe
big players in the industry but not
that leveraging or
necessary the smartest or with the
changing regulation
most engineering expertise; and they laws will make any
benefit directly. They write
impact at all on the
publications to make their lives
collaborative
easier which saves them money. An practices.
accredited standard such as ASME,
membership is based primarily on
expertise. You cannot pay to be a
voting member. While being a
member, might give your company
some exposure, you are primarily
there to ensure the good design of
equipment so that the industry does
better, for the public's benefit.
However, to help the industry, the
UASDOs, as you call them, need to
bring their information to the
ASDOsSDOs, and be open to the fact
that the Standard organization have
experts and voting in place, and only
the information that has consensus
on, will be published. Publishing on
their own will only go so far, because
as I said earlier, they are not
standard organizations and thus
their publications are not standards.

SG1. I think UASDOsSDOs
are too far down the food
chain so to speak, to be
impacted or bring any
action from any
government. A
standard organization
by definition has
oversight; that is why it
is accredited. You are
comparing apples and
oranges with these
ASDO/UASDO see my
1st suggestion to
Question 1

SG1. A publication
from a UASDO is a
wishful thinking,
protecting
themselves
guideline. Their
organization
structure will be
equal representation
by all companies. I
don't think they are
open to change and
the organizational
structure of a ASDO
is critical and
inherent to be able
to call itself a
standard
organization

Themes

SG1. Leadership
training should be
focused on the
development of
collaborative
organizations.
SG2. Leadership
training should be
focused on
"leading by
example".
SG3. Leadership
training should be
focused on
sustaining
organizational
health.

SG1. Leadership
qualities do not
define expertise. A
document that will
help the industry do
their work correctly
and help the public,
needs
to be based on
expertise.
Leadership, in a
ASDO, is voted on
by the Standards
Committee. The
UASDOsSDOs
leadership is simply
voted on by the
participating,
money/paid
members.
However, leaders
from ASDOsSDOs
could familiarize
themselves with
the UASDOs so that
when information
is brought to them
from these
organizations, they
understand the
limitations of that
information and
encourage their
own members to
evaluate the
information strictly
on science.

Themes

Themes

Market-Driven

Optional Seventh
Question - No
Theme
Both type of
organization
should
prevent
creating
"special
interest
groups"
within
themselves.

SG1.
ASDOsSDOs and
UASDOsSDOs
should focus on
the consumer
needs in specific
market,
collaborate with
other relevant
industries
governing
organizations to
prevent legal
conflicts between
different types of
standards.
SG2. ASDOsSDOs
and UASDOsSDOs
in one industry
should learn best
practices from
other industries
ASDOsSDOs and
UASDOsSDOs.

SG1. Standards will
always be market
driven initially, but I
believe many
members of ASDOs
care about the
general public as
well. And while
market drive is
inevitable, there
are enough
protocols in place
to ensure that
most of the time,
the Standards can
be relied on
sufficiently to
protect the public,
more than if they
were not
published. The
more that the
UASDOs recognize
the
importance of
these protocols,
which keeps
market driven
initiatives from
tainting the final
publishing, the
more UASDOs
will realize that
they need
ASDOS to give
more value to
the information
they produce.

I again
reiterate that
to call an
organization
unaccredited
but still call it a
standard
development
organization is
simply wrong.
And it confuses
the issue. A
standard is there
for a very
different reason,
than a guideline
by a UASDO.
Collaboration is
important if it
brings value to
the industry and
all parties are
interested in
collaborating. You
cannot improve
collaboration
unless both
types
of
organizations
have strong
interest and
see the value
of
collaboration.
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Appendix M: Sample of Raw Round 2 Results
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Appendix N: Sample of Raw Round 3 Results
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Appendix O: Round 1 Instructions
Dear :
Again, thank you for agreeing to be part of this important study. Your unique
identification code is [Code]. Please do not share this code with anyone. This code will
be used throughout the study.
When you are ready to answer the Round 1 questionnaire, please click on the following
link [link], or copy and paste this link into your browser. When prompted, please enter
your unique identification code. The questionnaire is designed so that you can save your
work at any time. When you have finished and reviewed your answers, please click on
the “submit” button. Once you submit your answers, you will not be able to change
them, so please review your answers carefully.
To recap, the basic research question is how could collaborative practices be improved
between Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standards Development Organizations and
Unaccredited Industrial Standards Development Organizations?
The Round 1 questionnaire is composed of seven questions. The first six questions are
based on the major themes that emerged from the literature reviews. Please provide
between three and five suggestions for each of the first six question, and add any
comments you would like. Question seven presents an opportunity for other suggestions
such as additional themes. Answers and comments should be short if at all possible in
order for you to complete this questionnaire quickly (30 to 45 minutes) and not burden
your time.
Any responses are acceptable – positive, negative, or merely commentary. Answers and
comments that may appear extreme are just as valuable as more mainstream answers and
comments. If you are not sure how to respond to a particular question, please do the best
you can. This study is designed to seek your opinion with as little influence as possible
from me as the researcher. Even so, if you feel there is need for clarification, please
contact me at XXX@waldeu.edu.
Please complete the questionnaire in 3 weeks. During the third week, I will send out two
reminder e-mails, unless you have already completed the questionnaire. Failure to
respond could result in being removed from the panel. To protect confidentiality, it is
recommended that you do not share your involvement or results with anyone.
Thank you again for your participation and I look forward to seeing your responses.
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Appendix P: Round 1 SurveyGizmo Instrument

First Round Questionnaire - Accredited vs Unaccredited
Standard Development Organizations in the U.S.
Competition
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 1: In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
1st Suggestion *
Competition
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 1: In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
2nd Suggestion
Competition
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
& UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations)
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Question 1: In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
3rd Suggestion
Competition
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 1: In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
4th Suggestion
Competition
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 1: In what ways could collaborative practices be improved between ASDOs and
UASDOs in order to reduce competition and conflict? (Theme - Competition)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
5th Suggestion
Deregulation
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Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 2: How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or changed to improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
Question 2
1st Suggestion *
Deregulation
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 2: How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or changed to improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
2nd Suggestion
Deregulation
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 2: How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or changed to improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
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3rd Suggestion
Deregulation
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 2: How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or changed to improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
4th Suggestion
Deregulation
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 2: How could deregulation laws be leveraged and/or changed to improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Deregulation)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
5th Suggestion
Oversight
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
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Question 3: In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight)

Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
Question 3
1st Suggestion *
Oversight
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)

Question 3: In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight)

Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
2nd Suggestion
Oversight
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
& UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations)
Question 3: In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
3rd Suggestion
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Oversight
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
& UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations)
Question 3: In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
4th Suggestion
Oversight
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 3: In what ways could government or other third party oversight improve
collaborative practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Oversight)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
Question 4
5th Suggestion
Organizational Structure
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
& UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations)
Question 4: What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might
improve collaborative practices? (Theme - Organizational Structure)
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Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
1st Suggestion *
Organizational Structure
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 4: What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might
improve collaborative practices? (Theme - Organizational Structure)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
2nd Suggestion
Organizational Structure
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 4: What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might
improve collaborative practices? (Theme - Organizational Structure)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
3rd Suggestion
Organizational Structure
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
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Question 4: What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might
improve collaborative practices? (Theme - Organizational Structure)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
4th Suggestion
Organizational Structure
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 4: What changes to either ASDO or UASDO organizational structures might
improve collaborative practices? (Theme - Organizational Structure)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
Question 5
5th Suggestion
Leadership Training
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 5: What leadership training could improve collaborative practices between
ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
1st Suggestion *
Leadership Training
Page description:

278
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 5: What leadership training could improve collaborative practices between
ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
2nd Suggestion
Leadership Training
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 5: What leadership training could improve collaborative practices between
ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
3rd Suggestion
Leadership Training
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 5: What leadership training could improve collaborative practices between
ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
4th Suggestion
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Leadership Training
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 5: What leadership training could improve collaborative practices between
ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Leadership Training)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
Question 6
5th Suggestion
Market Driven
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 6: In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the
development of standards be leveraged and/or changed to improve collaborative
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Market Driven)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
1st Suggestion *
Market Driven
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
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Question 6: In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the
development of standards be leveraged and/or changed to improve collaborative
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Market Driven)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
2nd Suggestion
Market Driven
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 6: In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the
development of standards be leveraged and/or changed to improve collaborative
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Market Driven)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
3rd Suggestion
Market Driven
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
Question 6: In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the
development of standards be leveraged and/or changed to improve collaborative
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Market Driven)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
4th Suggestion
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Market Driven
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
& UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development Organizations)
Question 6: In what ways could the market-driven, bottom-up U.S. approach to the
development of standards be leveraged and/or changed to improve collaborative
practices between ASDOs and UASDOs? (Theme - Market Driven)
Please try and provide at least 3 suggestions. Up to 5 suggestions are permitted. There is
no limit to the length of a response. However, keep responses succinct in the interest of
completing the questionnaire quickly.
5th Suggestion
Additional Suggestions (If Any)
Page description:
Definitions: ASDOs (Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standard Development
Organizations) & UASDOs (Unaccredited Industrial Standard Development
Organizations)
If you have any additional suggestions that might fit under themes not covered, please
make them here.
31. Additional Suggestions
Thank You!
Thank you for taking this questionnaire
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Appendix Q: Results From Round 1 and Round 2 Instructions
Dear :
Again, thank you for agreeing to be part of this important study. Attached you will find
the results of Round 1.
When you are ready to answer the Round 2 questionnaire, please click on the following
link [link], or copy and paste this link into your browser. When prompted, please enter
your unique identification code. The questionnaire is designed so that you can save your
work at any time. When you have finished and reviewed your answers, please click on
the “submit” button. Once you submit your answers, you will not be able to change
them, so please review your answers carefully.
To recap, the basic research question is how could collaborative practices be improved
between Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standards Development Organizations and
Unaccredited Industrial Standards Development Organizations?
The Round 2 questionnaire is composed of [ ] primary questions, each potentially with
two secondary questions. Please rate each question using the five-point Likert-type
scales provided. Like the Round 1 questionnaire, the Round 2 questionnaire should not
take you more than 30 to 45 minutes to complete. Comments are welcome but should be
kept short in order not to burden your time.
If you are not sure how to respond to a particular question, please do the best you can.
Please complete the questionnaire in 3 weeks. During the third week, I will send out two
reminder e-mails, unless you have already completed the questionnaire. Failure to
respond could result in being removed from the panel.
To protect confidentiality, it is recommended that you do not share your involvement or
results with anyone.
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.
Thank you again for your participation and I look forward to seeing your responses.
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Appendix R: Round 1 Results Cover Letter
Dear :
Attached is a document that presents the overview of the results from Round 1. The
primary value of this document is that it indicates trends in responses. Reading the entire
document closely is probably not required, however, you are welcome to do so. I would
tend to focus on the short summary at the end of the document as this lays out the path
for rounds two and three.
My plan is to provide each of you a link to the second round questionnaire by the end of
today or early tomorrow.
If there are any questions, please let me know. Thank you.
Joel Blumenthal
Walden University
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Appendix S: Round 1 Results Overview - Included as Attachment of Results
Results Cover Letter (See Appendix N)
Preface
Definitions: ASDOs = Accredited Standard Development Organizations (under ANSI).
UASDOs = Unaccredited Standard Development Organizations. Acronyms for UASDOs
include but are not limited to “Industry Consortiums”, “User Groups”, and “Vendor
Groups”.
The basic premise of the research question is that collaboration between U.S.-based
Industrial ASDOs and UASDOs is a good thing. The “good” aspect of collaboration will
continue to be the premise of this study.
Please keep these definitions and comments in mind as you review the following.
Overview of Round 1
The primary themes that resulted from the literature review are listed below and formed
the basis for the first round questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Competition
Deregulation
Oversight
Organizational Structure
Leadership Training
Market-Driven

These are very broad terms and subject to interpretation. My intention was to generate
thoughts and suggestions so I did not attempt to define these terms outside of the context
in which the questions were written. Highlights based on feedback from Round 1 are as
follows:
Competition
There was general agreement that ASDOs and UASDOs could be doing a better job of
collaborating. While improvements in communication tended to be the central theme for
improving collaboration, there was considerable diversity regarding what steps could be
most effective. Highlights related to improved collaboration included:
1. Assignment/Alignment of Responsibility and Goals
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Liaisons between different groups
Joint Meetings
Better Meeting Planning
Role of Industry/Trade Groups
Joint Training
Joint Presentations
Sharing of Information
Shared Protocols
Deregulation

There were definitely differences of opinion regarding the value and impact of
regulations. Some panel members felt that regulations simple added layers of
bureaucracy to an already over regulated process and really did not help collaboration.
Others felt that regulations were needed to encourage or even force collaboration. Still
others felt that more or less regulations would have little effect on collaboration.
Highlights related to improved collaboration included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Types of Regulations
Effects of Regulations
Value of Regulations
Regulations at the State level
Regulations at the Federal level
Navigation of Regulations
Oversight

There was general agreement that oversight could be a good thing. Several members
pointed out that ASDOs already agree to some form of oversight by agreeing to follow
ANSI’s “Essential Requirements”. Most panel members felt that if oversight were to be
put in place, a consumer-type group would probably be best. While government
oversight was not uniformly dismissed as a possibility, there was general agreement that
government organizations lacked the technical skills to really provide any sort of
meaningful oversight. Whether oversight should be mandatory or voluntary was a point
of contention. Highlights related to improved collaboration included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Consumer Group Oversight
Government Oversight
Mandatory Oversight
Voluntary Oversight
Responsibilities of an Oversight Organization
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6. Value of Oversight
Organizational Structure
There was general agreement that charters of ASDOs and UASDOs which were more in
alignment with one another could promote collaboration. Several panel members also
felt that some organizations (ASDOs in particular) were simply too large, and
restructuring them could improve collaboration by making them more responsive to
industry and consumer needs. Formalizing liaison functions in particular seemed to be a
general point of agreement with regard to improving collaboration. There was little
disagreement that goals of ASDOs and UASDOs tended to be different, but that having
different goals was not necessarily an impediment to collaboration. Rather,
understanding different goals and focusing on changing organizational structures
(charters) to work with as opposed to against another set of goals could improve
collaboration. Highlights related to improved collaboration included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Charters
Organizational Size
Sub-committee Responsibilities
Training (internal and external)
Formalizing Liaison Functions
Leadership Training

Some form of formal leadership training was recommended by most panel members, if
for no other reason, than most leaders of ASDOs and UASDOs come from forprofit
backgrounds and ASDOs and UASDOs tend to be incorporated as nonprofits. Training
was also recommended, not just for leaders, but for all volunteer members. There
seemed to be a general opinion that many volunteer members are just thrown into their
roles and must learn as they go. Joint training of leaders of different organizations was
also suggested by several panel members as a way to improve collaboration by getting
everyone on the same page (so to speak). Highlights related to improved collaboration
included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Collaboration Training
Empowerment Training
Leading-by-Example Training
Servant-Leadership Training
Feedback Training
Joint Training
Emotional Intelligence Training
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Market-Driven
There was general agreement that changing market drivers/forces was probably not a
good way to approach collaboration. Market drivers/forces are what they are, and finding
better ways to work within existing structures was probably a better approach to
improving collaboration. Industry/Trade Groups were often singled out as organizations
that could improve collaboration by making more of an effort to inform ASDOs and
UASDOs what was expected to support industry and consumer needs. Several panel
members suggested formalizing involvement by Industry/Trade Groups could improve
collaboration. Highlights related to improved collaboration included:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Consumer Needs
Industry Needs
Reducing Complexity and Duplication of Effort
Industry/Trade Group Involvement
Reward Structures
Healthy Competition
Summary

Although standards tend to be a Domestic and International issue, this study is narrowly
focused on steps that could be taken to improve collaboration between ASDOs and
UASDOs in the United States. Of the suggestions made, I expect that some are deemed
more practical than others. Suggestions from Round 1 will be consolidated into
statements for Round 2. For Round 2, panel members will be asked to cast a vote for
each statement. Only statements that pass the “consensus” test (frequency of responses
for options 4 and 5 [agree and strongly agree] on a five-point Likert-type scale account
for ≥70% of the panel members’ responses) will pass to Round 3. In Round 3, panel
members will be asked to vote on the desirability and feasibility of statements that pass
the consensus test from Round 2. The results will be tabulated in the final report and then
presented to significant stakeholders.

288
Appendix T: Round 2 Questionnaire – Proposed Template

The following primary statements were identified by participants in this study in response
to the first round questionnaire. In addition to rating the primary question, please rate
each statement as to both desirability and feasibility. Comments are optional.

Primary Statement

1.Strongly Disagree

Desirability
(Is the primary statement
option desirable or
undesirable?)
1 Highly Undesirable

1

 Highly Infeasible

2.Disagree

2  Undesirable

2

Infeasible

3. Neither Agree or
Disagree

3 Neither Desirable nor
Undesirable

3 Neither Feasible nor
Infeasible

4. Agree

4 Desirable

4

Feasible

5. Strongly Agree

5 Highly Desirable

5

Highly Feasible

Comments? (Optional)

More Primary Statements following a similar format.

Feasibility
(Is the primary statement
option feasible or infeasible)
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Appendix U: Round 2 Questionnaire – Actual Template

The following primary statements were identified by participants in this study in response
to the first round questionnaire. Comments are optional.

Primary Statement
1.Strongly Disagree
2.Disagree
3. Neither Agree or Disagree
4. Agree
5. Strongly Agree

Comments? (Optional)

More Primary Statements following a similar format.
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Appendix V: Round 2 Results and Round 3 Instructions
Dear :
Again, thank you for agreeing to be part of this important study. Attached you will find
the results of Round 2.
When you are ready to answer the Round 3 questionnaire, please click on the following
link [link], or copy and paste this link into your browser. When prompted, please enter
your unique identification code. The questionnaire is designed so that you can save your
work at any time. When you have finished and reviewed your answers, please click on
the “submit” button. Once you submit your answers, you will not be able to change
them, so please review your answers carefully.
To recap, the basic research question is how could collaborative practices be improved
between Accredited U.S.-based Industrial Standards Development Organizations and
Unaccredited Industrial Standards Development Organizations?
The Round 3 questionnaire is composed of [ ] primary questions, each potentially with
two secondary questions. Please rate each question using the five-point Likert-type
scales provided. Like the Round 2 questionnaire, the Round 3 questionnaire should not
take you more than 30 to 45 minutes to complete. Comments are welcome but should be
kept short in order not to burden your time.
If you are not sure how to respond to a particular question, please do the best you can.
Please complete the questionnaire in 3 weeks. During the third week, I will send out two
reminder e-mails, unless you have already completed the questionnaire. Failure to
respond could result in being removed from the panel.
To protect confidentiality, it is recommended that you do not share your involvement or
results with anyone.
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.
Thank you again for your participation and I look forward to seeing your responses.
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Appendix W: Round 2 Results Cover Letter
Dear :
Attached are two word documents. The first word document (Overview of Round 2
Results) provides an overview of the results from Round 2. The second word document
(Consensus Results of Round 2) presents specific data for those statements where panel
member responses met the definition of “consensus”. I am very encouraged that panel
members did believe, in one way or another, improved collaboration between all
stakeholders was a possibility.
In the third and final round, I will be asking panel members to weigh in on what they
believe is the desirability and feasibility of acting upon statements that met the definition
of consensus from Round 2. You should receive a link to the third and final
questionnaire before the end of this week.
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Joel Blumenthal
Walden University
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Appendix X: Round 2 Results Overview
Included as Attachment of Results Cover Letter (See Appendix U)
Dear :
The following is an overview of the results of Round 2.
Preface
(ASDOs vs UASDOs)
Experts (per the literature) tend to agree that the role of Accredited Standards
Development Organizations (ASDOs) is relatively well understood. In the case of this
study, the focus is on organizations accredited by ANSI. The role (and definition) of
Unaccredited Standards Development Organizations may not be so well understood.
Unaccredited organizations (generally referred to in the literature as “Consortia”) often
provide many of the same functions as accredited organizations in that they develop
concepts that if widely adopted, are often utilized by regulatory bodies and other
stakeholders. The following link may be of interest for those that wish to know more
about how unaccredited organizations can or do participate in the development of
standards (http://www.consortiuminfo.org/essentialguide/creating.php).
An Overview of the Results From Round 2
(By Theme)
Competition
Under the umbrella of Competition, improved cross-pollination in the form of more
discussion and dialog between ASDOs and UASDOs garnered the most support from
panel members as a way to improve collaboration. One interpretation is that the panel
members were suggesting that reducing silo mentalities and encouraging productive
interaction could improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs.
Deregulation
The use of regulations to improve collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs was often
met with skepticism. While some statements that fit under the theme of deregulation did
meet the definition of consensus, opinions varied greatly. Some felt more regulations had
too much of a “stick” feel and would not improve collaboration. Concern was also
expressed that more regulations could complicate what is already a regulated process.
One the other hand, some panel members felt that more deregulation might simple result
in greater chaos.
Oversight
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Oversight to improved ASDOs and UASDOs collaboration was generally viewed as
potentially positive. However, even those statements that met the definition of consensus
came with caveats from the panel members. As a general rule, “carrots” were preferred
to “sticks”. The real questions seemed to revolve around which carrots were most
effective, and how to deploy these carrots. Government oversight was generally not
viewed in a favorable light, and there was also general consensus that ASDOs and
UASDOs would have to buy in to oversight if oversight was to be effective in improving
ASDO and UASDO collaboration.
Organizational Structure
Statements under the theme of organizational structure were often closely related to those
under the theme of competition. The most popular statements were those that addressed
how changes to organization structures might improve discussion and dialog between
ASDOs and UASDOs. In general, changes to organizational structures that still
supported organizational goals while improving communication were viewed in a
positive light.
Leadership Training
Several panel members pointed out that focusing on just leadership training was not by
itself going to promote better collaboration. However, training in general regarding a
variety of topics and at various levels was often supported as a way to improve
collaboration by encouraging understanding of the larger picture.
Market-driven
Industries and Trade Groups were generally viewed by panel members as a potentially
positive force for improving collaboration between ASDOs and UASDOs. Again, many
of the opinions were focused on improving understanding and communication.
Statements that received the greatest support were those that suggested Industries and
Trade Groups could play a larger role in getting all stakeholders to work more closely
and productively.
Conclusion
Please keep the previous impressions in mind when reviewing the actual consensus
results from Round 2.

294
Appendix Y: Third Round Questionnaire - Proposed Template

The following primary statements were identified by participants in this study in response
to the second round questionnaire. In addition to rating the primary question, please
rate each statement as to importance and confidence. Comments are optional.

Primary Statement

1

Strongly Disagree

2

Disagree

3

Neither Agree or Disagree

4

Agree

5  Strongly Agree

Importance
(In Comparison with
other Statements)

1 Highly
Unimportant
2 Unimportant

Confidence
(In your assessment of the
primary statement and the
importance you assigned to
the primary statement in
comparison with other
statements)
1 Very Unconfident
2

Unconfident

3 Neither Important
nor Unimportant

3 Neither Confident nor
Confident

4

Important

4

 Confident

5  Highly
Important

5

Highly Confident

Comments? (Optional)

More Primary Statements following a similar format.
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Appendix Z: Third Round Questionnaire - Actual Template

The following primary statements were identified by participants in this study in response
to the second round questionnaire. Please rate each statement as to desirability and
feasibility. Comments are optional.

Primary Statement

Desirability
(Is the primary statement
option desirable or
undesirable?)
1 Highly Undesirable

1

 Highly Infeasible

2  Undesirable

2

Infeasible

3 Neither Desirable nor
Undesirable

3 Neither Feasible nor
Infeasible

4 Desirable

4

Feasible

5 Highly Desirable

5

Highly Feasible

Comments? (Optional)

More Primary Statements following a similar format.

Feasibility
(Is the primary statement
option feasible or infeasible)
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Appendix AA: Round 3 Recap and Overview of Study Results
Dear :
The following is an overview of the results of Round 3. I have attached a spreadsheet
that includes the results as well as comments, and a table that shows only statements
where feasibility met the definition of consensus. My focus tended to be on what the
panel members felt was feasible, and from this perspective the attached table is much
easier to read.
Round 3 was by far the most interesting in that the results provided a glimpse of what
might be possible as far as improved collaboration is concerned. Overall, the results were
as follows:
1. 27 of the 31 statements from a “desirability” perspective met the definition of
consensus (agree & strongly agree ≥70% of responses). I am not terribly
surprised that most of the statements met the definition of consensus because the
statements from Round 2 that passed to Round 3 had already been culled by the
panel members for ideas that were considered bad.
2. 12 of the 31 statements from a “feasibility” perspective met the definition of
consensus (agree & strongly agree ≥70% of responses). I think feasibility of ideas
is the real heart of this study. Ideas that are not considered feasible, even if
desirable, are probably non-starters.
3. No statements that failed the desirability consensus test passed the feasibility
consensus test. I actually would have been surprised if an idea (a good idea
anyway) was considered feasible, but not desirable.
There is much room for additional research, but there were many opinions that indicated
improved collaboration could be achieved without draconian measures. As was often
pointed out, organizations will tend to respond to what they believe is in their best
interests, and finding the right carrots would probably be more effective than finding the
right sticks.
Comments by panel members also shed light on what approaches could make feasibility a
reality. Some of the comments also pointed out weaknesses in this study. However, this
too was valuable information because future research could improve on the approaches
used in this study. Of note (in my opinion) were the following:
1. Silos between various stakeholders (primarily ASDOs, UASDOs, and End Users)
need to be broken down if collaboration is to improve (OK, pretty obvious).
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2. There are ways to break down silos that do not create clear winners and losers and
generally revolve around incentivizing communication and cooperation.
3. Industries and Trade Groups could play a much larger role in getting ASDOs and
UASDOs to collaborate more effectively (especially by incentivizing
communication and cooperation), and all stakeholders could potentially benefit
from a less bureaucratic and contentious environment.
4. Changing organizational structures and/or changing regulations (although in some
cases considered desirable) are not necessarily required to get ASDOs and
UASDOs to collaborate more effectively in a market-driven environment as long
as power structures are not threatened.
5. Leadership training, while maybe desirable, is probably not going to create the
incentives required to promote collaboration.
Specific suggestions that garnered support included:
1. Creating liaisons and/or divisions within both ASDOs and UASDOs tasked with
improving communications between ASDOs and UASDOs through sharing of
information, training, and increasing understanding.
2. Industry and Trade Groups need to become more active participants in providing
guidance as to what they expected from ASDOs and UASDOs.
3. Oversight in some form could have a positive impact upon collaboration, but I
think this gets back to the whole issue of improving communication and providing
guidance.
The underlying theme behind these suggestions was, how to come up with the incentives
that would encourage collaboration. Virtually no one felt that creating such incentives
could happen without some serious mind-set recalibrations, but that mind-set
recalibrations could be accomplished if there were the proper incentives to do so.
Possibly the most important suggestion I got out of this study was that Industry and Trade
Groups could improve collaboration by taking a more active role in providing guidance
to ASDOs and UASDOs. If Industry and Trade Groups are not on the same page, then
how can ASDOs and UASDOs be expected to work together?
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What the final study will look like is still very much a work in progress. At the moment I
can only state that I was more encouraged than I thought I would be, and thank you all
for your time and input. It will probably be several months before the final study is
blessed, and you will all be provided a copy. The “Holy Grail” (so-to-speak) is to create
a study that everyone can at least agree was done well, even if not everyone agrees with
the results. We shall see. Thank you again for your time and input.
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Appendix AB: Final Results
Dear :
Thank you for agreeing to be part of this important study. Attached you will find the
final results of this study.
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at XXX@waldenu.edu.
Thank you again for your participation.
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Appendix AC: Permission to Cite

Hi, Joel—
You may certain cite the paper—since it is a working paper, it shouldn’t require authors’
permission to cite. And I’d love to know more about your dissertation. Craig Murphy and
I are currently revising a book manuscript on the history of private, voluntary standard
setting from the late 19th century to the present. I’d love to know about your findings, and
perhaps to cite them.
Best,
JoAnne
From: Joel A. Blumenthal [mailto:joel.blumenthal@waldenu.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, January 24, 2018 10:38 AM
To: JoAnne Yates <jyates@mit.edu>
Cc: Karla S. Phlypo <karla.phlypo2@mail.waldenu.edu>
Subject: Permission to Cite
Hello Dr. Yates:
My name is Joel Blumenthal and I am a Doctoral Student at Walden University. I am
hopefully about a month from graduation. My dissertation is focused on Industrial
Voluntary Consensus Standards, and what I will call the growing battle between Standard
Development Organizations accredited by ANSI, and those that are not. I have been
involved with Industrial VCSs since the mid-80s starting with 3A. The working paper
authored by you and Dr. Murphy has been key to my research, but I noticed as I was
doing a final links check that your paper now requires authors permission to cite.
So this is a formal request to obtain permission to cite this paper. For your information, I
have included what Google Scholar currently lists as the citation reference. If permission
is granted, I would appreciate any guidance as to how you would like me to include the
citation in the reference section of my Dissertation. I have included my chair, Dr.
Phlypo, on this e-mail. Thank you for your time.
Sincerely,
Joel Blumenthal
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Appendix AD: National Institutes of Health (NIH) Extramural Research Certificate

Certificate of Completion
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Office of Extramural Research
certifies that Joel Blumenthal successfully completed the NIH Webbased training course “Protecting Human Research Participants”.
Date of completion: 03/20/2013
Certification Number: 1142156

